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THE PASSING OF POLITICS

THE PASSING OF POLITICS

By WILLIAM KAY WALLACE



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PREFACE

HISTORY offers a method of approach to the problems of the social order without having recourse to speculation. If we are able to arrange events in their sequence we may do away with the necessity of seeking to invent explanations for them, and busy ourselves with the more important question of determining their true nature.

The invention of explanations means that the mind of the investigator has no tangible realities with which to deal, that he is often careless of sequence and seeks in analogies, or by logical, and at times, illogical constructions to devise what is known in philosophy as a system.

The most valuable contribution of the new historical method is that it is tending to clear the atmosphere of speculation and permit events to speak for themselves. In brief, we have in history the foundation of science and a scientific view of life.

The contrast between philosophy and history is here saliently brought forth. Philosophy may be well suited to an age which has not as yet the means of verification at its command ; to an age that has blocked out from the unknown more than it can digest or even explore, when the relation of cause and effect is believed to be something more than mere sequence. Thus philosophy is prone to introduce transcendental elements, or rejecting these, substitute intuitions or mystical inferences, be satisfied with nebulous verbiage, or seek refuge in dogmatism.

Politics makes use of philosophical method. It is the philosopher who outlines the rules adopted by the politician. The political philosopher devises the theory of government which comes to be put into practice.

The philosophy of politics is a currently accepted phrase. The State is a philosophical creation. The ideal political State is ruled over by a philosopher-king.

During the five centuries which have elapsed from the close of the mediæval age down to our own times, the modern political age or Modern Times, as it is called, we may trace the gradual transformation of politics as reflected in the changes accompanying philosophical method, and during the latest period discover a new method which is destined to displace philosophy, and as a consequence, politics. The new scientific method of history reveals that politics is no longer the pivotal factor in social life. It is by applying the test of history to the problems of group life, it is by attempting to remove the covering from politics and abandoning the haphazard methods of philosophical speculation that we may hope to arrive at a clear understanding of current social tendencies.

In this survey of politics we have sought to approach the problem from all of its chief angles. We have studied politics in all of its various phases. In so doing we have sought to view politics, first from the outside by examining its factors of strength, and then from the inside, laying bare its weakness and the corrosive elements at work. Throughout this inquiry our method has been historical. We have endeavoured not to speculate about matters which would yield to verification. We have, in so far as possible, taken nothing for granted, and we have arranged our data so that it may be unnecessary to rely upon the fruits of speculation as a basis for our conclusions. In every instance the argument advances along historical lines, follows, so to speak, the course of least resistance, and endeavours to adapt itself to the sinuosities of the life process. This may serve to explain what will appear to some readers, imbued with older ideas of stereotyped history, as the occurrence of unnecessary repetitions, undue emphasis on factors that have hitherto received quasi-axiomatic acceptance, and have been shelved as such. But we would point out that the life process, which history, as we understand it, reflects in its totality,

is filled with just these elements of repetition, emphasis on the self-evident, and arbitrary direction. These are not matters to be dealt with by methods of speculation, which philosophy relies upon, but we must attempt to reveal their origin, arrange their order, point out their sequence, and thus render a truly complete picture.

It is by the application of scientific, historical methods to problems of social organization that we will be able to discover the outline of the new status of society now in process of formation. Industrialism has brought about a change in social equilibrium, and we now find a new pivotal factor replacing politics as the cohesive element of social life. But the passing of politics implies at the same time the displacement of philosophy and of the philosophical method, out of which politics has grown. In this way history may serve as the torch-bearer. It is by replacing philosophical speculation by historical verification that this transformation can be most readily accomplished.

Political organization, suited to an age when philosophy was dominant, is being replaced by industrial organization, the outgrowth of an historical mode of thought. Until this fact is widely appreciated, until it is realized that philosophic method is an antique technique unsuited to a scientific age such as our own, no rapid development of the new order is possible. But if we adopt the historical view-point, if we accept the truth which history reveals instead of that which philosophy promulgates as a fiat, we will be able to enter into the full heritage of the new age.

W. K. WALLACE.

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THE PASSING OF POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

I

POLITICS, like war, is a struggle for power. It is a means of realizing the aims and plans of an individual or general will.

In politics, as in war, certain rules have been established which practice has sanctioned, and custom tends to enforce. But in point of fact, neither the politician nor the soldier concerns himself much with the rules laid down for his guidance. The statesman and the great general make their own rules, which lesser men then for a time observe until another political or military leader comes forward with a fresh code.

The principal object both in politics and in war is to gain a given end. What that end may be depends upon those multiple, interrelated, cultural factors which we call the civilization of a given epoch. The similarity of the objective in politics and in war has often been noted. By military writers, war has been defined as a continuation of politics carried on by other means, while political writers insist that politics is war carried on by other means. In recent times the view has come to be generally accepted that war is subservient to politics. The influence of politics on the conduct of war has become decisive. Politicians declare war and make peace. Political leaders influence the conduct of campaigns. In brief, politics makes use of war to attain its ends when other methods fail. Such was not always the case. War, as an end in itself, has at various periods in history been the predominant factor. As Clausewitz well remarks : " War is nothing more than

extended single combat." Each contestant seeks to overwhelm the other by physical force.

Every aristocratically organized society is essentially warlike ; it relies solely on force. An aristocracy is in the first instance nothing more than a warrior caste, the ally of a priest caste. The former establishes its rule by physical means ; the latter enforces it by psychical influence. When the two are joined in one grouping we have the essential impetus to cultural development. Without taking our examples from classical antiquity, we may cite the case of the social structure of the Mediæval Age in the West. Then the division of physical and psychical factors in the social ordering was clearly marked. The Church ruled the Western World as spiritual overlord. The lord of the manor, or of a larger realm, knew of no other way to settle differences with equals than by the use of armed force. This mode of settlement, wholly non-political, only gave way to other method when the art of war lost its distinctively aristocratic character.

II

During the Middle Ages the knight in his full panoply looms in the forefront of the history of the epoch. He is the central figure. Clad in his cumbersome suit of armour, armed with a heavy two-handed sword or battle-axe, he rushed into battle. Thus the chroniclers portray him. War was a private business. To this extent it was inspiring, ennobling. The knight felt his personality enhanced. If victorious his social value was immensely increased, and the booty of the day compensated him for his effort.

As we peruse the accounts of the chroniclers it is curious to note how the development of a more systematic military strategy was seriously hampered by the hostile attitude of the nobility who resented the intrusion of the burghers in warlike enterprises. The battle of Crécy (1346) was lost by the French owing to their impetuosity, and their refusal to adopt more modern military tactics. Seventy years later the English won

the day at Agincourt in spite of the overwhelming numerical superiority of the French, owing to the fact that they made use of the new means of combat. It is to the English archers that the victory is ascribed. The flower of the French aristocracy here fell a victim of its inability to keep up with the changing times.

War was no longer to be the sole prerogative of the knight in armour, the privilege of an aristocratic war caste. For more than a century the democratizing of war had been going on. In Italy the city republics and tyrannies had grown accustomed to hire their fighting forces to do battle for them.¹ A race of *condottieri* had grown up, captains of mercenary troops to whom war was a trade, like any other trade. Such men had no scruples about maintaining the aristocratic code of war. They were not slow to make use of all of the new mechanical inventions which an industrious, active and intelligent group of artisans was offering for their use. Instead of the knight in armour, the engineer, the artilleryman, the bronze cannon moulder assumed positions of importance in war. A new strategy was devised. With the further perfection of artillery, the strongest hill-town castle could be reduced without great effort. New offensive methods were made possible by vastly increased mobility and range of action. The lightly-armed infantrymen came to be of more actual importance in battle than the heavily armoured, mounted knight.

All of these factors served to degrade war from its former high position as the exclusive prerogative of the lord and his personal retainers. Honour, valour, courage and those other characteristic virtues of a soldier caste which the aristocracy of the Western World had hitherto jealously guarded as its own, began to be less valued in war and subsequently in the conduct of public affairs. Princes were henceforth to

¹ Mercenary troops were commonly used throughout the Middle Ages. As early as Norman times, we find that mercenaries were employed. The Brabançon pikemen, the Italian cross-bowmen and the Swiss professional soldiers were hired for wars, but these had little or no influence on the conduct of war, and it was not until the fifteenth century that a decisive change is to be noted, which hastened the democratizing of the war process.

employ other methods than war, to value and make use of diplomacy and other pacific political means to attain their aims. War was no longer an end in itself, but was made to serve aims and plans which bore a political imprint.

It is not our purpose here to trace the evolution of war in modern times, but rather to show very briefly, how war became subservient to politics as a result of the democratic influences which discredited war as the sole means of settling disputes. The growth of political method was accompanied by the decline of the feudal system. The landed aristocracy by degrees lost its former ascendancy. A new urban aristocracy was in the process of formation. The evolution of national states was in a large measure due to the fact that the aristocracy, discarding its coat of mail, lost its distinctive character as a warrior caste, and after an embittered struggle rallied to the support of a single leader or king, who was finally recognized as embodying the sovereignty of the State.

If we seek to discover the various causes which brought about the decadence of those warlike attributes which were the cultural focus of the feudal world, we find that this was in a large measure due to the democratizing of the method of warfare, which had its origin in the Italian peninsula during the period of the Renaissance. In our own time, living as we do at the close of an era of political democracy, we have not yet thoroughly awakened to the fact that a democratic age is essentially one of degradation, yet historical research warrants our making the assertion that an era of democracy is the concluding stage that marks the decay of a given civilization. It is the democratizing of the art of war as practised during the mediæval epoch, that led to the degradation of war as the bulwark of the then existing social order.

III

Hitherto the lessons of the Renaissance have, as a rule, been misinterpreted even by recent historians,

biased as they have been by a purely political outlook. Too much emphasis has been placed upon the "rediscovery of antiquity," as it is usually called. Too much insistence has been laid upon the results of the capture of Constantinople by the Turks, and the consequent migration of the guardians of Hellenic culture westward. Not enough credit has been given to the fact that the human mind, rid for a time of the incubus of war, rid of the fear of the robber baron and the tithe-exacting tyrant, felt that a great load had been lifted. On turning away from war, men began to think in other terms, and the small group of intellectual leaders saw in Aristotle's *Politics* and *Ethics* a practical basis upon which to rebuild the social edifice. Even more important is the fact that war as an end in itself was being displaced by newer methods of social adjustment. War was no longer the sole occupation of the best type of man. The virtues of the war caste could not at once be transferred to the new political caste.

The field of politics is much wider than that of war. Men were to take an interest in politics who had none of the traditions, none of the high virtues which the warrior caste had held to be those of ideal manhood. This may serve in a measure to explain what appears to later generations as the immoral or nonmoral conduct of the political figures of the Renaissance, popes and princes alike. This may enlighten the study of Machiavelli's work in laying the foundation of politics, in his realistic application of the Aristotelian doctrine of the separation of politics from ethics, and the subsequent establishment of politics as the social determinant of the coming era. Many generations were to pass by before we have the type of politician, the statesman of high integrity who assumed public office invested with the insignia of virtue comparable to those which formed part of the natural heritage of the feudal lord. In fact, the politician was never altogether able to divest himself of the stigma that he was a middleman, the broker of public affairs, rather than the moulder of events in the sense that the feudal lord had been during the Mediæval Age. There was something secretive, in-

direct, unsavory about political method, when compared with the directness and openness of the feudal war process, which left its trace on the human mind long after the feudal knight had been buried beneath the heap of extravagant ridicule of a Cervantes.

It is a matter of no little historical interest and importance that it was in Italy where the art of war was first democratized, that here also the first impetus was given to politics in Modern Times. We have called attention to the similarity between the objective of politics and of war. When politics became ascendant, it made use of war as a means of achieving results. It integrated war as an element in its technique.¹ War was no longer, as it had hitherto been, the sole element of decisive action, but a weapon to be called into play should political intrigue, negotiation, or diplomacy, fail. What were the means made use of by politics to supplant war as the focus of social life? In how far did politics tend toward the development and improvement of social conditions which contribute to the attainment of a good life? In how far has politics to-day been supplanted in its method and aims by a new technique, as war was supplanted during the Renaissance? What new factors have developed which tend to show that politics and political methods have grown obsolete, and that the politician to-day is as incongruous and ridiculous a figure as Don Quixote?

IV

Many a learned treatise has been written concerning the nature of politics and the art of government since the days when Aristotle first declared that man is a political animal. What he meant by this phrase succeeding generations have variously interpreted. Though we need not confine ourselves to Greek political speculation, as the diligence of modern historians has revealed notable instances of similarity in the political institutions

¹ It is significant as an illustration of this point that Machiavelli, who is the founder of modern politics, should have also given to the world a book entitled *Arte della Guerra*.

devised by all the peoples of the earth who have attained a higher cultural plane, yet it is useful to permit Aristotle to guide us in order that we may arrive at a clear understanding of the background of political thought at the time of its revival, at the beginning of the modern political era.

How well adapted to the outward physical conditions in the Italian peninsula during the fifteenth century are the opening words of Aristotle's *Politics* :

"As we see that every city is a society, and every society is established for some good purpose ; for an apparent good is the spring of all human actions ; it is evident that this is the principle upon which they are every one founded, and this is more especially true of that which has for its object the best possible, and is itself the most excellent, and comprehends all the rest. Now this is called a city, and the society thereof a political society." And a little later he declares that, "society is a city, and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the end and perfection of government : first founded that we might live, but continued that we may live happily."¹

We have often been told that to the Greeks politics was not a struggle for power, but the means of attaining to a perfect and self-sufficing life. To them the State was a mode of life ; not merely a complex political mechanism. The makers of their laws and the framers of their political constitutions were not politicians in our latter-day sense of the term, but experts in political affairs. Aristotle's *Politics*, more properly termed *A Treatise on Government*, was intended to be a text-book for such legislators. To discover what elements in a given social order might best serve as a basis for a community of purpose was the aim of the politician in the Aristotelian sense. Politics was held to be an ethical means of attaining the best form of social organization. It was ethics² extended to the realm of the practical, in public as distinguished from private affairs, though this distinction was never carefully drawn.

¹ Cf. Ed. Bekker, chap. i, bk. i, 1252a, 1252b.

² B. Jowett in his *Introduction to Plato's Republic* has judiciously noted that first ethics, then politics, is the order of ideas ; the reverse is the order of history. "Only after many struggles of thought does the individual assert his right as a moral being. In the early stages he is not one but many, the citizen of a State that is prior to him, and he has no notion of good or evil apart from the law of his country."

Aristotle was the first to point out the distinction between politics and ethics, to demarcate their difference. He called attention to the *de facto* character of politics and sought to lay the foundations of an empirical science of politics.

The other great teacher of the theory of politics during classical times, Plato, had less practical influence. He conceived an idealistic interpretation of politics. In his *Republic* he presents to our view a State, not for men, but for " gods and children of gods."

It is usual to remark at this point that the Greeks did not look upon the State as a unit of power. Yet it is this struggle for power in its most debased political sense that caused Plato to turn away in disgust from practical politics and seek refuge in the construction of an ideal republic. Furthermore, it is difficult to believe that the tutor of Alexander the Great should not have recognized the political advantages to be derived from the use of force, of power as the principal object and aim of the State. Even if this were not the case, Aristotle's work came too late. The rise of the belligerent State as the determining factor of practical politics can be historically fixed. The defeat of Antigonous at Ipsus, B.C. 301, within two decades of the death of Aristotle, marks the beginning of the competition for political power in the Eastern World. The battle of Zama,¹ just a century later, brings to a conclusion the high period of politics of the Romans, and is the beginning of the predominance of Rome as a World-State. During this epoch politics cut loose from ethics. Politics was concerned with the pursuit of power. The State was the means, force was the method, power the end in view. This was the epoch during which Italian unity under the hegemony of Rome was achieved. The power of Carthage was destroyed, and the Hellenic world brought within the orbit of Rome. Henceforth Rome was to depart from its

¹ Polybius tells us that the battle of Pydna (B.C. 168) marks the beginning of Rome's struggle for world power, and most modern historians have accepted this view. But it is beyond question that the defeat of Hannibal at Zama made the victory over Philip of Macedon, thirty years later, inevitable.

traditional policy of insularity and spread the standards of its legions across the known world. Rome was to become the *orbis terrarum*.

V

The passing of the war period in Rome was marked by the downfall of the old nobility. A new moneyed urban aristocracy was in process of formation, which was to gain control of the State. As is invariably the case under such circumstances, the virtues of the older military aristocracy were no longer prized. Wars degenerated into expeditions for booty. Old-school politicians, such as Cato, sought in vain to reform the corrupted body politic. A new spirit of democracy was spreading. Its taint infected the political institutions of the Roman State. Political incompetence and inconsequence marked the successive steps of demoralization. It was an era of political mediocrity. No leaders came forward equal to the task of political rule.

The decline of the State from its old high political respectability inspired young men to try their hand at curing the ills from which it was suffering. The example of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus championing the rights of the people, introducing reforms in an effort to save the State, and finally dying for their country, has inspired many other young men in later ages to do noble deeds in the arena of politics. But the work of the Gracchi properly interpreted proves the paucity, not to say the total absence, of political sagacity among the Romans of this epoch, and shows conclusively that the era of democracy portended that the political age was drawing to a close. The fact that such impassioned reformers as the Gracchi, who lacked the experience and realistic insight needed to conduct political affairs, should have been permitted to direct the destinies of Rome, even for a brief period, in the stead of that "cool, calm, somewhat narrow-minded, deliberative assembly," as Mommsem so well characterizes the Roman Senate, confirms our view. The Gracchi did not succeed in reforming the body politic, but pre-

precipitated it headlong into the democratic abyss from which it was to emerge transformed by the genius of Cæsar. The establishment of the Empire brings to a conclusion the ancient political state system. The State politically conceived disappeared, not to be revived for more than a thousand years.

VI

As we turn over the pages of history and piece together the story of the six thousand years of man's known efforts to establish institutions which may lead to a good life, we find in the history of civilized peoples a remarkable similarity in the evolution of these institutions.

The sequence is somewhat in this fashion : A rural military society with (*a*) war as its focus ; (*b*) an aristocracy as its rulers ; (*c*) religion as its cohesive factor ; and (*d*) a priesthood as its spiritual ministrants ; is followed by an urban national (commercial) society with (*a*) politics (war carried on by other means) as its focus ; (*b*) a middle class as its rulers ; (*c*) education as its cohesive factor ; and (*d*) philosophers and artists as its spiritual ministrants. This urban political society in turn makes way for a cosmopolitan (industrial) society with (*a*) peace as its focus ; (*b*) Cæsarism as its rule ; (*c*) science as its cohesive factor ; (*d*) engineers and technical experts as its spiritual ministrants. It would be difficult for an historian to determine with precision when one such phase may be said to begin and another to end. Broadly speaking, each phase, in so far as it may be historically traced, appears to have continued for five centuries. Within this period minor movements of growth, full flowering and decay occur, reproducing in miniature the broader social movements outlined.

The sequence of the type of social institutions is adduced without any question being raised as to the degree of perfection attained. It is important, however, to determine in so far as possible what stage at a given time the social process has reached ; whether we are

at the dawn of a new era, or merely of a new epoch. Searching inquiry leads us to conclude that it may be assumed with confidence that the end of an era is marked by the democratizing of those institutions which have served as the framework of the social order. Epochs of democracy mark the turning points in history. 'Democracy' performs a healthy function in that it acts as the dissolving agency of decadent institutions.

We have briefly outlined the causes which led to the decay of mediæval society accompanied by the democratizing of war. It is not our purpose here to trace the revival of politics in modern times.² What we are concerned with is the present status of political theory and practice; with the science of politics. We may thus be in a position to show how politics as the focus of social life has declined; how dried up is the stream of political action, though it still trickles through the crevices of the social order; how politics which still seems like the mighty river it once was, though in reality it is merely a shallow stream, is no longer the determinant of public affairs. It will then become clear that in our own times the era of politics is drawing to a close, and that a new age is opening before us. It is useless to discuss whether the new epoch is to be one of decadence. It is futile to proclaim a coming Renaissance. But it is essential to clear away the dead lumber that impedes the growth of the new order. Democracy has done its work of the destruction of political society with admirable thoroughness, but it has left the field littered with smouldering ruins of thrones and powers.

It is not to be expected that much headway will be made until the dying sophisms, the weedy truisms of politics are ploughed under, so that a new and richer flowering of the human spirit can come forth. What is most needed is a Cartesian view-point, a vigorous scepticism to be followed by an equally vigorous

² We must be careful to distinguish democracy from republican forms of government; a loose usage has identified the two; they are, however, distinct.

³ Cf. Wallace, *The Trend of History*, which deals fully with this subject.

optimism. Just as in the work of Descartes we find an implicit confidence in the powers of the human mind, in the greatness of the race, coupled with a contempt for what has gone before, so we may be inspired by the same confidence, and an equally healthy contempt for what historians are pleased to call Modern Times, the political age, from the peace of Westphalia to that of Versailles.

CHAPTER I

THE POLITICAL AGE

The Nature of Politics—Origin of Modern Politics—The Law—International Relations—Political Wars—Richelieu—Cromwell—Home and Foreign Politics Contrasted—The Example of France and England.

I

THE Modern Era was a political age. During this period, politics was held to be the fulcrum of social life. Let us see if we can arrive at a clear understanding of what this signifies. To do so, we must examine briefly the nature and character of politics. I would merely point out here certain salient characteristics by way of definition, before passing on to the social consequences arising out of modern political institutions.

Politics in the simplest way of expressing it is, as we have noted, a method of regulating social intercourse without immediate recourse to force. In its broader aspects, it is a logical method of bargaining among nations, groups, or factions of relatively equal strength. It is commonly accepted that a politically organized society is the outcome of a rational mode of thinking; a confidence that the human mind can by its ingenuity and dexterity find solutions to problems of practical life, by referring them to the norm of theory, in public affairs, the theory of the State.

In war as an end in itself, the passional elements of life are given direct expression and spend themselves in combat. There is no theoretical background to war. It is an actual experience which comes to a spontaneous decision whatever this may be, and is as such, accepted. Victory is the triumph of the life process. It is the process as an actual experience. The victor lives on

and imposes upon the vanquished what we have come to recognize as his will. Thus the will becomes identified with the life process, with the victorious life process. My will is the expression of my life conceived as victorious. The will is the theoretical aspect of actual existence until by its enforcement it is rendered *de facto* by some outward act. As a result of continued experience, it comes to be recognized that the will may be enforced by some other method than by war. The realization of the anti-social nature of war dawns slowly. Theories of social intercourse on a political basis or theories of State, in which this anti-social war factor is relegated to the background are propounded. Henceforth political action, that is to say a method of enforcing the will without immediate recourse to war, is made use of.

There are, of course, other factors which contribute to displace war as the determinant of social intercourse. But we are here concerned with stating as simply as possible the direct transition from war to politics, as the motivation of social intercourse. War is not eliminated, it is merely displaced. It remains the *deus ex machina* in political affairs. It is a gloved hand that grips the sword. Between offence and penalty, between insult and injury, between crime and punishment a new decisive element has been inserted—positive law.

II

The law serves two purposes, the one of command, the other of order. Positive law is the command of a superior imposed upon an inferior. It is based on the theory that might confers right. But with the rise of politics, another definition of the law is arrived at. In the words of Professor Holland: "Law in general is the sum total of those general rules of action as are enforced by a sovereign political authority."¹ The law is no longer held to be merely a divine ordering, the enforcement of the will of the Deity, but a regulative system conferred by men upon a given social group—

¹ Cf. T. E. Holland, *Elements of Jurisprudence*, 11th Ed.

the State—which is charged with its enforcement, and as a consequence becomes sovereign.

Political society regards the law, not as something handed down to it by a divine ordainer, nor as abstract rules for the regulation of the actions of mankind, but rather as a code for establishing the limits of the rights of the governed and the governing in specific instances, thus regulating their behaviour. The law in this sense is the outgrowth of a rational inquiry into the nature and character of the actions of man in society, taking into account his habits, customs and traditions. Such was the function of the law in political society when politics reached the highest stage of its development in Modern Times.

In classical antiquity the concept of the law was more exclusively that of order. It arose as the result of the observation of a certain sequence of phenomena which was in the first instance referred to the will of a deity; later to the notion of a universe moving according to the law of its own being. Though it must be admitted that positive law, which grew up with the organization of modern political society, greatly influenced political action, yet the technique of politics has remained under the domination of the older war methods of the preceding age.

Political negotiation presupposes that the negotiator is backed by force which he can call in to intimidate his opponent and often bring him to terms by threats of violence. It is not the place here to trace the rise of international law, the code governing the conduct of States in their relations with other States. In how far an international code governing the relations between sovereign States may be termed "law" has been the subject of much discussion. Positive law implies a command, while international law implies at best merely the acquiescence of sovereign independent States to adhere to certain rules if in accordance with their cultural practice and social antecedents. The validity of such law could not fail to remain highly questionable as long as war was held to be the ultimate method of settling all disputes. But we can see that politics

shows a great step forward in that it served to delay the outbreak of war by substituting a relatively rational examination of differences, for an immediate recourse to arms. War had been removed from the forefront of public affairs, but its influence as the final arbitrament remained unimpaired. The virtues of the warrior, no longer of practical value in war, became the norm of the new social code that was in process of formation.

War was no longer a personal affair, the prerogative of a social group or class, as it had been during the mediæval age, but the distinctive privilege of the sovereign body politic, the State. Henceforth only sovereign States, or those groups seeking to assert their sovereignty, could declare war. The growth of national States may be measured in direct proportion to the displacing of war as the focus of the social life of the individual. War was to assume formidable proportions when carried on by a great State with all its resources, in pursuance of a definite political plan. It was no longer to be a marauding expedition or a campaign of conquest that might serve as an outlet for the energies of a restless and ambitious prince, but a war carried on to achieve a distinct purpose, to initiate a political policy.

III

The political age was ushered in by such wars. The wars of the seventeenth century, when national States were in process of formation, show clearly the transition from the old to the new type of warfare. During this period the political nature of war was only dimly apprehended. The fact that war had passed into subservience to politics was not realized. The outward objective of the Thirty Years War was ostensibly religious; the Civil War in England also bore a religious imprint. Nevertheless, political factors were predominant in both of these struggles.

The Thirty Years War began as a struggle of Catholicism, championed by the Habsburgs, to regain for the Church the territory lost through the adherence of the German Princes to the Protestant cause. The

Imperial forces entered Bohemia and regained that territory as well as Lower Bavaria for the Church. North Germany was then invaded, and seemed to be at the mercy of the Catholic party when Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden came forward as the defender of Protestantism. His troops were everywhere victorious. But the German Princes looked with disfavour upon the success of the Swedish King. Their growing political consciousness made it difficult for them to be grateful for the services he had rendered to the Protestant cause. They feared that he might have ulterior designs of a more strictly political nature.

With the death of Gustavus in 1632, the character of the war underwent a decisive change. Henceforth, it was frankly political. The religious motive which had been the cause of the conflict was lost sight of. Catholic France, guided by a man imbued with the new political spirit, Cardinal Richelieu, came forward as the supporter of the Protestant cause and lent aid to the German Princes. Richelieu's sole aim in pursuing this policy was to break the power of the Habsburgs. As a result of his intrigues, the Cardinal was soon able to involve all Europe in the struggle. He stirred up the Dutch and lent them active support in their efforts to throw off the yoke of Spain. He gave assistance to the Swedes, fomented war in Italy against the Imperial forces, and put French armies in the field in pursuance of his policy. Brilliant French generals such as Turenne and Condé were found to conduct victorious campaigns against the Imperial troops. Though Richelieu died before the end of the war, his policy was continued by his successors.

The undisputed ascendancy of politics as the guiding motive in public affairs was henceforth assured. The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which brought the Thirty Years War to a close, was the first treaty negotiated on distinctly modern lines in consonance with the new spirit of the political age. It gave a great impetus to the establishment of national States, and marks the rise of France to a leading position in international affairs.

In England a similar struggle was taking place in

the narrower field of home affairs. The Civil War was, in its inception, a struggle for religious freedom, but in reality it was an assault of Parliament upon the Crown made by the politically-conscious middle class, which henceforth was to strive to gain control of the guidance of the body politic. The rise of Cromwell to the dictatorship as Lord Protector can thus be adequately explained. With the revival of the monarchy, a compromise was arrived at which vested the real power in the State in the hands of the Commons, the representatives of the middle class. But "political liberty," as it came to be called, was not achieved until after a prolonged conflict. The Stuart dynasty had to be overthrown, and a new and more docile king selected by the politically-conscious group of citizens, those privileged to vote.

Thus the first modern political State came into existence as the work of the middle class. There the aristocracy was first displaced in the guidance of political affairs and by degrees assimilated without losing its social significance.

IV

The establishment of constitutional government in England served the twofold purpose of marking the ascendancy of politics as the focus of social life, and of placing the middle class in control of the State. Politics was to become more and more the especial prerogative of this class, which was soon to identify itself with the State.

The result of the work of Cromwell in the field of national politics and that of Richelieu in international affairs may thus be summarized. It throws much light on the subsequent development of politics. From England came the impetus as well as the model of the internal organization of the modern State along political lines. Here the middle class, which was largely urban and essentially commercial in its interests and social view-point, early gained control of public affairs, and was later on to gain complete control of the State, and mould it according to its aims and needs.

The social structure of the political State, and the political ideals which constitutionalism embodies, had their origin in the peculiar circumstances and conditions existing in seventeenth-century England. The political institutions which the people of England set up were peculiarly adapted to the social conditions prevalent at that time. Nevertheless they were made to serve as the model, and became the pattern of the political institutions which other peoples adopted and sought to imitate. Throughout the political age, England was to retain this position of leadership, and the political institutions devised kept constantly in view the aim of vouchsafing to the individual his liberty. But it must not be forgotten, if we are to understand the true nature of modern politics, that home politics as we may call it, evolved in England, or by Englishmen in America or Australasia, grew naturally, whereas in other countries it remained in the nature of an importation, never to be wholly assimilated.

From France, on the other hand, came the theory and practice of the international organization of political society, with the strongly compacted sovereign national State as the political unit. International politics with its instrument—diplomacy, its weapon—war, which Richelieu was the first to make use of on a grand scale, was to govern the relations between States during the political age. Here, as was the case with internal political affairs, which received their characteristic imprint from conditions prevalent in England, the character and nature of international relations were to be shaped by the peculiar exigencies of the historical position of France in continental Europe. Thus it will be seen that the theory and practice of politics in the field of home and of foreign affairs had their source and owed their development to the two great peoples of Europe, England and France, who were to become the guiding factors in the history of Modern Times.

V.

The modern political age, properly understood, belongs essentially to North-western Europe. Its character was moulded and determined by the racial and social traits, customs, traditions and mental range of the French and the English peoples. To understand the nature of modern politics and the political organization of the State this fact, hitherto not insisted upon, must be recollected, even though political practice appears to have been influenced by theories originating elsewhere. In the main this has, however, not been the case.

The vigour of the English middle class which we find in the England of the seventeenth century, its independent outlook and commercial boldness, characterize the nature of politics during its high period. The interest which Cromwell took in matters of education; the laying of the foundation of a national navy, and to cite but one instance, the occupation of Jamaica, were to contribute to the commercial pre-eminence of England, and as a consequence to its political supremacy. This gave to home politics, as the focus of social effort, the broad basis upon which it was to flourish.

The policy of Richelieu, which became the policy of France in international affairs as typified by the recognition of the independence of Holland and Portugal through the treaty of Westphalia, laid the foundation of the practice of foreign politics and the growth of free and independent, sovereign, national States. The use of French as the language of diplomacy, and the spread of French culture throughout Europe during the eighteenth century, testifies to the success achieved by the French in the realm of international politics, just as the imitation of the English constitutional system shows clearly the supremacy of England in the realm of home politics.

CHAPTER II

THE THEORY OF POLITICS

Relation of Theory to Practice—Politics and Logic—Political Technique
—Political Theories from Machiavelli to Marx—Rousseau and
Democracy—The Marxian Theory—Rousseau and Marx Contrasted.

I

IT would be a difficult and invidious task to seek to decide arbitrarily whether it was the empirical, rational, matter-of-fact temper of the new age, its commercial spirit and urban character which defined the nature of politics, or whether it was the secular character of the epoch, the displacing of war as the focal factor of social life and the consequent rise of politics which made possible the new empirical rational spirit that spread across Europe during the eighteenth century. The two movements are complementary, and it would be improper to select the one as the cause of the other. A study of history reveals the fact that the urban middle class, as a vigorous factor in the social order of England, had been growing up for three centuries, and was already powerful before the struggle for supremacy with the older aristocratic society was undertaken. Here political practice forged ahead of any theory of politics which had received wide acceptance.

On the continent, the theory of the relations between States, questions of sovereignty, and kindred topics of a distinctly international nature has been the subject of much theoretical speculation. Accepted opinions concerning the State, questions of peace, war and diplomacy in general were, in a large measure, based on *a priori* theories. This may serve to explain the wide divergence which has always existed between home and foreign politics. The former was the outgrowth

of actual experiment, the latter the result of adapting practice to theory. As long as the internal structure of the State, patterned on the English constitutional model, was held to its natural limitations, politics remained dominant. It is only when we see the State extending its sway over the individual, depriving him of that liberty which he had been taught to believe to be his inalienable right, that we may note a change taking place.

The modern political State, as first established, restricted the suffrage to a carefully chosen electorate, trained to practice the restraints needed in all social organization, and strong enough to impose these restrictions upon others. Such was the case during the early stages of political evolution. But thereafter the theory was advanced that the alleged natural difference between men was incompatible with the fact that all men are born "free and equal." Here was the first wedge of democratic theory to be inserted into the scheme of politics. Such doctrines as the "sovereignty of the people" and "the rights of man" naturally followed.

II

The relation of theory to practice is an intricate one. Nor can the matter be so easily dismissed by stating that theory is merely the co-ordination and interpretation of facts, and that a perfect theory harmonizes with practice. Theory, as currently understood, outlines the concepts of the human mind in the form of a general rule or law; practice is a given episode which may be subsumed under that law. Whether we pursue an inductive or deductive method of inquiry is irrelevant. In social science both are needed.

The adjustment of theory to practice is made by means of what we call technique. Technique may, for present purposes, be compared to the syllogism. In logic a syllogism works out very neatly by means of the necessary symbols. Politics, which is in a measure a logical science, is very rich in these symbols. But unlike other symbols which are conventional and

arbitrary signs used for purposes of simplification, the symbols of politics have with few exceptions, no such close relationship with the world of facts. It is well known that in logic, if you grant any premise irrespective of an inductive test of its validity, it is possible to prove that white is black, or black, white. The same is true of politics.

Now whereas in logic the association of a concept with its particulars is evidence of an untrained mind, in politics such association must be constantly at hand in order to make theory and practice fit with any nicety. The technique of politics undertakes to perform this function. Furthermore, as a symbol always refers to something which is placed outside of itself, it is the essential function of the theory of politics to give definition to political practice, rather than as would first glance appear, the reverse order. The result of this process is political judgment. Just as in logic a judgment is a concept rendered definite through some assertion concerning it, so in politics those vague and shapeless ideas, expressed in the symbolic language of the politician, are rendered precise and definite by technique. It is in the distinctly social phase of agreeing judgments that the theory of politics may be said to arise.

The trend of all logical thought is from the universal to the particular. In logic, it is by combining two judgments having a term in common that a third is formed. I have repeated here this very elementary explanation of the method of logic in an effort to make clear that in politics, this third term is an unknown quantity which has to be supplied by what we call political technique.

The technique of politics includes in it more elements of psychology than of logic; it includes eloquence rather than reason, intuition rather than intelligence, conation rather than cognition. It seeks to realize in the field of practice those social judgments which are arrived at by means of logical mental processes. Politics, in this sense, is eminently a practical application of the logical faculties of man. It gains pre-

eminence in periods of rational inquiry and mental independence, and is invariably linked with a secular mode of viewing life.

Here politics departs from logic, which is concerned with truth and attaches to itself purpose, that is to say, the attainment of a good life. In so far as agreeing judgments are arrived at, in so far as in the conflict of opinion a new technique is outlined, in so far will the practice of politics fit the theory to which it is related. It is in these agreeing social judgments that we may seek for the interpretation of political practice. Such judgments unfold the character of the social order.

We are here confronted with another difficulty. In the classification and arrangement of social judgments, the political philosopher deals with his problems only after devitalizing them for the purposes of his theory. The politician and the statesman have to deal with living material, with the life process, with all of its weakness, inconsistencies, incongruities and unknown quantities, with men, not merely as individuals, but as groups. The politician must rely solely on his technique in order to achieve tangible results. It is therefore with this technique that we are most concerned, for through it we may approach nearest to an understanding of the relation of theory to practice and discover the true nature of politics.

Our task in this respect will be easier in view of the fact that we are not seeking to construct a workable political system, but rather to take apart the complicated political mechanism, to analyse its component elements. Like a watchmaker who examines with curiosity and interest an antiquated timepiece and marvels that it could have kept time at all, we must approach the political institutions of Modern Times and marvel that such a primitive technique should still serve so important a function.

III

During the formative period of a new science, be it politics, physics or any other, theory furthermore serves a useful purpose in that it calls attention to what

remains to be accomplished on the basis of what has been done. As yet only a very elementary classification of facts may be said to exist, and the inferences drawn therefrom are of necessity faulty. Political theory is at this stage little more than the formulation and generalization of isolated incidents of current practice. It is therefore liable to be arbitrary and dogmatic, based in greater part on *a priori* reasoning.

If we follow the course of political speculation from Machiavelli with his thesis of "reasons of state" through the theories advanced by Grotius, Hobbes and Thomasius, outlining the concept of natural law, we may trace the earlier phases of modern political development without examining in detail its technique; for the practice of politics had not as yet evolved along sufficiently independent lines. During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, politics was only by degrees attaining autonomy. The method and practice of the Mediæval Age had been carried over into the new epoch, and the old technique of a pre-political society served for the time being. Theory was concerned with defining the rights of the governing, with endowing the State with sovereignty, establishing the predominance of a secular code of morality, and separating morals from politics. In practice national States were in process of consolidation. The supremacy of the Roman Church was overthrown, the last religious wars were being fought, and the consciousness of a new individualism was awakening.

With the close of the seventeenth century, politics had passed through its elementary stage and was tending towards the full realization of its possibilities. The new technique was primarily concerned with the place of the individual, the politically enfranchised individual, in society. We have Locke's theory of the contractual relation between the governing and the governed in his attempt to formulate a workable code of social relations in a political state. We have Wolff's theory of self-realization as the aim of mankind, and the integration of the individual in the State. Montesquieu writes his celebrated *de l'Esprit des Lois*, in which he

gives precision to the technique most suited to insure the smooth functioning of political society. He outlines a workable system of government, in which theory and practice meet on common ground. In this sense he may be said to have formulated the technique of politics, subsequently adopted as the most useful and best suited for political practice. It was only a step to Bentham's doctrine of utilitarianism (which may be considered the climax of political theory) as carried to its logical conclusion in the work of Comte and J. S. Mill. Here we have not merely a text-book of the technique of politics, but a theory arrived at by inductive method, admirably adapted to the needs of a political society. Here is a political theory held in close correspondence with facts and therefore apparently adequate to assure a close harmony between theory and practice, if we take its postulate of "the greatest good to the greatest number" in a political and not in an economic sense.

The field of politics had by this time been divided by specialists who sought to justify political action, to develop its scope by relating it to some particular field of knowledge. We have the historical school of Savigny which postulated the organic character of the State endowed with a distinct purpose. What we may call an absolutist school sprang up, which asserted that might is right and that the State is not the work of man, but a natural growth due to the inherent inequality among men. It claimed that social organization must take into consideration not merely individuals, but groups. Other schools of politics might be cited, such as the theocratic of Joseph de Maistre, continued by Fr. J. Stahl in his claim that the purpose of law is the maintenance of "God's ordering of the universe." Already we may note in these theories discordant factors. There was no longer any agreement as to the place of the individual in the State. The individualism which had grown out of a secular mode of viewing life, and had been strengthened by the practice of self-reliance and self-determination, was now giving way to the integration of the individual in the State

and the assumption by the State of many of the characteristic duties hitherto the sole privilege of the individual.

A group mind, group action, a group mode of thinking, and a national view-point had grown up. The egotism of an individualist political society which discounted all of these group factors, was by degrees being replaced by a social view-point in which the group was to be more valued than the individual. The technique of politics conceived and perfected along lines of individualism was to find itself unable to adapt to the new requirements. Therefore it is not surprising that the abolition of political society should have been advocated.

IV

The most significant abolitionist theory is that known as historical materialism, or Marxism. It is significant that at the time it was outlined politics had just entered upon its culminating phase. Though in the main destructive, the Marxian thesis, in spite of outward signs which at first strike the imagination so forcibly as already belonging to a new order, can only be understood when considered within the framework of politics. Much has been made of the fact that Marxism outlines no programme, no theory relating to the new order, that it is merely a statement averring to prove scientifically the reasons why it is inevitable that the political organization of society will pass. But of the nature of the organization of the society that is to succeed it, it says nothing. Whether it is sufficient to be told that the existing social order is to be followed by a different one, whether it is sufficient to warn men of the impending doom of their most cherished social arrangements, is a debatable question. In point of fact we may note that Marxism has no technique of its own. It endeavoured to adapt the technique of the older political institutions to the new industrial society.

More significant still is the failure of Marx and his followers to recognize in how far democracy was accomplishing the work of destruction of political society by

a natural process of disintegration. In the light of this inquiry we may assert that the Marxian doctrine must be looked upon as a conservative force. It focussed attention on the ills of political society; it made it essential for the supporters of the politically organized State to take active counter-measures in the nature of social prophylaxis. Political society adopted measures of social reform which for a time arrested the decay of the State that democracy was carrying forward. Scientific socialism thus served as a foil for the consolidation of the State along absolutist lines. The Communist Manifesto of 1848 was a danger signal which established governments heeded. It produced results contrary to the professed purpose it had set for itself, which was not the improvement of existing conditions, but the disruption of the social order. If we examine the Marxian doctrines further, we cannot fail to be impressed within what narrow limits they are valid. It will become patent that they were thought out by a mind imbued with political prejudices, a mind not having sweep enough to see far beyond the horizon of political society. It is only if we confine ourselves within the narrow limits of this society that the radicalism of the Marxian doctrine assumes menacing proportions. We feel that Marx is within his cell rattling the bars and making a great noise, causing much disturbance and anxiety among his fellow inmates, prisoners and guards alike, but without making any systematic attempt to get out. If by chance he did escape, he would feel himself lost in a non-political society with no means, no plans of orienting himself. But if Marxian communism is viewed from the outside as we may now view it, and our vision is no longer restricted to the contemplation of political society as though it were the social universe, if we free ourselves from the habit of thinking in terms of politics, Marx no longer appears as a menacing giant, but rather as the advocate of violent measures to achieve what was being far more smoothly and decisively carried on within the body politic by democracy. This thesis loses none of its validity in spite of the efforts made to revolutionize the

social order in Russia. That experiment to establish a State on scientific socialist principles illustrates very forcibly the point that Marxism is in its fundamental character political, notwithstanding the insistence on the importance of economics as the corner-stone of social life.

The Marxian superstructure of the State, as we see it in Russia, confirms our view that it is merely a political reversal of order based on a favourite text found among all peoples, "the first shall be last and the last shall be first." But Marxism remains to the end wholly under the influence of the political world of the mid-nineteenth century.

It is not our purpose to discuss the theory of the Russian social experiment, nor would it be fair to suppose that Marx could have foreseen that his doctrines would first find practical application in a land where the underlying economic conditions which he declared were required before his theories should be enforced, would be conspicuous by their absence. It must be recalled that the dissolution of political society in Russia was in the first instance not the result of Marxian propaganda. Politics was only grafted on the surface of Russian culture. It never spread beyond a very limited group or governing class. It remained a foreign importation, hostile to the temperament and character of the Russian people. This made the overthrow of the existing order the easier. But what is not so generally understood is that it made the establishment of any political procedure along Western European lines, whether as a constitutional monarchy or republic in their usual sense, an anomaly. Whether the new society in process of formation in Russia will assume a position of leadership depends in a large measure on whether it will be able to evolve a new technique of social relations. This becomes the more evident when we consider the destructive vigour of democratic doctrine.

V

Rousseau differs from Marx as the French Revolution differs from the Russian. The former merely sought

to refashion the body politic, the latter seeks to inaugurate a new society. If we examine Rousseau's doctrine, we come immediately upon the key to his programme. He wished to emphasize what he held to be the defects of political technique, wherein the general will had no means of expressing itself. This will, which is the fundamental factor in political organization, Rousseau claimed was infallible, can never err and never seeks aught but the realization of the best interests of society at a given moment. The natural outcome of this postulate urged him to seek to discover some method whereby this general will should find expression, and as a consequence the inherent rights and liberties of every individual will, as forming part of the general will, be realized. "Each and every one of us," Rousseau declares, "places his person and all of his power under the supreme direction of the general will, and each member is held to be an indivisible part of the whole body."

Here is the basis of his social contract. This was not an original idea, but first used by Hobbes, it was made over by Locke to suit the needs of parliamentary government. Rousseau recast it in order to regulate the behaviour of the majority in his effort to discover technical means of giving expression to the general will, which he claimed was identical with that of the majority; the will of the victorious party in the struggle of conflicting opinions. This will of the majority, that is to say, of an electoral, numerical majority was then given the symbolic appellation of the "rights of man" and the "sovereignty of the people." He made use of current humanitarian theories in so far as he could twist them to fit his main thesis of the supremacy of the general will.

Rousseau's chief historical significance is due to the fact that he suggested a plausible method of democratizing the technique of politics. The French revolutionary doctrines were based on his theories. The destructive vigour of the Revolution was in a large measure the outcome of the ruthless effort made to apply to political society the remedies which he

suggested. Since that time, the virus of democracy has spread throughout political society. Democracy has even been adopted as the ideal of that society and confounded with a constructive force. Here, Rousseau shows his great superiority over Marx. He had evolved a workable technique, and it may be possible to aver, if we omit psychological considerations of a subjective nature in estimating Rousseau's work, that he himself believed his theories to be "for the good of mankind." If so, we can readily see that in spite of the fact that he was one of the keenest political theorists, not inferior to Machiavelli or Aristotle himself, he fell into the error of confounding social judgments, arrived at as the agreeing factors of social intercourse, with the categorical judgment contained in his idea of a general will.

VI

Leaving out of account for the time being, the view that the existence of a general will is highly problematical, and confining ourselves to Rousseau's theory, we will discover that it postulates a will as existing within the bounds of the social order, at once actual and general, arrived at by the temporary surrender by the individual of his individuality and his power, both to be placed at the disposal and under the direction of, the general will. It assumes that in the State which includes complex groups of complex interests, which speedily develop collective selfishness, a general will nevertheless exists. If we distinguish the acts of volition from the object willed, the acts of volition must remain individual, and cannot be delegated or transferred beyond the limits of a particular interest. Furthermore, those concomitant factors which find expression as public acts in political society contain very little of what can be called will. They include habits, prejudices, half-conscious motives, dimly foreseen consequences of present desires. Important political decisions are rarely taken as the result of a definite expression of the individual, much less of a general will, but are rather the consequence of those

psychological impulses which have little in common with acts of violation. In spite of the fact that Rousseau claimed that sovereignty cannot be delegated, he seems to sanction the delegation of the individual will. He is thereby led to infer that the general will implicitly involves the recognition of the equality of those participating in its formation. He is careful to state that he has no way of knowing how inequality arose, how man lost his freedom. He sanguinely presupposes this liberty to have been the prerogative of man in a state of nature; probably merely for the purpose of being able to point out how inequality, though obnoxious, became legitimate.¹ Unlike Marx, who gives us what appears to him as a satisfactory chain of circumstances which must inevitably lead to the overthrow of political society, Rousseau merely postulates a change from a former free and equal status among men which preceded their present inequality. He in no way defines this inequality, but apparently assumes that it was political inequality. For the purpose of emphasizing the social phases of his doctrine of democracy, he asserts that political inequality is the sole drawback to the immediate realization of complete human happiness. His skill as an expert technician is revealed in the suggestions which he makes to realize in practice the premises of his theory. This may serve to explain his insistence that "the will of the majority" represents the "sovereignty of the people."

The expedient Rousseau makes use of appears on the surface to be both logical and reasonable. The magic of numbers is invoked. A counting of heads is transformed into a counting of wills. The will of the majority, which may be defined as the will of the minority plus one, is then erected into a general will, in spite of the fact that the will of the minority, which may be, and often is the numerical majority minus one, is diametrically opposed to the will postulated

¹ "Man is born free and he is everywhere in chains. . . . How this is brought about I do not know. What could make it legitimate? I think I can answer this question." Cf. *Contrat Social*, Bk. I, chap. I.

as the general will. Thus the majority, for the time being, must be endowed with dictatorial powers to enforce its will. In spite of this very faulty structure, the theories of Rousseau, owing to the simplicity of the technique suggested, received wide acceptance. Not only may they be held responsible for the destructive work of the French Revolution, but they performed an even more important part in planting in the core of the American theory of state, the seeds of democratic doctrine. Some of the founders of the government of the United States had an intuitive realization of the dangers of democracy and endeavoured to safeguard the State from the encroachment of democratic theories. Thus, whereas the philosophical basis of the American theory of state as contained in the Declaration of Independence is democratic, the executive and administrative functions as outlined in the Constitution are hedged about with safeguards against the intrusion of democratic doctrine. The American theory admitted democratic generalities, which made possible the spread of democratic principles ; its practice was based upon political methods of an oligarcic nature not unlike those of republican Rome. The State was to be governed by an executive endowed with many arbitrary powers, and it was to be administered through the influence of small committees—congressional committees—formed from among the elected “representatives of the people,” without the latter being fully aware of the oligarchic nature of their institutions. In this way the subversive influences of democracy were held in check, and the dissolution of political society retarded. The success of the American system had great influence abroad in popularizing those democratic theories which aim at the destruction of politics as the focal factor of the social order. In the United States it led by slow degrees to the sterility of politics noted in the later phases of party government. It made possible the gradual development of a new social order within that of decaying political society.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL PRACTICE

The Nature of the Social Process—An Historical Interpretation—
The Example of the United States—The Kantian View—Psychological Considerations—Political Institutions—Secular Morality—
Sovereignty—The Origins and Forms of Government—The Influence
of the Renaissance in Italy, France and England.

I

NATURE always builds before it destroys. As in the chrysalis, before the old cell structure has completely broken down the new structure is already in process of formation, and the essential features of the butterfly are contained within the decaying larva—so in the old social order the new form of social life takes shape.

The old society is not to be looked upon as the mother of the new in accordance with the Marxian interpretation, but a complete transformation may be said to take place, and the new order arises out of the old as a butterfly soars out of its cocoon. This would appear to be the process of social evolution. In this light history reveals the fact that social life is not a mere random process, but a progressive actualization of conscious development towards a definite goal. Instead of history repeating itself, the facts of history never recur. What does recur is the process of transition which, from stage to stage, appears identical. Yet each such transition has individual features characteristically different, different in degree and in kind.

History does not deal with individual phenomena but with the general character of singular episodes. This does not mean to imply that everything that occurs is to be held to be logically necessary. History reveals

not only the rational, but also the irrational in the life process, and is bound up therewith. But the laws we may deduce from historical analysis should be accepted as even more valid than those of natural science ; for the data of history is endowed with a universality which in science is only inferable from the examination of individual phenomena, and the process repeated over and over again. Natural science has no means of evaluating the general character of singular episodes, which is the principal function of history. Such an episode, for example, is the influence of democracy on social life. We cannot analyse it properly by following the ordinary method of science. This has often been attempted in reviewing the focal factors of social life, such as war, religion, politics, economics and their various implications. The result has been a distorted picture in which an inversion of values has often resulted. But by following an historical method as suggested here, we may trace with precision those general features which characterize social evolution and the development of new social forms, and deduce therefrom propositions which correspond with reality, and are therefore true.

Thus in examining the nature and character of the decline of political or other cohesive unities of social intercourse, we invariably come upon the coincidence that democracy flourishes during the final stages of the old order. A phase of this process is well illustrated in the political institutions of the United States. Before the establishment of the American state-system, politics as the focal factor of social intercourse had in Europe reached a high stage of development. The democratizing of political institutions which continued throughout the nineteenth century is marked step by step by the decline of politics, at first scarcely noticeable, but later leading to the stage of political sterility and stagnation which we may observe to-day. It is not a question here whether social conditions outgrew political institutions which thus became obsolete, but we wish merely to point out that the development of a new society was taking place in the United States, much in the fashion that political society evolved after the decline

of the feudal system through the democratizing of the war process.

Or again, we may here find an adequate explanation of the fact that the United States to-day appears as the most conservative political State, and its people as a whole, the bitterest opponents of the various forms of socialism and radicalism. In Russia and the United States, we have the two opposite methods and tendencies in the process of social evolution. On the one hand we may note the degeneration of political society through the agency of democracy, on the other the violent measures required to make up for the absence thereof. In the United States, political society, permeated with the democratic spirit, is following an inductive and empirical method of evolving a new society. Russia is the protagonist of a new order based on *a priori* hypotheses which serve to supplant the lack of democratic influences in the past.

II

When we turn away from political theory and contemplate the realm of practical politics, we are confronted with a different set of values. The primacy of practical reason was postulated by Kant with a view to reconciling theoretical exigencies with practical interests. Kant subordinated theoretic thought to practical reason in an effort to reach a higher harmony. But he excluded from his method those forms of judgment, those categories, which natural science cannot make use of, but which form the basis of history.¹ Kant sought to define theory by determining the essential nature of practice.

Political theory, however it may in recent times have been influenced by Kantian rationalism, has for its principal object the task of pointing out how things

¹ Kant's definition of the law: "Das Recht ist der Inbegriff der Bedingungen unter denen die Willkür des einen mit der Willkür des anderen nach allgemeinen Gesetze der Freiheit zusammen vereinigt werden kann."—Cf. *Metaphysik der Sitten*, Part I. Also his *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* illustrates the practical nature of his conception.

ought to be. Political practice interprets things as they are. Political theory is based upon the belief that an order independent of individual differences, exists. Political practice emphasizes the actuality of individual differences as contained in various opinions, which it endeavours to correlate and express in the form of social judgments referable to the norm of theory. The intrusion of individual differences, or, as they may be called, "wills," makes it essential to seek to harmonize these differences, not by subordinating theory to practical reason in the Kantian sense, but by the adoption of a method of co-ordination, by referring the *is* to the *ought to be*, which is, as we have seen, the function of the technique of politics.

When we enter upon a detailed consideration of the field of practical politics, we are confronted at the outset by what in psychology is known as the stream of consciousness. Political practice deals with the data of social life, not as a fixed state as is the case with theory, but as continuously arising out of a previous state and developing into a subsequent state. Thus the practice of politics finds much of its interpretation through the adoption of psychological method. It endeavours to transfer to a given group those characteristics, emotions, abilities and volitions which it is assumed an individual possesses. The practical politician is supposed to possess an instinctive knowledge of the nature of the individual, of human nature. He has no method of estimating group action except by individual standards. In practical politics the individual becomes the norm of social life. A political age is one during which individualism is most highly prized and reaches its fullest realization. Yet politics takes for granted the pre-existence of a social group.

The city exists before the individual can realize his individuality. Political practice must assume that over and above individual volitions, acts of will exist independent of subjective caprice, and that this will may be relied upon to react in the present and in the future, in the identical fashion that it reacted in the past. It is a will that is expected to preserve its identity in

spite of changing conditions, just as the individual is believed to retain his identity. This will is embodied in the theory of State and the government of a given group of people, and forms the basis of what we may call their political institutions. It is in these institutions that theory and practice may be said to be united by the technique of politics. Thus the functions of political institutions belong to the realm of practical politics.

Politics differs from other means of social grouping in that it is based on a system of selection, or choice. In a society in which politics is placed at the centre of its organization, its institutions do not arise as the result of a divine sanction as is the case in a religious society, or by hereditary hierarchy as in a warlike social order such as the feudal age, or by an apparently implacable necessity which is the mainspring of all economically organized groups, but by what we may call a rational choice. The character of political society and of its institutions is determined by selection or, as it is commonly termed, election; of two possibilities, to select one, preferably the right one, is the alternative offered. This gives to politics that colouring of liberty which is so highly prized by the human spirit. It is essentially an individualist mode of choice between alternatives.

The course of development of political institutions may be traced by examining the character of the choice made. Political practice is wholly concerned with methods of selection, in order to determine in so far as possible in advance a means of selecting the *right* alternative and rejecting the *wrong* one; though *right* and *wrong* are for political purposes shorn of their ethical signification and invested with the meaning of advantage or disadvantage to the continued existence of the given institutions.

III

Political institutions thus tend to develop a code of secular morality consonant with their needs, and it is an error often made to declare that politics has nothing to do with morals. In point of fact morality is the prop

of the institutions evolved by a given social order. It is its code of conduct without which this order could not exist. The fact that political morality differs from the code of morals belonging to the mediæval age that preceded it, or to the age that is now opening before us, should not exclude the recognition of a moral code peculiar to political institutions. In point of fact that highly complicated mechanism of political society, the State, is a fabric of interwoven moral obligations which make possible the functioning of government. The decay of politics like that of any other pivotal factor of a social system, brings in its train the discrediting of the moral code which animated it.

If we examine the institution comprised under the term the State, we will discover that in reality it is little more than a series of moral obligations to do or to leave undone certain acts of what are termed sovereignty. Sovereignty in modern usage denotes the supreme power of the State as the law-making, law-enforcing agency. It endows the State with territorial powers, the right to exclude all foreign interference in a given territory which gives to the body politic its corporate character. As a result the sovereign State came to be held a physical entity endowed with specific functions. Yet if we continue our analysis further, we soon discover that in reality the State is a moral rather than a physical structure, that the territorial character of the modern State is not the essential essence of the State but merely a secondary attribute. The State, in so far as it may be tangibly isolated, embodies a specific code of conduct and public morality, which finds expression in what is termed government. For purposes of practical politics, it is the government of the State rather than the State itself, that is the chief concern.

An inquiry into the origin of government has often been attempted. It has been the subject of much *a priori* speculation. Many theories have been advanced to explain its rise. In Modern Times a primitive, social contract was hypostatized which gained widespread credence. Here was a definite foundation upon which to build a theory of human society. But with the growth

of evolutionary theories, that of the origin of government underwent a change. The older contractual theory was rejected, and natural causes devoid of all purposive elements were substituted. War, the family, external pressure, a common foe, were cited as causative agencies. Other suggestions were advanced but proved equally unsatisfactory. Whether we listen to Hobbes, or Sir Henry Maine, to Rousseau, Spencer or Seeley, Bentham, Comte or Bluntschli, in no case have any of these inquirers advanced any adequate proofs of their assertions. This is due in a great measure to the fact that the State was interpreted to be an exclusively political society, wherein the governing were identified as sovereign, the governed as subjects or citizens, and government arose with a view to adjusting the relations between these two elements. The fact that owing to the rise of democratic influence the governing and the governed were in the declining political society identified as one and the same, merely added to the confusion already subsisting regarding the essence of government. In spite of outward differences we must note a great similarity in all of the views hitherto presented. It is assumed that the social world coincides with political society as it exists in Modern Times.

It is extremely difficult for an observer to form an objective opinion regarding institutions of which he is a part, in spite of the fact that he may be bitterly opposed to their existing form. It is far easier to view dispassionately the nature and character of a social order when it is no longer the active medium of our intercourse. We to-day understand far better the fundamental principles of mediæval society than did the peoples who composed it. We are in a like fashion just beginning to be able to consider in a scientific spirit and without prejudice or bias the basic principles of political society. We may now hope to discover the characteristic features of political institutions without having to refer to any national or partisan view-point.

IV.

The careful classification of the organs of political society in proportion to the importance of governmental authority as between local and central governments, or between the governing and the governed which has hitherto been the major interest of students of politics, has become obsolete.¹ We have grown so accustomed to confuse government in general with the political institution currently known by that term, that it is very difficult to divest ourselves of the preconception that government is necessarily, as it is in its modern political sense, a form of authority delegated by sanction. Whether this sanction was divine or secular was for a long time the subject of inquiry among political philosophers. When the course of events showed that such sanction, to be in accord with political institutions which had evolved their own code of morality, must be secular, what became known as constitutional government arose.

The division of government into aristocratic, monarchical and democratic which was known to the Greeks of the fifth century B.C. and reaffirmed with emphasis by Montesquieu in the eighteenth century, was later abandoned when it was recognized that these terms can relate to various institutions which may exist more or less simultaneously, though the ascendancy of one phase is likely to give a general colouring to the whole order. In our view the error lies deeper. Hitherto, a proper understanding of the terms aristocratic, monarchical and democratic has not been arrived at. These cannot rightly be held forms of government, but must be considered phases of government.

We may go so far as to assert that we have here a basis for a more satisfactory interpretation of the nature of government. Government cannot be interpreted by any classification of forms or of agencies of authority, but rather as the factor in social science corresponding

¹ Recent political writers have abandoned the attempt to classify the forms of government, though they still make a distinction between parliamentary and non-parliamentary forms according to the degree of representation.

to the life process in natural science. This does not mean that we need hold a biogenetic view and beg the question by asserting that government is compounded from government ; or yet accept a hypothesis similar to that of Lord Kelvin's suggestion that the "germs of organisms" were brought here by meteorites from other world systems—in social science a theory of divine origin ; or that government which we maintain is in social life the correspondent of the life principle, evolved from non-living matter to which it eventually must return—an hypothesis favoured by certain biologists which in sociology finds its counterpart in an economic interpretation of history. It is agreed that it is as difficult to trace the origins of government as it is of life itself. Nevertheless we may approximate to such a definition by pointing out that what we term life is an organization of functional parts, and that it is not the organs nor the function, but the combination of organs and functions that results in the so-called life process. The same is true of government. Our view is that government is the origin of social life, and not that social life is antecedent to government. Government exists before the term "social" comes into language or can be understood by human reason. Viewed in its broadest aspect, government is antecedent to the life process or at least a realization of this process. It is not claimed that government can be summarized in a single phrase. Yet we may accept the view that government fulfils itself in law.

The transition of law from a code of private rights to that of public needs, marks the transition from a pre-political to a political social order. This is consistently illustrated by the history of mediæval times. The feudal world concerned itself little with general interests, it sought merely to safeguard private rights. During this era, government was divinely sanctioned, and politics, in so far as it may be said to have existed, was held to be a branch of theology. The unity of the mediæval world knew no geographical limitations ; the conception of sovereignty was only dimly realized. The individual as such did not exist—man had con-

scious knowledge of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, of a corporation, family or some other grouping.¹ He knew himself only as a member of a group.

V.

It is in the Italy of the fifteenth century that we find that individual self-consciousness was first awakened. Hand in hand with the democratizing of the war process and the rise of politics which made possible an objective view of social life, we may trace the rise of individualism which was to play such a preponderant part as the burden bearer of the culture of Modern Times. We now come across *l'uomo unico, l'uomo singolare* for the first time, and there follows a long line of "supermen" such as Leonardo da Vinci, Michael Angelo, Francesco Sforza, not unlike the type that Nietzsche vainly clamoured for at the close of the political age. Here at the dawn of the modern epoch, we may see in these people of the Renaissance, in their mode of living and mode of thought, the origins of that feeling of personal sovereignty, which, carried over into the realm of politics, gave to the individual a desire for independence which became the chief incentive of all political action.

The influence of individualism upon the political institutions of the Western World must be held in view in order to arrive at a proper understanding of political practice. Sovereignty, which in its origins may be defined as the result of the awakening of a feeling of individual self-consciousness, was in the realm of political action transferred in the first instance to the head of the State. It is in France that this conception of sovereignty first found actual application. The feeling that the self-conscious individual has as the sole and sovereign power over himself, which we meet so often among the Italians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, was made over into a political principle, and by Bodin postulated as the characteristic feature of kingship. As he expressed it, "All the characteristics

¹ Cf. Jacob Burckhardt, *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*, Urausgabe, Part II, chap. i.

of sovereignty are contained in this, to have power to give laws to each and everyone of his subjects and to receive none from them." The king usurped for himself this exclusive sovereign right, and thus sovereignty became identified with the head of the State which gave to the State its peculiar and distinct characteristics as a person, in its relations with other nations that were patterned on the model of social relations among individuals. We may here find an adequate explanation of the court life of France, of its forms and social ceremonial, its politeness and gallantry which became the model of social intercourse among the "court circles" of Europe. These are but evidences of that "feeling of sovereignty" which manifested itself in Italy during the Renaissance as an awakened individualism. The desire for fame, the cult of *la gloire* in a secular sense as typified by the practices of the court of Louis XIV, the training of the courtier, the insistence upon culture in the sense of personal accomplishments, in brief the term "society" as it is still commonly used in polite parlance, are all remnants of the conception of individualism as first manifested during the Renaissance. Until the days of the French Revolution, it was possible for the king to retain for himself, as his personal privileges, those characteristics of sovereignty in a political sense of the term, which, during the nineteenth century, were transferred to the State.

In England the influence of the Italian Renaissance was more direct and emphatic. The awakening of a self-conscious individualism was here more widespread, more akin to what took place in Italy. The king was unable to claim for himself exclusively all of the characteristics of sovereignty, as was the case in continental Europe. After the glories of the Elizabethan age, came a marked growth of individual self-consciousness, of self-realization, of a desire for self-government as we might best term it. This transformed the character of political institutions by vesting sovereignty in the State, or rather in its government, which was held to be delegated to it by the electorate.

CHAPTER IV

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

The Sphere of Sovereignty—Transfer of Sovereignty to the State—Government and the State—The State as the Complete Social Organism—The Consent of the Governed—The Formation of Parties—The Cabinet—The Electoral Privilege.

I

SOVEREIGNTY, liberty, authority and equality are the bases of modern political practice. They are an outgrowth of the individualistic view-point which, as we have seen, arose during the Renaissance, and characterizes that epoch as a departure from the collective, social ideals which prevailed during the feudal period. The sphere of sovereignty was soon made coincident with that of government. Sovereignty was in the first instance restricted to the person of the king, and the question of the succession to sovereign authority, or the right to govern was the principal determinant of continental politics. All of the great wars of the eighteenth century, and these wars were essentially political,¹ are concerned with questions of the succession to the throne. It was not until sovereignty had definitely been made over to the State that government came to be invested with those characteristics of majesty and power which had hitherto vested in the person of the prince.

The history of the evolution of constitutional government marks the phases of this change. England offered the model of this new type of sovereign authority, vested no longer in the prince, but in that imponderable combination of social relations of the inhabitants of a defined geographical area which became known

¹ "La guerre de Sept Ans, quelle que soit la variété de ses événements, est une guerre politique et de stratégie; elle n'a pas l'intérêt des guerres d'idées, des guerres de religion et de la liberté au seizième siècle et au nôtre."—Cf. Michelet's, Introduction to Thier's *Histoire de la Revolution Française*, vol. i, p. 106.

as the State. The prince had, in the first instance, stretched out his hand and grasped as wide an *expanse* of territory under his sovereignty as he could defend against the encroachments of other sovereign princes. When sovereignty was transferred to the State, the State carried forward this policy of conquest and incorporation with even greater zeal than the personal sovereign had vouchsafed to do. The principle of such individualized state sovereignty was to become the basis of international relations.

International law arose as the code defining the rules of conduct of sovereign states in their intercourse with each other. The transfer of sovereignty to the State gave to the latter those characteristic features of individuality which were to become the distinctive marks of the modern State. Sovereignty became the most jealously guarded prerogative of the body politic, the token of national independence to which all of the peoples of the Western World were to aspire. The feeling of national solidarity or patriotism was a direct outgrowth of the carrying over of the concept of sovereignty into the realm of practical politics. The sphere of such sovereignty was, under the new State system, constantly extended. Not merely the territory of the State, but territorial waters, colonial domains, ships at sea, the flag, as a symbol of the national State, came to be invested with the insignia characteristic of sovereignty. Sovereignty in this broad political sense was henceforth to be the basis of the liberties of a free and independent State. Within the boundaries of the State this liberty found its widest expression in the privilege of sharing in the control of the State, in its government.

The State was now recognized as a group of persons occupying a fixed territory. The government of the State became identified with the State itself. Its organs stand over and above the subjects or citizens of the State, just as in the Middle Ages, the Church stood above the layman. Henceforth the State is held to be the most complete form of social organization, the only sovereign authority in a given territory. It rises high above all other corporate forms, spiritual or

secular, which are held to be but incomplete organizations, lacking the characteristic of sovereignty. The State claims for itself the right to regulate and control all other forms of corporation. The distribution of power in the State becomes a principal problem of politics ; the relation of the governing to the governed, the chief concern of the State. How sovereignty may be distributed without the government of the State losing its control, is intimately bound up with the growth of the constitutional system.

II

As we have noted, it is in England that constitutionalism arose. Here government first became subservient to the will of the electorate as represented in Parliament. But this electorate was for a time in the nature of a closed corporation which jealously guarded its electoral privilege. It believed in a system of exclusion. It looked upon the franchise as a prerogative, and in this sense was above the law. Furthermore, this electorate held itself to be self-sufficient ; its membership was controlled by a property qualification. Property came to be looked upon as the *alter ego* of the individual elector. Feudal property was slowly disappearing, and private property, in its modern sense, taking its place. Such were some of the historical changes which indicate a shifting of the centre of gravity of the body politic from the king to Parliament by the establishment of constitutional government.

Constitutional government, which signifies the transference of sovereignty as the personal privilege of the king to that of the State, came to be considered the most admirable form of political organization, the ultimate expression of true liberty. The poets and philosophers of the day joined in the exaltation of this new liberty. Freedom, the goal of mankind, was soon to be realized. Man was to be a free citizen in a free State, modelled along constitutional lines.

Much of the exuberant optimism of the later age of enlightenment is traceable to the spread of this new doctrine of human freedom. Summed up briefly, this

freedom consisted in the right to vote. It was interpreted to imply that government was to have a new function to perform. Government was no longer to be primarily an organ for maintaining order, but for promoting justice. Justice was the natural consequent of freedom, and henceforth the individual was to be free. Even so shrewd an observer as de Tocqueville, writing near the middle of the nineteenth century, declared that "the object of the State is the emancipation of the individual." The State in its constitutional form was to reflect individual freedom as the moon may be said to reflect the light of the sun.

The struggle for electoral privileges was to become the principal factor in political action. The theory that the government of the State rests on the consent of the governed had found in the constitutional system a rudimentary method of enforcement. To devise some method whereby the "consent of the governed" could be given adequate expression and justly be determined, became the chief concern of practical politics. This consent was held to embody the will of the State, and became the mainspring of the action of government. The function of government was, in principle, to act in accordance with the dictates of the authority delegated by the electorate to Parliament. Parliament, composed of elected representatives, was to take steps to see to it that the will of the enfranchised was enforced.

III

It is common experience that a corporate body which habitually acts in unison, comes sooner or later to feel itself no longer composed of individuals, but a distinct and separate unit. In this way, Parliament was not slow to claim for itself those characteristic marks of sovereignty which had hitherto been held to belong exclusively to the king. Technically, government became a "complex system of royal acts based upon the advice and consent of Parliament."¹ In point

¹ Cf. H. Laski's interesting essay on the "Responsibility of the State in England" in his *The Foundations of Sovereignty*.

of fact, the verdict of Blackstone that Parliament "hath sovereign and uncontrollable authority—this being the place where that absolute despotic power which must, in all governments, reside somewhere, is entrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms," clearly expresses the arbitrary character so readily assumed by parliamentary bodies. A majority of the members of Parliament constituted the basis of the new governing authority and became identified with government. To gain control of the government, that is to say of this majority, became the principal aim of political practice among that small group of political leaders, professional politicians or statesmen as they came to be called, who devoted themselves exclusively to political affairs. This led to the formation of political parties and the establishment of the Cabinet as the highest governmental authority. Party government evolved slowly. The Cabinet becomes the executive committee of the State. It is composed of a small number of leading members of Parliament belonging to the party holding the majority for the time being. These Cabinet members act individually as the executive heads of the various departments of State. Collectively they agree to serve under the leadership of a Prime Minister, who is the advocate of a definite programme of policy. We find that the King withdraws more and more from affairs of State, and public policy is determined by the Cabinet, though the King is kept informed of its acts and may exercise pressure upon its deliberations. The Cabinet is now directly responsible to Parliament, and when no longer able to command a majority, is compelled to resign. The responsibility of the Cabinet is not a legal obligation, but merely serves to indicate its position of dependence upon the electorate, as the life of such a Cabinet is contingent upon the control of a majority in Parliament. Party politics becomes a struggle for office, a competition for the control of the machinery of government which was henceforth the chief concern of politics.

Such are some of the main features of constitutional government in England. Though the party system was

later more highly developed in the United States, and the theory of responsibility of the executive authority, which in England vested in the Cabinet, was modified and assumed elsewhere different forms, yet in the main the system of constitutional government and party control, which was later extended to all civilized countries, was everywhere based upon these same fundamental principles.

IV.

Government, the life process of the body politic, is under the constitutional system held to have its source in the will of the enfranchised electorate. The electoral privilege is a very ancient institution. During the Middle Ages, whatever political life may be said to have existed, found expression during the meetings of assemblies in the towns and shires for certain local administrative purposes, chiefly matters of assessment. The growth of the guild system and of powerful corporations gave to the latter a measure of self-government in a political sense of the term. In the rural districts in England, elections took place to the old county courts, and the electoral privilege was confined to freeholders. In the fifteenth century, with the awakening of political consciousness, these representatives were no longer content merely to vote on questions of assessment, but undertook to deliberate on matters of local policy. In 1430, we find that in the counties, the right of voting was so regulated as to be confined to persons possessing freeholds in the shire to the value of forty shillings a year. This formed the basis of the electoral privilege which the middle class, when it came into power, firmly adhered to, so that this property qualification was not abolished until four centuries later by the Reform Act of 1832.

The middle class, which had gained control of government and had established the constitutional system only after a bitter struggle with the Crown, was anxious to retain for itself the prerogative of the ballot. This class was made up largely of Puritans, traders in

the towns, gentry and farmers in the country, who had fought for religious liberty and had gained therewith political authority. Wycliffe, already in the fourteenth century, had formulated the doctrine which had guided Puritan action. In his *Summa Theologica*, he states, "All human authority is conditioned by the worthiness of the person exercising it, and unworthiness is a valid reason for withdrawing one's allegiance." It was after withdrawing allegiance to the Stuarts, whom they deemed to be unworthy, that the middle class had finally taken over control of the reins of government. This same class was to see to it that the persons exercising authority should be directly dependent upon it, and that a change of those persons might take place without it being necessary to have recourse to revolutionary methods. This may serve to explain the adoption of a system of complete dependence of the actual executive authority upon the will of the majority in Parliament. It interprets more significantly than has hitherto been the case, the reason for the instability and transience of Cabinets and executive authority in general, which is so characteristic a feature of the constitutional system. It gave to politics that semblance of freedom of action, and of control of authority by the individual elector which was cherished as the expression of assertive, or, as we may say, sovereign individualism. At the same time, it introduced that element of uncertainty of the tenure of office, which precluded a logical sequence of policy, and gave to political history its haphazard and reckless character. The rapidity with which Cabinets are overthrown, the constant changes of government, such as witnessed in France and other continental countries, are patent examples.

This subservience of executive authority led to the corruption of politics, as witnessed in the rotten boroughs in England even during the most flourishing period of politics; or the "spoils system" and ward politics in the United States. It subsequently gave to politics that colouring of democracy which is typified by the equality of the ballot. It made it appear as

though the executive authority was *de facto* as well as *de jure* under the direct control of the voter, and gave rise to the doctrine of popular sovereignty.

In defining the dominant position of the middle class in the realm of practical politics, it must be borne in mind that during the formative period in England, the control of public office rested altogether in the hands of those members of the aristocracy who had adapted themselves to the new order, and sought to retain control of the affairs of State by enforcing middle class policy. They emphasized the personal character of government, and gave to party action that cohesive unity which would have been impossible under a more extended franchise. Whether consciously or not, the middle class realized that the extension of the suffrage would result in the democratizing of political institutions which would entail the loss of their control of the government.

It is an error often made by historians to view the Revolution of 1688 in the light of a democratic movement. It must rather be looked upon as the crowning episode in the rise of individualism, of personality as sovereign, and the transfer of these characteristics to the State. In point of fact, the political age, the era of constitutional government, which we may conveniently date from 1688, though an earlier date during the same century, the Great Remonstrance of 1641, or, viewed from the standpoint of foreign affairs, the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, for example, might be chosen, coincides with what in history is known as Modern Times. In its proper sense modern politics knows no other than the constitutional form. During the era that preceded, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, politics was emancipating itself from the trammels of religion. During this period, the chief concern of the peoples of Western Europe, was the establishment of a code of secular morality, based upon an alert and awakened sense of the value of the individual. Such was the true significance of the Protestant Reformation. It became the ground on which politics was to flourish.

CHAPTER V

FOREIGN POLITICS

The Influence of France—The Liberal Movement—The European State System—The Peace of Paris (1763)—The French Revolution in its External Aspects—Psychological Interpretation of Political Episodes—The Stage of History.

I

WE have dealt in some detail with constitutional practice in England as it is the model which other States sought to imitate. Its form was peculiarly adapted to the needs and requirements of the English people. It is not surprising, therefore, that among no other people did the prestige of parliamentary government rise so high. But if modern civilization owes so much to the people of England for those representative institutions which were to be the basis of the political State, and for the technique of home politics, the struggles of a people of racial or political affinity to erect a sovereign State and establish its independence as such, owes little or nothing to their example or assistance. As we have noted, relations between sovereign States and the complexion of foreign politics was moulded by France.

During the century and a half between the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution, politics in the realm of foreign affairs, was concerned with giving to the State corporate unity, as embodied in the person of the king. This was done by adapting old feudal institutions to the new political requirements. In England alone, the constitutional system had been established. On the Continent, the State continued to be the passive property of the king, who embodied all sovereign power. But with the opening of the

eighteenth century, a wave of liberalism swept over continental Europe.

Liberalism may be termed an effort to reform existing institutions which are growing senile. It is a remedy offered when social institutions are no longer suited to actual requirements. At such times we meet with a systematic effort to reform and remodel them in accordance with their new needs. When a storm of social upheaval is brewing, efforts more or less violent are made to stave it off by, what in history, we may recognize as liberal movements. Liberalism may be compared to the warm, soft breeze that precedes the breaking of the storm. Men are for a moment lulled by a sense of well-being into forgetting that the storm is upon them. Such an era preceded the French Revolution; such an epoch was ushered in with the twentieth century. We have Roosevelt attempting to found a progressive party and let a breath of fresh air into the old system, or Mr. Asquith defining liberty in a "liberal" sense, as "the power of initiative, the free play of intelligences and wills, the right, so long as a man did not become a danger or a nuisance to the community to use as he thought best the faculties of his nature, or his brain, and the opportunities of his life."¹ We might almost think that we were listening to some of the florid generalities of the eighteenth century, when the theory of human rights was the gossip of the inns and the coffee-houses.

The liberal movement of the eighteenth century was no exception to the general rule. Liberalism is at best a futile doctrine, a sort of social anæsthetic. In the eighteenth century it assumed a peculiarly benign form. At that time, those in authority were, on alleged to be, enthusiastic about applying the doctrines of liberty, equality and fraternity, which the political pamphleteers were sowing broadcast. Liberalism, in its political interpretation, monopolizes "liberty" and defines it in accordance with the tenets of constituted authority. The liberalism of the eighteenth century

¹ Cf. Speech at the conference of delegates of the Liberal Association of East Fife, 1907.

demanding unfettered liberty ; that of the twentieth, categorically declared that unfettered liberty cannot be tolerated in a civilized State. During the eighteenth century, cosmopolitanism united a group of eminent philosophers in an international fraternity for the dissemination of the liberal doctrines of the day, regardless of the limitations of national boundaries. In the twentieth century, liberalism had to combat socialist doctrines which were essentially international in character, and we find the liberals of each country patriotic and nationally exclusive.

It is not the place here to review either of these two liberal movements in detail. I have set forth a few salient contrasts in order to show the essential ineffectualness of liberalism to do more than for a time stem the tide of social development along the lines of its more natural evolution. It must, however, be noted that liberal movements attract men of high personal worth, and of natural conservative tendencies, who nevertheless represent to themselves that they are on the side of the new order, when in point of fact they do more than their so-called conservative opponents to delay its advent. Such was the case in the eighteenth century. At that time France was the centre of the liberal movement, which spread the new political theories of the age, and preached the advent of a social millennium by the establishment of a cosmopolitan world State.

II

In the realm of practical politics we may, on the contrary, trace the rise of highly individualized sovereign States, which were to form what we would term a constitutional system of States, similar to a certain degree to the constitutional system in its internal organization. Here it was not the individual who was struggling for his rights and his personal freedom, but small vassal non-sovereign States were seeking to gain their national independence and assert their sovereignty as equals in a society of nations. In the formation of this State system, France played a preponderant part.

The Peace of Paris of 1763, which brought to a conclusion the Seven Years' War, served to determine the new orientation of foreign affairs and the subsequent growth of Nation-States. It marks the rise of Prussia under Frederick the Great. Prussia was henceforth to feel herself equal to Austria, and we may here see the beginning of the long struggle for hegemony in Germany which France originally aided and abetted, as she looked upon the Habsburgs as her traditional enemy on the continent. England found herself mistress of the seas and in control of India, which were henceforth to shape the course of English foreign politics. We may here detect the hand of the French, diverting the attention of England from the continent to problems of overseas expansion. Though the French were driven from Canada, this event was to lead directly to the American Revolution and the establishment of the United States. Here again we may observe the skill of French foreign policy in turning to best account the defeat overseas, and exploiting it to fullest advantage by supporting the American colonists in their struggle for independence. Russia, also as the direct result of the treaty, was drawn into closer contact with Europe and brought for the first time within the orbit of the West. In general, all of the participants in the Seven Years War, Prussia, Great Britain, Austria, Russia, France, Sweden and Spain, for the first time, felt the stirring of that new feeling of national unity which was to dominate foreign politics during the ensuing century.

III

In dealing with the French Revolution, historians, as a rule, emphasize the work of demolition which it accomplished. They insist upon the results which may be traced to the dissolution of the feudal order and the final abolition of its rights and privileges. On the constructive side, they set forth that the Revolution was the culmination of the struggle for human rights in an individualist sense of the term. Liberty and equality were henceforth to govern the social relations between

individuals. The high hope placed on this new political liberty, which included as its natural corollary equality, was doomed to early disappointment. Thiers, in concluding his study of the Revolution, remarks: "The Revolution which was to give us liberty and which prepared everything for its advent someday, was not and could not itself be liberty. It had to be a great struggle against the old order." He then adds hopefully: "Liberty was to come someday. It has not yet come, but it will come."¹ It is significant that Thiers, writing during the third decade of the nineteenth century, should have declared that "liberty" has not yet come. He was unable to foresee that whatever liberty the individual was to attain during Modern Times, had already been won in England, and that the constitutional system already established, was to spread, first to continental Europe and subsequently throughout the civilized world. In this work, France played a secondary part. The Revolution only indirectly influenced, but did not alter the fundamental character of constitutional practice as developed in England. By dressing it up with high-sounding phrases, the Revolution popularized English parliamentary government. Careful historical inquiry reveals the fact that this was only an incidental phase of French revolutionary propaganda. The true significance of the Revolution must be sought in the realm of foreign politics. Here we may discern the constructive factors of this event, which serve to confirm our view of the preeminence of France in the shaping of the character of international politics.

What took place at Paris during the Terror or even at less disturbed periods, during the decade of 1789-1799, the storming of the Bastille, or the enthronement of the cult of the Goddess of Reason, or any other similar episode, has no place in a scientific history, which purports to relate the significant events of the Revolution. Such episodes should be examined by specialists in abnormal group psychology or group

¹ M. A. Thiers, *Histoire de la Revolution Française*, concluding graph.

dementia. The methods of psychological inquiry applied to such disturbed periods in history will be more fruitful of good results than the romantic bombast with which historical narrative is so often strewn. Though the school of Carlyle stands discredited in recent historical science, yet much remains to be done to exclude from historical narrative, episodes which more properly belong to other branches of science. Whereas history, in the sense of a detailed narrative of circumstances leading up to a given crisis, may assist the psychologist or psychiatrist, in arriving at a proper diagnosis, yet the facts of such a narrative should not obtrude in the diagnosis itself.

The object of history, in its proper sense, ought to be to set forth the course of events based on such a method of diagnosis, rather than to present a strung-along narrative, as though the episodes of social life were pearls to be strung on a string for the adornment of civilization. If the historian is to be in a position to do this, he must be able to turn with confidence to the research of the group-psychologist, to the work of specialists in group dementia, in revolutions, wars, and so forth, who will offer relatively sound data concerning group abnormality. The study of revolutionary epochs is a case in point. We are placed in a peculiarly favourable position to pursue such experimental analysis. There is much data now available for such study, without our having to have recourse merely to the scanning of documents.¹

¹ During the nineteenth century, the question whether history should be considered the subject of science or of philosophy, was widely discussed. In point of fact, the Political Age was in its essence imbued with that haphazard method of generalization which is termed philosophy. The true scientific spirit was, and at the present writing, still is to a large extent in its infancy. As the scientific attitude comes to displace the philosophic, so scientific history will more and more replace what has hitherto been termed philosophy. History, during a scientific age, cannot be based on the heterogeneous half-understood and uncollated mass of data with which it has hitherto had to deal, but must base its conclusions, founded upon diagnoses scientifically arrived at in some such fashion as is the case in other branches of science at the present time. History will then no longer be confined to an inquiry into the past. It will be in a position to diagnose existing conditions on the basis of the known factors presented to the historian by the various branches of scientific research. To-day, we may already reject as inadequate the method advocated, for example, by Seignobos, who in his *Introduction aux Etudes*

The decade 1914-1924 is rich in material for investigation by the group psychologist imbued with the new scientific spirit. The revolutions of 1917-1919 in Russia, Germany and elsewhere, can only find proper interpretation if examined as mass movements judged by the norm of the known factors of group psychology.¹ It is only after such specialization has been carried forward that we may hope to arrive at a scientifically accurate survey and proper perspective of the true significance of the course of events. It is not claimed, as has often been done, that if the psychology of individuals were well known, we should be able to foretell their conduct in a given circumstance. It is not here implied that in like manner when group psychology has been the subject of careful inquiry, we shall be able to predict with absolute accuracy the trend of events. Nevertheless, the need for sound psychological analysis is urgent. What is required is a group of experts who will devote themselves to the investigation of the data of history in the manner here suggested. It is high time that the science of history be no longer considered a free field for the browsing of the voracious-minded, unscientific historian, philosopher or novelist.

We have on more than one occasion felt the absence which a reliable method of psychological investigation would have afforded to arrive at a sound interpretation of events. In the more limited field of biography, we may note the success which has attended the application of psychologic method, owing to the development which

Historiques declares: "L'histoire se fait avec des documents. L'historien observe les documents directement: après cela il n'a plus rien à observer, il procède désormais par voie de raisonnement pour essayer de conclure aussi correctement que possible des traces aux faits."

¹ Though group psychology is still undeveloped, W. MacDougall and Graham Wallas have sought to make a start by establishing a basis for investigation. LeBon in his *Psychologie de la Foule* has made some interesting and fruitful observations. Sig. Freud in his brief paper entitled *Massenpsychologie u. Ich-Analyse* puts forward further suggestions based on the apparently well-founded hypothesis that "Im Seelenleben des Einzelnen kommt ganz regelmässig der Andere als Vorbild, als Objekt, als Helfer und als Gegner in Betracht und die Individualpsychologie ist daher von Anfang an auch gleichzeitig Sozialpsychologie in diesem erweiterten aber durchaus berechtigten Sinne."—*Op. cit.*, Introduction, p. 1.

individual psychological research has attained. ' Yet we cannot agree with Lord Morley's dictum that, " History is only intelligible if we place ourselves at the point of view of the actors who make it." ' Such an interpretation may have satisfied an individualist age,² but it will be readily acknowledged that great leaders, generals and statesmen are merely incidents in the broader social complex, mouthpieces, if you will actors of the process of history.

Institutions cannot be changed by the will of individuals. Such change has far profounder cause, and must be sought elsewhere. It is not intended to imply that social movements are anonymous. The actor is essential, as essential as in the theatre. But are we justified in interpreting the performance of the actors as though each had written his or her own part? What is true in the theatre is even truer on the larger stage of history. Here the figure of the actor assumes even smaller proportions in relation to the course of events. Events in history are like the scenes in a play and only have significance within the broader context of the whole. Mommsen has so well remarked : " History cannot reproduce the life of a people in the infinite variety of its details ; it must be content with exhibiting the development of that life as a whole." ³

In this way it may be seen how the true significance of the French Revolution has so often been distorted by undue insistence upon incidents which are of psychological value to the specialist, but should not find their way into the pages of the historian. What the French Revolution did accomplish was to arouse a sense of deep national patriotism, of territorial allegiance to the politically organized State. The State system of the *ancien régime*, based on the last surviv-

¹ Cf. *Life of Cromwell*, p. 238.

² De Tocqueville notes : " Dans les siècles démocratiques l'historien voit beaucoup moins les acteurs et beaucoup plus les actes." The author here makes use of the term democracy very loosely. This careless usage destroys the harmony of an otherwise shrewd observation, especially as he continues : " Les historiens anciens ne faisait pas assez usage de theories generales, les modernes sont trop prêts en abuser."—Cf. *Démocratie en Amérique*, Vol. III, p. 143.

³ Cf. *History of Rome*, vol. i, p. 188.

ing vestiges of the feudal age, disappeared. It had been a system of alliances of the two opposing ruling houses—the Bourbons and the Habsburgs—which for two centuries had contended for the domination of Europe. After the Revolution this system was not revived. In its stead, we may trace the rise of national States and the process of State building. Modern Germany, United Italy, the Balkan States and finally the resurrection of Poland and the States carved out of the Russian Empire and the Dual Monarchy mark the stages of the predominance of the doctrine of nationalism, and the hegemony of France after the war of 1914. Already there were many signs of the dissolution of the political state system.

IV.

We can here discern the course of the evolution of the French doctrine of state sovereignty. We may note the direct influence of France in the erection of the national State system. We may follow the growth of the recent phases of international relations based on the sphere of influence of the State ; the rise of Great Powers, of World Powers, of neutralized States and the whole scheme of international sovereign States endowed with those characteristics of independence which under constitutional government had been acquired by the individual. Here we may see these attributes transferred to the State.

The right of sovereign statehood was the high goal to which all of the nations of the Western World were to aspire. In international politics it corresponds to the right of suffrage which in home politics was the aim of the individual member of the State. As the political parties competed for power and office at home, so the national States competed for ascendancy in the realm of foreign affairs.

Throughout this process we may record the tireless energy, the unflagging zeal with which the French pursued their plan of attaining to the hegemony of Europe. It confirms our view that the actors, be they

men of genius or of mediocrity, play no determining part as the moulders of events, but are merely instruments of the social process. We may thus interpret aright the rôle of Napoleon I and his efforts to assert the predominance of France by conquest. After the failure of this programme we find France, under Napoleon III, the champion of nationalism, moulding the course of foreign politics. Undaunted by the *débâcle* which followed, France, under a new republican régime, still pursued the same plan. We can, in the light of this interpretation, arrive at an understanding of the method adopted to build up a new system of alliances, similar to that of the eighteenth century. It explains the formation of the coalition which became known as the Triple Entente, and the unloosing of the military forces of the world in her behalf in the last mighty effort to attain to the hegemony of Europe which was an underlying cause of the World War.

It is not here intended to infer that this was the deliberate plan of the countless ministers of State who held office at the *Quai d'Orsay* during the past half century. We would not aver that they conceived with such precision the sequence of events or the historical mission of France in the field of international politics. Yet a careful perusal of history will serve to confirm the view that it was as we have pointed out, the method and practice of France that determined the characteristic features of foreign affairs, just as England outlined the course followed by constitutional procedure.

If we examine with care the evolution of constitutional government, we will find that it was, for example, no mere fortuitous circumstance that women's suffrage was first advocated in England. When J. S. Mill, writing in 1869, declared that : " the principle which regulates the existing social relations between the sexes—the legal subordination of one sex to the other—is wrong in itself and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement ; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other," he, for the first time, enunciated a doctrine

which in its realization, a half century later, was to introduce universal suffrage in its most extended interpretation. Just as the question of suffrage may be viewed as the principal one in home politics, so the creation of Nation-States is the central focus of foreign affairs. As France moulded the course of events in the realm of foreign politics, so from England came the impulse and plan for the internal organization of the State. This may serve to show the course of development of much that appears ambiguous in history, and explain the decay of the political state when its ultimate aims had been attained. We would not insist too much upon this solution, which on the surface appears oversimple. But in point of fact, it does serve admirably to interpret the main current of political practice.

The close parallelism between home and foreign politics may be confirmed if we are careful to keep apart their sources. Thus, to take a case in point. The colonial policy of England is to be viewed in the light of home politics; the colonial policy of France belongs to the realm of foreign affairs. The expedition of 1830, which led to the conquest of Algeria; the effort of Napoleon III to found a Mexican empire; the acquisition of Tunis in competition with Italy in 1881; the penetration of Morocco which led to the crisis of Agadir in 1911; all indicate the habit of France of viewing colonial problems as a part of her foreign policy.

England, on the other hand, in the establishment of overseas domains, gave to these possessions a distinctly Anglo-Saxon character, and sought to create a feeling of solidarity and community of interest with the mother country, so that their administration became matters of home rather than of foreign politics. India, which might have readily become a question of foreign policy, has always been held by Englishmen a proprietary interest which enhanced their feeling of individual power. In spite of the efforts made by France to embroil England in foreign political entanglements, as for example, in Egypt, she has in the main been unsuccessful. The only period during which

England took an active part in foreign affairs in a real interpretation of the term was in the days of Disraeli. His policy was, however, contrary to the best traditions of England, and was due largely to the fact that France had suffered such a defeat that she was not in a position, for the time being, to take an active part in world affairs. As soon as France had recovered sufficiently we see England returning once again to her position of isolation and detachment in Europe. Such was not the case with modern Germany.

V.

The rise of the German Empire is in a measure to be attributed to the vigour of the German people in the competitive struggle between States. But the headship of the Hohenzollerns in Germany and the exclusion of the Habsburgs is traceable to an original plan of France, matured during the eighteenth century. Without making an appeal to what is so often called the logic of history, we can account for the rapid rise of Germany as part of an original French plan. In this light the proclamation of the German Empire in the halls of Versailles would, by a theatrical episode, seem to confirm the inexorable sequence of the social process. "France raised up Germany to political greatness in order to be able to strike her down," the older type of dramatic historian might succinctly put it. But we cite this episode which had its conclusion in the same halls of Versailles in the summer of 1919, merely as an illustration confirming our view regarding the true nature of international politics. The appearance of Germany as a powerful State, during the final phase of the political age, must be regarded merely as an interlude in the realm of international affairs. Germany served as the stepping stone to the culmination of the plan of the hegemony of France and the dissolution of the political state system which we are now witnessing.

If we examine the history of modern Germany we will find that during the early stages of his chancellor-

ship, Bismarck apparently had a shrewd conviction that Germany should not, in so far as her continental position permitted, become entangled in foreign affairs. His principal aim was to consolidate the internal structure of the State with due regard to its geographical position in Central Europe. Thus he looked upon the Triple Alliance in the light of home politics.¹ Yet he was apparently not shrewd enough to estimate at its proper worth, the influence of France in the realm of foreign affairs. He overestimated the consequences which a military defeat inflicts upon the conquered contestant. He never realized, nor did his successors realize, the historical position of France in Modern Times. When after the accession of William II, Germany plunged headlong into the main current of foreign politics and, for a time, made Berlin the political capital of Europe, contesting the century-old prerogative of France to mould the course of foreign policy, we may trace, step by step, German progress by the blunders which those entrusted with the guidance of foreign affairs at Berlin made, which were dexterously exploited by France. But more important than these mistakes of political tactics, the Germans forgot or more probably never clearly realized that war and military power in itself were no longer the determining elements in the social process, but merely a means to an end. Germany never had a clear-cut political objective. "A place in the sun" is not a political aim.

It must further never be lost sight of that the rules of the game of international politics are of French origin. They are the direct outgrowth and development of peculiarly French racial characteristics which have been carried over into the realm of political affairs. Traceable in the methods of a Louis XI, and already vigorous in Richelieu, they were adopted by Napoleon I, and made use of by Poincaré. The cohesive unity of France, the absence of a disturbing individualism or of a rampant particularism; the Gothic spirit, as we may call it, which made possible

¹ Cf. Wallace, *The Trend of History*, p. 329.

the building of the great cathedrals of Rheims and Chartres, are all distinctly grouped as opposed to individualist characteristics. Joined thereto, there is in French character a zeal for proselyting which we may note in the French Jesuits in the seventeenth century in Japan and Paraguay, as in the propagandists of the Revolution. Withal there is an innate conviction latent in the heart of the average Frenchman that his land is the earthly paradise. All these factors must be taken into account in estimating the nature of international politics.

It becomes evident how unsuited Germany was to enter the lists against France in this field. A deeper examination than has hitherto been undertaken by historical inquirers into Franco-German relations will reveal the successive steps whereby France deftly extricated herself from out of the ruins which a purely nationalist policy had heaped upon her during the rule of Napoleon III. It will show the skill displayed in turning to good account the auto-intoxication which the German people experienced as a result of their victory of 1870. It will be discovered that the Triple Alliance, instead of being opposed by France, was in a broader historical sense, abetted by the latter, in order that she might be in a position when the proper time came, to turn to the two other great States of Europe, Russia and Great Britain, and point to the menace of the Triple Alliance, and enlisting their support form the Triple Entente to counterbalance it. It will become more evident than it has hitherto been that the overt hostility of the French towards Italy, which forced the latter to seek the protection of a German alliance contrary to the vital interests of Italy, as an independent and sovereign State, was undertaken not without shrewd political insight based on the conviction that in spite of a paper alliance, Italy would never become an aggressive factor against France in the event of actual conflict. Viewed in the light of history, Germany appears as a pawn in the game of international affairs that, for the time being, had been allowed to play the part of a king.

CHAPTER VI

PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT

The Right of Belligerency—Politics and Nationality—Local *versus* Central Authority—Two Aspects of Sovereignty—The Secularization of Morality—The Moral Code of Political Society—The Greek View—Subsequent Development—Hobbes—Natural Laws—The Concept of Progress.

I

WE have surveyed some of the principal factors of political practice in its two facets of internal and external affairs. It is in Modern Times that this distinction may, for the first time, be carefully drawn. In essence they are referable to the interpretation placed upon sovereignty, both in an individual and a national sense.

In its simplest form sovereignty implies equality co-existent with the power to enforce it. Individual sovereignty is expressed in the generic term liberty, defined in politics by succeeding generations in accordance with the needs of the ruling class of the moment. Liberty has thus been inclusive or exclusive at various epochs. Originally exclusive, the prerogative of a limited body of men, it tends with the decay of a particular institution to become inclusive. We have what we term the spirit of democracy, which finds expression in popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty, if it means anything, is the affirmation of the "right" of the people of a given sovereign State to govern itself; that there shall be no other source of authority but that of the electorate. In point of fact, this conception of sovereignty has always remained a fiction, though it has influenced the course of constitutional practice, which reached its highest and most consistent

expression in English political institutions. The establishment of a system of rational intercourse between States, and the adjustment of international problems never attained a similar degree of development. The individualism of States, which their sovereignty postulates as independent and above the law, prevented the growth of an orderly means of adjusting differences comparable to that of the elective system in home affairs. The power of the State was maintained by reliance on armed force, though diplomacy, in a measure, took the place of an immediate recourse to arms.¹

The State had asserted for itself the sole right to wage war; it legalized war to the extent that it retained for itself the right of belligerency which came to be the principal prerogative of sovereignty. International law sought to establish a code of war to which all civilized States would adhere. But the attempt was only partially successful, as it was held to be the sacred duty of the State to defend its national honour and vital interests at all costs. International relations remained chaotic when compared to what was achieved in the narrower field of national affairs.

II

If we seek to sum up the essential features of politics we first come upon the importance it attaches to government. In Modern Times the entire social process resolves itself into devising methods for erecting adequate governing bodies, in outlining the nature and character of government. In other words, politics appropriates government as its own particular sign, just as religion appropriates the Deity as the central factor of its cult. The theory of politics defines the scope of government. Political practice is concerned with arriving at some system of social ordering, adapted to the actual conditions of group life at a given moment, by means of what we have termed the technique of politics. It will thus be seen that politics is, in reality, merely a secular

¹ Cf. p. 18.

method of accomplishing certain social ends, without reference to the intervention of a Supreme Being. It is a rational method of bargaining, of adjusting differences, which accompanies the awakening in the individual of a realization of his own aptitudes.

Politics flourishes during periods of enhanced personality, when human life as a separate unit is deemed valuable in itself and capable of the progressive development of its innate capacities. Individualism is carried over to the group and leads to the foundation of national States. Among peoples whose individualism has not been over stimulated, as was that of the Italians during the Renaissance by the humanists, or as was the case in Germany and England during the Reformation, national solidarity attains to a higher degree of compactness, and the allegiance to the State becomes a more comprehensible doctrine. Such peoples conceive government in its national, not in its local sense, and we have the centralization of authority as we find it in France, where local administration remains of secondary importance, while the greater destiny of the State in the realm of foreign affairs is, as a natural consequence, the principal task of government.¹

Government came in political society to have two aspects. Looking inward upon the State and its citizens or subjects, government was the supreme and sovereign authority invested with full powers to maintain order and promote public welfare. Looking outward, government, while asserting its sovereignty, very jealous in matters of national honour and national pride, found itself confronted by other sovereign States animated by similar desires and ambitions, and in the last analysis, relying on armed force to settle all differences. The State, as sovereign, admitted of no superior, and claimed for itself absolute independence. Government, which directed and controlled the destiny of the State, came to be invested with characteristics of omnipotence, hitherto reserved exclusively for the Deity. Government

¹ It is of importance in estimating the position of France in the modern State system to bear in mind the various causes which contributed to the development there of national individualism. Not the least of these is the fact that the Reformation never gained a permanent foothold.

thus came to symbolize the life process of the State, its animating agency similar to the life process of the individual.

In order to appreciate the full significance of government in political society and arrive at an understanding of the transformation of social life which resulted, we must constantly hold in view the secular nature of its moral code.

The secularization of morality must be signalized as the most significant contribution of the political age. Though in classical antiquity, there were epochs of political preeminence, eras of individualism, so that already in the fifth century B.C. the saying is attributed to Protagoras that "man is the measure of all things," yet politics was never in the past able to free itself altogether from religion. To be sure both Plato and Aristotle taught that the individual has a duty to perform towards society as represented by the State, and that moral virtues have social as well as individual worth. Yet the Greek State itself was compounded of religious and secular elements without any clear line of demarcation being drawn between them. If we review the various types of government from earliest times, we find that it was only during the modern age that we come upon a strictly secular government. The Amphictyonic Councils were mainly religious, but came to concern themselves with secular matters. In Rome politics and religion were never carefully separated.¹ Tacitus gives an account of the "Truce of God" of the Germanic tribes, a rudimentary political gathering, closely connected with the worship of Hertha. When, after the barbarian invasions, the Church of Rome drew to itself the control of the social order of Western Europe, it naturally subordinated secular functions to religion. The gradual ascendancy of politics arising out of a reawakened individualism, of which the Renaissance and the Reformation were the two most active propagators, tended to displace religion

¹ Even when a high stage of political development was reached, we find that, "Pontifex maximus atque arbiter rerum divinarum humanarumque"—Festus, *De Verborum Significatione*, p. 185.

and substitute a secular view-point, which became the basis upon which government in Modern Times was erected.

III

The belief that government is established, not merely for the sake of maintaining order, but for promoting justice as the foundation of a good life, very briefly summarizes the transition from a religious to a secular moral code. Religion posits that "God is just." Politics endeavours to show that "government is just." To establish some form of government that will insure justice has been the aim of modern political practice.

It is to Hobbes that we must turn to discover the first outline of a strictly secular moral code. It is well to recall that he published his *Leviathan* in 1651, three years after the Peace of Westphalia, and in the year that Cromwell became the *de facto* dictator of England. Standing, as he did, on the threshold of the modern political age, we find him attempting to codify the egoism of individualism and compound this egoism with the aims of government in the promotion of justice. Hobbes characteristically forecast the temper of the new age in his definition of felicity as a "continual progress of desire from one object to another, which soon translates itself into a perpetual and restless desire for power after power that ceaseth only in death."

The highest of all virtues he held to be social eminence which inspires fear in others. Hobbes insists that all men are by nature equal, that is, equally capable of doing each other injury, and on the average, equally capable of self-defence. It is this equality which promotes ceaseless strife and requires a central authority strong enough to prevent it. "Where there is no common power there is no law ; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues." But according to Hobbes, the first and most fundamental Law of Nature is "to seek peace and follow it." He thereupon sets about to outline eighteen other such laws, which may be taken as the basis of

the accepted code of secular morality. These may be summed up in the words: "Do not that to another which thou wouldst not have done to thyself." Here we may discover the distinction between religious and secular morality.

Secular morality was in the main negative. It was well fitted to the temper of the times. It inverted the old positive tenet of Christianity "do unto others as thou would have others do unto thee," and sought a way out consonant with the protestant spirit of the middle class, which was rising to power in the newly forming social life. It is not averred that Hobbes himself had any fixed plan to set forth what we now term a secular moral code. He was, as far as can be discovered, not conscious of the significance of his work or of its distinctively secular character. The laws of nature, which he enumerates, he held to be immutable and eternal. They indicate a decided break with the old order, a protest against unreasonable traditionalism and a blind acceptance of the older religious moral code without reference to personal good. In fact, his whole code of *jus naturale* is but a series of formulæ which are closely linked with the individualism of the age.

Hobbes, in the construction of his political system, refers constantly to the fear of every man for every man. This may account, in a large measure, for the form of political absolutism which he advocated. It led him to transfer the absolutism of the mediæval Godhead to the State. "Without government," Hobbes declares, "there exists continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." To do away with this fear and curb the selfish impulses of individual action, the State is set up as the criterion of morality. Government comes to have power to restrain individual warfare, to promote peace and remove fear which prevents the pursuit of happiness. Hobbes also asserts that his code of Laws of Nature is the result of a rational inquiry into the nature of man. But reason alone is not strong enough to insure its enforcement. This is secured, in the first instance, by contract between individuals ani-

mated by opposing interests. He declares : "Covenantants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all."

IV

When we consider the general character of the Italian Renaissance, and the individualist influence spread over Western Europe during the sixteenth century, we are not surprised to find that the ground upon which Hobbes endeavours to erect his State system is the firm conviction that individuals are not naturally adapted to organized social life, and must therefore be compelled to submit to such organization, if need be by force. Hence arises the urgency of establishing a secular government, a State which all men will obey. In spite of the apparently despotic character of government, as he sees it, Hobbes conceives of the State in its truly modern sense. A wide gap separates the Leviathan from all previous forms of absolutism, when he declares : "As if every man should say to every man, 'I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition : that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner.' This done, the multitude so united in one Person is called a Commonwealth. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather to speak more reverently of that mortal God to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence." Here we see the individual acting, as it were, of his own free will, as the equal of other men who are inspired by like motives. The power of the government of the State thus established is conferred upon it by the individuals composing it. The individual has become the centre of the universe.

Hobbes, for the first time, outlined the thesis which was destined to become the motive force of political action and secular morality. Government, both in public and private affairs, was henceforth to rest upon the consent of the governed. Examined in the light of its origins, the subsequent development of politics

and secular morality becomes very clear. The individualism of the age had, for the first time, given a sense of real social importance to the gentry, burghers, small landed proprietors, merchants, in brief, the middle class. The older, religious organization had crumbled and left the individual isolated in a disturbed and disturbing world. The members of the middle class, more especially in England, had, for the first time, played a conscious part in history. The State, as embodied in the person of the monarch, had strengthened its position by its emancipation from Rome. Its government was now the highest social authority. Many members of the middle class, dissatisfied with the newly established State Church, had been bold enough to dissent therefrom and establish a church organization of their own. But some felt that this Church was not strong enough to form a valid social bond. Further, the newly aroused self-consciousness of the middle class, which had been stimulated during the Elizabethan age, directed attention to the affairs of this world as of more importance than those of a world to come. A new sense of national patriotism, of national allegiance was supplanting religious sentiments. The old religious code of morality had become discredited. In the new moral code the predominance of secular interests made itself felt. The State had inherited, as Hobbes shows, many of the attributes of the Deity, had become the "Mortal God." But the average man was jealous of his newly won sense of individualism. The condition of his life, here and now, not only was of more concern to him than it hitherto had been, but it was coming to be believed that it determined his future salvation. The concept of progress was being formulated; the possibility of perfection by man's own efforts, was beginning to be dimly realized. All of these factors contributed to give a secular colouring to the new tenets of social organization, and were incorporated in the new moral code.

Such are some of the characteristic elements which contributed to the formulation of the code of secular morality as the basis of political society in Modern

Times. It will become evident that the separation of morals from politics, which Machiavelli is credited with having first called attention to, by reviving the distinction drawn by Aristotle, shows that this separation is only valid as between religious morality and politics, and that secular morality, which was developing, had not been taken into account. It is evident that Machiavelli had no clear appreciation of the possibility of establishing a secular moral code. To speak of a separation of morals and politics, and to declare as in subsequent epochs, more especially during the latter decades of the nineteenth century, was insisted upon by Trietschke and other political philosophers, that politics has nothing to do with morals, is evidence of ignorance or of a distorted view-point.

Politics evolved as consistent and well thought out a moral code as did the religious society which preceded it. Political society is based on a worldly way of thinking. This worldly way of thinking, which takes the individual as the social unit, outlined a secular moral code consonant with the fundamental tenets of a world view, in which man's immediate horizon is bounded by the physical world, by life here and now. This code we find expressed in the natural laws of Hobbes, and it is not without importance that this same thinker should have evolved the fundamental tenets of modern political practice. His laws of nature became the gospel of the political age. We would not deny that his premises often appear unduly harsh and misanthropic, but his contribution, as the founder of the moral code of Modern Times, cannot on this account be overlooked. He holds the mirror of middle class political society up to nature, and we see there reflected a truer picture than is generally acknowledged.

Hobbes did little more than assemble the loose ends of current doctrine and opinion. His code of secular morality is very close to that of religious morals. In both instances they arose from the desire to attain peace. But secular morality looks to establish peace here; religious morality is more concerned with peace hereafter. Secular morality aims at establishing

peace between individuals. The government of the State, or as we may here say, secular government, to distinguish it from the religious control of the social order, was established with a view to securing this peace. The unit of this social order was not, however, in the first instance the State, but the individual.

V

As we have seen, the individual bulked large on the social horizon of the Renaissance and the subsequent age. What Burckhardt has to say regarding the individualism of the Italians during the Renaissance applies, making allowance for temperamental, historical differences, to the peoples of Western Europe in general, more especially to Englishmen. We would quote the following passage very fully, as it serves to show the nature of the soil out of which the modern, political age grew. In reviewing the national traits of character of the Italians of the Renaissance and the morality of the age, he concludes :

Excessive individualism, the fundamental vice in their character, was, at the same time, the cause of their greatness. The individual first cast off the rule of constituted authority, which was in point of fact in most cases tyrannical and illegitimate, for what he did or thought, whether rightly or not, he knew would be reckoned against him. The success, which attended a thorough-going egoism, inspired him to emulate the examples set before him in everyday life and defend his interests with his own strength, believing thereby to be able to secure peace ; only to fall a victim through revenge of " the powers of darkness." In his amours, he seeks a partner whose sense of individuality is as highly developed as his own, his neighbour's wife. In contact with all matters of daily life, of the law, or restraints of whatever kind, he retains the conviction of his own sovereign individuality, and meets every situation from this independent standpoint, according as honour or interest, passion or calculation, revenge or renunciation, gain the upper hand.

If, therefore, egoism in its wider as well as its narrower sense, is the root of all evil, the more highly developed Italian was for this reason, more inclined to wickedness than individuals of other nations, at the time. This individualism was not the result of any fault of his own, but an historical necessity. Nor were the Italians the only peoples imbued with this spirit, but it was spread chiefly

through Italian culture among the other peoples of Western Europe, and has, since that time, constituted the framework of their social life. In itself, it is neither good nor bad but necessary; within its bounds, the modern standard of good and evil has grown up, a sense of moral responsibility which is essentially different from that which was current during the Middle Ages.¹

To insure peaceable relations between individuals, to re-establish the dignity and prestige of law and order, which had been overthrown by the collapse of the secular authority of the Church of Rome, and in addition, to promote justice, was the immediate task of politics. Constitutional government, as evolved in England, was devised to secure this end. It is significant that the modern concept of equality, which was carried over into the field of politics and there transformed, was, in its origin, like all the other tenets of middle class individualism and politics, essentially negative. Equality signified "equal ability to do injury." It was only much later transformed into a positive assertive characteristic by Rousseau, who, here as elsewhere, showed a profound ignorance of the historical origins of the ideas he made use of.

Another enduring tenet of secular morality, traceable directly to Hobbes, is the conviction which became current, that there is no good in society apart from its members. Yet the individual, as a member of the commonwealth, surrenders his rights to a central social authority, and identifies his will with that of the State. Here we can see how the doctrine of a general will arose by eliminating the individual and regarding the State as a being made up of these delegated wills. In point of fact, the will that Hobbes had in mind was negative, "the will to do injury." Though civil government subsequently sought wider fields of activity and translated this negative characteristic into a positive right, political society was never able to devise any sound system for the fusion of wills, even by such alchemic methods as suggested by the use of the concept of political equality.

¹ Cf. *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*, Urausgabe, Part VI, chap. i, concluding paragraphs.

Political society never was able to get beyond the stage of an agglomeration of individuals ; it never achieved a truly social ordering. Constitutional government was established as a curb upon unbridled individualism, not to promote individual freedom as it was subsequently believed to be. If we follow the evolution of politics and of its accompanying secular moral code during the ensuing centuries, we will discover that both underwent many changes, but held firmly to the two basic, negative concepts—equal ability to do injury, and surrender of the will to do so.

CHAPTER VII

ETHICS AND POLITICS

The Constitutional System and Secular Morality—Shaftesbury—Kant—Utilitarianism—Individualism and Nationalism—The Aims of Political Society—The Influences of Urban Life.

I

WHEN political society had firmly established itself, and the State, as embodied in constitutional government, became the uncontested repository of social authority in England, we can discover a modification of the harsh moral code outlined by Hobbes. A new type of secular responsibility makes itself felt, which is first reflected in ethical speculation. The exclusive individualism of the early seventeenth century, inherited from the Renaissance, begins to give way, and we find it tentatively posited that the good of the species is to be held higher than the good of any one individual of the species. Shaftesbury (1671-1713), also calls attention to the fact that social affections are direct sources of good, apart from any considerations of self-interest; "public interest" helps to determine the standard of right and wrong.

It is not the place here to trace in detail the evolution of the new ethical code and its development parallel with that of politics. In the main the theories advanced by philosophical inquirers in the realm of ethics, reflect very faithfully the given stage of political development. Constitutional government was, in principle, conceded to be the most rational method of adjusting social differences, of restraining individualism, which led to the establishment of peace and order within the State. This result was achieved by adhering to the secular

code of morality which had been built into the constitutional system, by adjusting the relations between governing and governed on the basis of contract and delegation of wills, as first outlined by Hobbes. The attention of political philosophers was henceforth directed to the broader field of international affairs. No rational method of adjusting the relations between sovereign States was to be discovered. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that during the epoch which preceded the French Revolution, a reaction should have taken place against the predominance of reason, which was to have far-reaching influence on public morality.

Hume, writing in 1739, declares: "Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions, and never can pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." Rousseau takes his cue from this new intuitional doctrine, and gives us an irrational, or as we may say, a passional interpretation of political theory. He transforms the rational negatives of Hobbes into the irrational positives of political equality and the general will, which were susceptible of various interpretation. The subversive influence of the new doctrine made itself felt during the Revolution. In the meantime Kant strengthened the thesis of Rousseau by drawing a careful distinction between duty and self-interest, from which he deduces his categorical imperative: "Act only on the maxim whereby you can, at one and the same time, will that it should become a universal law." Broadly speaking, this is, in the realm of secular morality, the counterpart of Rousseau's political doctrine of the general will. Kant, furthermore, deduces a well-reasoned doctrine of the freedom of the will and undertakes the task of reconciling will and reason. Under this aspect we may view his very important contribution, as the founder of those various voluntaristic systems, which influenced so profoundly the practice of politics. He was also engaged in seeking a means of establishing peace among States, as Hobbes sought peace among individuals. He admits that, "Peace, among men who live as neighbours, is not a natural condition (*status naturalis*), which, on the con-

trary, is a state of war, even if hostilities do not always break out, yet they are continuously threatened. It (peace) must be made."¹

II

In the year of the outbreak of the French Revolution Jeremy Bentham published his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. We are not surprised to find that the doctrine that was to gain wide acceptance during post-revolutionary days should read: "Nature has placed man under the governance of the sovereign master 'pain and pleasure.'" Utility is to be the most satisfactory norm of morality. We also here find the basis of nineteenth century individualism in his declaration that "everyone is to count for one, and for no more than one." J. S. Mill carried the doctrine of utilitarianism to its logical conclusion nearly a century later. Writing during the American Civil War, in the year of the emancipation of the slaves in the United States (1863), he states: "Each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons." The end sought by Mill, as "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" marks the highest stage reached by modern, ethical speculation in the development of secular morality. Thereafter the perversion of the secular moral code and the decline of politics go hand in hand. We may trace this decay in the ruthless, voluntaristic philosophy which may be viewed as a counterpart of imperialism in the field of politics. The "will to live," the "will to power," and finally such a specious doctrine as contained in the clause "the will to believe," and the democratizing of the moral code which we find expressed in the pragmatism of William James, during the first decade of the twentieth century, are step by step accompanied by the decadence of political society, and the dissolution of secular morality, which was the basis of the social order.

We have only touched on a very few points of a

¹ Cf. *Zum Ewigen Frieden*, Part II, sec. i.

correlated movement, which may be traced with great precision. It will also be discovered that when individualism reached the height of its development, during the middle of the nineteenth century, a new, social doctrine was in process of formulation. "Socialism," as it is currently called, though the term is the bearer of numerous different theories of the new social ordering, may be conveniently used to sum up the new tendencies. These will be dealt with elsewhere.¹ We are here principally concerned with giving precision to the correlation between politics and ethics, as exemplified by the secular moral code evolved through philosophical speculation.

III

It will be seen that it is more than a mere coincidence that the modern political era should have coincided with the inquiry of philosophers centering about the individual and the ego ; with problems of personality ; of mind and matter. It is not merely chance that we find reflected in philosophy the temper of the times in which it flourishes. During the modern political age philosophy replaced religion in the development of the code of secular morality which had its roots in the self-assertive confidence of an awakened individualism.

Just as in the Middle Ages, we find those social characteristics of group unity and solidarity and the individual, rarely if ever, rises above the group to which he belongs, so in Modern Times, the individual asserts his autonomy and establishes a duality of interests, his own and those of the community. With the growth of political consciousness the line of demarcation between private and public interests becomes sharply defined. The new conception of individual sovereignty conduces to a sense of isolation. The older community spirit is replaced by a new, broader unity, which is termed national. Such community spirit, which we may discover in the corporations and guilds of the Middle Ages, or the orders of chivalry of the feudal régime, makes way before the rising importance of the indi-

¹ Cf. p. 234 *et seq.*

individual in private affairs, and of the State in public life. Communal property comes to be supplanted by private property ; private rights take the place of class prerogatives.

The contrast between the older communal form of social organization and the individualist form developed during the modern political age is emphasized in the antithesis set up between the notion of the community and political society. Political society, which is incorporated in the national State, seeks to devise a workable system of gathering together in this broader unity and binding by the ties of secular allegiance, individuals who feel no intimate affiliation with other members of the community. Viewed historically, the State system was established to put an end to the social chaos caused by the unbridled individualism which spread across Europe at the close of the Middle Ages. It was well adapted to assure peaceful relations between individuals living in close proximity, one to another, while still leaving room for individual initiative. Constitutional government was, from a psychological standpoint, admirably suited to these ends. It removed from the forefront of men's minds the fear of arbitrary punishment at the hands of an unprincipled ruler, and at the same time was strong enough to insure the peace and order necessary for the successful pursuit of those private interests which henceforth were to engross the attention of the individual.

The social consequences of the exclusive pursuit of private interests were far reaching. These interests were in the main economic. The older community spirit, which had governed trade and industry, had been replaced by this new individualist conception. Politics was already being pushed to one side by the electorate, the middle class, which had struggled so tenaciously to secure its constitutional liberties. A badge of nationality was given to the individual in return for allegiance to the State, though this allegiance was only very partially and loosely defined. The individual, as a member of the State, was conceded to have certain rights which the State undertook to safeguard.

At the same time, every adult individual was expected to defend his private interests himself against all comers, including, if need be, the State itself. He was no longer permitted to use force. His property was guaranteed to him by process of law. His property rights had been written into the new social code, and had become matters of principle concern to the individual, who, as a rule, looked out upon the world of politics from the angle of his private economic interests. Hence arose that antagonism between the individual and the rest of the community, which soon translated itself into a division of interests between the governing and the governed.

To increase his store of private property was the first interest of the individual in the new society. This served to emphasize his isolation. It fostered his energy and working zeal; it made him resourceful and independent, and gave him the sense of freedom which he craved. The fixity of the social order of the Middle Ages, which had been undermined during the Renaissance, had given way before the assaults of individualism. Now this free individual found himself isolated and stranded with a pack of private property on his back, or an empty one which he was anxious to fill.

The individual was henceforth the centre of the new social universe. His egoism was made to serve as the basis of the new social order. Egoism, though characteristically anti-social, was held to be the highest "social" virtue. Expressed in terms of self-determination, self-help, self-government, it became the mainspring of action during the political age. It is not without good reason that the political era may be characterized as distinctly non-social. In fact, social order in the older sense of the term disappeared, and it is only with much difficulty that any social purpose may be traced beneath the hardened crust of individualism. It is not surprising that the fundamentally social concepts embodied in religion should have made way for the erection of numberless, mutually exclusive cults, and that religious propaganda should have adopted the competitive methods of an individualist society.

Competition replaced co-operation as the bond of social union. The pursuit of wealth had become the dominant interest of the vast majority, as to each individual was conceded the right to retain all that he could garner.

A complex system of exchange and contractual relations gave a semblance of solidarity to this individualist social structure. The emphasis on the geographical character of the State increased in direct proportion to the spread of an awakened individualism. Here was a method of devising a form of power, of corporate solidarity which permitted the widest scope for individual autonomy. A large State meant, so it was believed, that the burden of taxation, felt by the individual would be correspondingly lighter. Each member would have to contribute but a very small tithe of his private wealth, and in return receive even more adequate protection of his interests than had hitherto been the case.

IV.

Political society is in its essence, urban. It presupposes a common meeting place for the peaceable exchange of opinions, and a resulting compromise of divergent views arrived at by what is termed parliamentary procedure, and thereupon agreed to by the governing body, which promulgates the results of such method as the law. Cities are not mere marts of trade, but become the centres of social intercourse. Here we find that a community of various interests grows up, not so much confined to a trade or class, as to the given locality where the individual dwells and pursues his occupation, his private interests. Among individuals thus grouped, each attains to a certain feeling of liberty, security, and at the same time, privacy, as regards his own affairs, and a certain range of action which binds him more closely to others engaged in different pursuits, residing in the same locality. The individual is still isolated, but this isolation no longer inspires fear, as the protecting hand of the State is ever present.

It is susceptible of proof that the geographical State

system of political society was consolidated with a view to adjusting the newly won individualism to an orderly mode of life. It is this individualism which in turn conferred identity upon the State as a person. The State, thus organized, guaranteed the loosest possible social bond between individuals compatible with the greatest freedom ; while private rights and private property were safeguarded by public authority. The rise of great cities, capitals of States, was the natural consequence of this individualistic organization of political society. The city became the focus of social life. It is in the cities that the cultural atmosphere was evolved, which permitted the soaring of the free spirit. It is here that the individual was first led to accept the transformation of those negative concepts upon which political practice was built, "equality to do injury, and the surrender of the will to do so," into their positive counterparts of "equality" and a "general will." The well-policed, well-regulated and orderly urban society which we find in Modern Times, the respect, not merely for the laws promulgated by the authority of the State, but also for municipal regulations, the security of life and property, are but a few characteristic features of the city which contributed to raise the standard of living. The city became the focus of public opinion, the centre of culture which the State sought to appropriate and mark as its own. The city was characterized as the brain, the country, the brawn of the social organism. The two combined to give the State its individuality.

In point of fact, the permanent contribution of political society to the social process is not to be sought in the loose and arbitrary geographical State system and the subsequent exclusion of many vital interests from a share in the government, but in the great urban centres which became the hearths of social experiment, the laboratories of social science, the birthplace of a new society. The significance of modern urban life is here revealed. It does not belong to the political age during which it was developed, but to the new era. Just as the modern, geographical State system was first established during the feudal age, though it had no

part therein, so the modern world cities, New York, Chicago, London, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Buenos Ayres, or Tokyo, to mention but a few, cannot be understood unless we look to the social organization of the future, which will be divested of the limitations of a geographical State system.¹

The place of the city in political society is local and national. By contrast with the rural feudal society which preceded it, political society appears urban. Yet political society, which developed in the urban centres, was never able to free itself from the tyranny of "the country." In Europe we find that a landed aristocracy awed the middle class into subservience, long after the aristocracy had lost all real power in the State. In America the preponderant influence of rural communities was emphasized by the federal system, which gave "the country" an overwhelming, political supremacy over the city. This conflict between the city and the country has been continuous, but it is only in very recent times that we can note that the city has been able to emancipate itself from its environs. It has drawn a good part of the country to itself. It has converted the country at large to city ways of thinking. Where it has not done so, where the newspaper and the cinema, the two great propagandists of modern urban life, have not penetrated, there the country remains outside the orbit of history.

This subjugation of the country by the city is a cultural development which has its origin in political society, but does not belong to it. The political State system never was able to outgrow its distinctively geographical, and as a consequence, its rural characteristics. The State, nationally defined by rigid boundaries, remained to the end the social unit of political society. World cities, however, draw their sustenance from beyond national frontiers. However extended we may conceive these to be, frontiers are barriers which hamper development. World cities are not national, but cosmopolitan. In this light it will be seen that the world cities of to-day present an entirely new social problem with which the political State system is unfitted to deal.

¹ Cf p. 306

CHAPTER VIII

RELIGION AND POLITICS

Secular and Religious Methods—Their Ultimate Consequences—The Unknowable of Spencer—Pragmatism—The Fears of Inequality—Classical Antiquity—The Contribution of Christianity—The Rise of Secular Authority—The Rôle of Science—The Idea of Equality—Descartes—The Rational Mind—Individualism—Subservience of Religion to Politics.

I

IF we review very briefly the characteristic features of political society in Modern Times, we will find that its principal contribution was the establishment of a secular moral code, and the suppression of that violent individualism which accompanied the decay of religious morality at the close of the Middle Ages and produced the social chaos which prevailed in the Italian peninsula during the Renaissance. Politics is a secular method of securing order, which takes the individual as the central figure of the social universe. It posits that the individual has as such, a duty to perform towards society as represented by the State of which he is a member.

We have traced in outline certain consequences of the ascendancy of politics and of its accompanying moral code. During the final stages of the political age, we have Spencer telling us that : "Every man is free to do as he wills, provided that he infringes not the equal freedom of any other." Here we have equality and freedom linked together as the basis of the moral code. Here we have democracy firmly establishing itself at the heart of morality. William James, coming at the close of the political era, summarizes the concepts of the age under the criterion of convenience, that man

is the creator of truth and law. "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good." The true is only the expedient in our way of thinking.

The rapid spread of pragmatism is to be accounted for by the fact that a new series of fears had seized hold of the human mind. "'The will to believe' came at just the right moment to fill the void left by Spencer's Unknowable, that fatal outcome of the scientific method which had been exalted to the rank of a philosophic method. The door was open to the inspirations of feeling, since intellect, backed up by mathematical science, had done such poor service and had been constrained to own itself beaten, why not try to find a substitute for it?"¹ These words express the temper of the age. They reveal the new fears which the discrediting of reason had awakened. Reason no longer suffices; intuition is called in to aid it.² Imagination is essential to all thought.

These are but a very few indications that the older rationalism has been discredited, and that intuition is to be relied upon to explain man's position in the universe. If we seek for an adequate historical interpretation of the new movement, we will find that a transformation was taking place, in the social order, and that mankind found itself confronted with a new series of fears. This requires a brief analysis.

II

At the dawn of the twentieth century the individual in the West believed that he had mastered his political destiny, just as at the opening of the sixteenth century he believed that he had mastered his religious destiny. Anthropological investigation has revealed that all early forms of religion arose through fear of some transcendental power which it was believed shaped the destiny of human beings.

¹ Cf. Aliotta, *Idealistic Reaction Against Science*, p. 166.

² H. Poincaré, in his study on the value of science, asserts that it is not possible to base mathematics solely upon logical axioms. "Intuition must do its share."—*La Valeur de la Science*, p. 11.

A striking similarity of religious beliefs among primitive peoples has been noted.¹ This similarity is ascribed to an ignorance of science and a desire to explain the hidden forces of nature by some causal interpretation. Religion relies on miraculous powers which are placed beyond the chain of causality. It would appear that it is this feeling of fear which gave the first impulse to social life. It is a fear grounded in inequality. The individual confronted with the mysteries of natural phenomena, which he believes are animated by supernatural beings, seeks the protection of his fellows. This inequality before the Deity led to the formation of a communal organization of society characteristic of all early social life. It gave to the ministrants of religion their ascendant position. The inequality between man and his god was by degrees transformed. The community is consolidated and asserts its preeminence as a State. The State subjugates the gods and enlists them in its behalf, and we have what we may term political society as it existed in classical antiquity. The gods became local and national.²

Christianity gave a broader basis to religion than had hitherto been possible. Not content with offering a method for the elimination of fears for those who followed its precepts, it incorporated teachings of secular philosophy, of Stoicism and neo-Platonism, and offered a positive programme of action directed towards definite ends. Christianity, unlike other previous religious forms, assumed truth and offered value in return for allegiance. With the spread of Christianity in the West, religion

¹ "The general form of religious beliefs is much the same among Esquimaux and Africans, Red Indians and Ainos, Australians and Indian aborigines, Polynesians and Samoyedes."—Cf. MacCulloch, *Religion: Its Origins and Forms*.

² We may call attention to the fact that the rise of politics in modern times was accompanied by efforts to nationalize the Deity. The Reformation was, on its religious side, a disintegrating force. At the same time, it gave the needed stimulus to the emancipation of Northern Europe from allegiance to the Church of Rome, which made possible the formation of national states and the ascendancy of politics. The process was continued during modern times, and the struggle between the Church and the various States plays a large part in politics. The Church of Rome even after losing the last vestiges of temporal power, never surrendered all of its political prerogatives, nor its claims to the headship of Christendom.

became a mode of life; life in this world in preparation for life everlasting. It eliminated time from the thoughts of men, as it dealt in eternities, in the here and hereafter. The span of man's life in this world sank into insignificance in comparison with his long pilgrimage and final bliss in the world to come. Christianity did not offer a limited national God-head or signalize its adherents as a "chosen people." It claimed to bring "peace on earth and good will to men" to the farthest limits of the universe.

The Roman World State was transformed and extended, and became the basis of the Church Universal. During the Middle Ages the civilization of the Western World was entrusted to the care of the Church. No one who has surveyed the long succession of centuries from the sixth to the fourteenth, can fail to realize the magnitude of the task which the mandatories of Christianity performed. The system of Canon Law and religious discipline of the Roman Church brought peace and order out of the destruction wrought by the barbarian invasions and the dissolution of the Roman World. The theological system developed made politics subservient to religion, but by degrees the age-old struggle between reason and intuition began anew.

It is not the place here to trace the development of religion. We have merely given this very fragmentary sketch to indicate that religion has, in the first instance, to deal with a series of fears which we have called fears of inequality. The relations between man and God are not probed by reason, for all religions are at bottom modes of feeling. They have in common a reliance on intuition, that still uncharted area of the human mind. Religion is termed spiritual in that it relies on passional elements for its growth and spread. It is a matter of imagination, not of will. It is an artistic view of life in contrast to a utilitarian view, which is political. But, if there are divergences between religion and politics, there are also points of contact. Both religion and politics are based on accepted beliefs. Both rely on faith as a basis of action. Whereas religion posits belief, politics ordains belief on the strength of divine authority

and transcendental revelation, politics professes to insert knowledge between authority and acceptance of belief. Common sense, as it is called, becomes a factor in politics; individual reason, the court of appeal. In the end politics, like religion, has as its fundamental purpose the removal of fears.

III

The fears which accompany the development of political society are more intricate than those with which religion has to deal. Sociological inquiry reveals that the growth of political society and a secular moral code may be traced to a rationalizing of the ignorance as to the causes underlying simple, natural phenomena; the discrediting of miracles as the result of a more intelligent inductive inquiry into the sequence of causality. The consequent removal of fear of the supernatural awakens individual self-consciousness. The place of man in the universe now becomes the centre of that universe. This arouses the desire to explain the universe in physical terms, and where physics no longer is adequate, metaphysics is resorted to, to substantiate a rational interpretation consonant with the belief in the supremacy of human reason and the importance of the individual.

Metaphysics is not to be confounded with religion. It does not prove the existence of God. Reason demands proof; religion is satisfied with revelation. A rational interpretation of the universe removes God to a remote sphere, when it does not go so far as to become frankly sceptical. Man now takes cognizance of other men as individuals. He soon discovers that they are much like himself, animated by the same desires, ambitions and aims. With the growth of the new individualism, which rational inquiry promotes, life in this world comes to be held more important than life hereafter. Man's "fear of God" is replaced by fear of his fellow men.

No student of history can fail to be impressed by the awakening of a new fear series on the transition

from one form of social organization to another. During the Renaissance, we may trace in Europe a revival of freedom of thought, a revolt against authority, a return to nature similar to that which we meet with in Greece during the epoch preceding the high period in politics, or in China during the sixth century, B.C. The older fears have been abandoned. Reason illumines the wilderness which had hitherto appeared impenetrable. Modern scientific method had its first rudimentary beginnings in the work of Galileo and of Copernicus, of Newton and Descartes. Physics and physiology, psychology and politics are linked together, in the groping towards a new social order. Bacon and Spinoza, Hobbes and Descartes establish a new critical method reminiscent of Greek speculation. Aristotle becomes the model, but natural philosophy now soars on its own wings. Philosophy is no longer merely speculative, it claims to be creative—*Scientia propter potentiam*. The end of science is utility, and the object of social life is posited as the "pursuit of happiness."

Life is characterized by this new dynamism as a pursuit, as action with the view to the speedy realization of definite aims. The individual has been freed from the trammels of the older religious morality, and for the time being his conduct is without moral code. This serves to interpret the excesses of the early Renaissance, its incongruities and abnormalities. By slow degrees a new order is evolved. The fear of "every man for every man" has become intolerable. Political action replaces the older communal acquiescence. The individual as sovereign voluntarily resigns his privileges in return for the safeguarding of his interests. Politics becomes the principal concern. It is based on a new series of beliefs. A secular moral code is established to combat the fears born of the individualist spirit of the age. The fear of nature has been overcome. Nature has become pliant, plastic, in the hands of man. Natural Law is posited as the basis of political government. The age is characterized by a boundless faith in the new secular authority set up; a naïve faith in the power of reason. Men are ready to make

plans for to-morrow, confident that they will not in all probability be interfered with by a blind destiny or an avenging God. The early stages of the modern political era are marked by a sturdiness of faith that made for efficient action. Men had, so to speak, moved to a new planet. The individual was master of his destiny; he had become the centre of the universe. Religion had offered a plan of action in the face of a universe in which man stood in a position of inferiority. His fears, as we have seen, were born of inequality which immobilized the social order. The new fears of "man for man" found expression in action, in what came to be known as competition. Competition for the good things of life became the underlying motive of social organization.

IV.

It has often been claimed that the conception of equality was the basis of the first human society. "It is in recognizing in his neighbour the capacity to do injury equal to his own that the caveman came to respect his neighbour and make friends with him."¹ This hypothesis, favoured by biologists, would appear to be unfounded. It is only when individualism has asserted itself, when the individual has mastered his surroundings, that the consciousness of equality may be said to take shape. It is, however, uncontested that, as is here pointed out, the idea of equality in the first instance is an outcome of fear. The fears engendered by the individualism of the Renaissance, essentially equalitarian in origin, led to the establishment of the political state system and its perfection as constitutional government. It is only when the fears of equality have been removed, when the State has asserted its superiority, when the will of the majority has replaced the individual will, that a new and higher notion of equality, of freedom, may be said to take shape.

The fears which political society was established to combat, the "fears of equality," as we may term them, were during the nineteenth century overcome. We may

¹ Cf. Felix Le Dantec : *Égoïsme, seule base de toute Société*, p. 204.

here already trace the beginnings of a new fear series with which politics is unable to deal, just as religion was unable to comprehend and deal with the fears of equality. Religion implies something done to placate the Deity; politics, something done to adjust relations between individuals who are conscious of their separate existence.

But the individual with whom politics had to deal was in the main merely a fragment of the old social order of the feudal age. The individual of political society was at best incomplete. Out of the disruption of the communal life of the Middle Ages the individual of Modern Times emerged and took cognizance of himself as a separate entity, but that is all. It was as though the old social order had burst like a bomb, leaving the separate pieces scattered over the face of Western Europe. Each piece was then called an individual. What he was; what was body; what, mind, the ego; what his place in the scheme of things; of these he knew nothing. His ignorance was colossal. His faith in reason to explain everything, to teach him, was sublime. In the *Discourse on Method*, which became the credo of the new age, Descartes declared: "Reason is a universal instrument that is available for every occasion. . . . In fine, whether awake or asleep, we ought never allow ourselves to be persuaded of the truth of anything unless on evidence of our reason."¹

It is difficult for us to-day to gain a clear insight into the mind of the individual at the dawn of Modern Times. If we attempt to reconstruct his view-point, we will find that the individual's realization of himself as a separate unit was confirmed to him by reason. "I think, hence I am," was the corner-stone upon which he was to build. He had emerged out of the old order a shapeless fragment, unfit for social life. The Renaissance had been an era of social chaos. It was a period of transition during which the individual as arbiter of his own destiny, had cast off the authority of religion only to substitute in its stead the cult of antiquity. The confusion of principles, the conflict of

¹ Cf. Descartes, *op. cit.*, Part IV, concluding paragraph.

authority, the demoralization which characterized the epoch, had become intolerable to the men of the late sixteenth century. The demand for order was accompanied by an equally insistent demand for a complete revision of beliefs. The authority of classical antiquity was as unbearable to the men of the new age as ever the authority of the Church had been to the men of the Renaissance.¹ We may trace the emergence of a secular view-point, of philosophy in place of religion, of education in place of humanism. We will also discover that the individual of political society was not a person. Whatever personality may be said to have existed was embodied in the State. The State had become the new arbiter of social life. It conferred upon the individual his distinctive character.

Henceforth, to belong to a State was a necessity; to be a member of its electorate, a privilege. For a prolonged period the number of individuals in relation to the total number of inhabitants in a given community was very limited. An individual in a political sense was most conveniently defined as one belonging to the electorate,² broadly speaking, the middle class. It is this middle class which rose to power in the State, and moulded the character of modern political practice. The reliance on reason, which we have noted as the most significant feature of the new society, had led to the establishment of constitutional government as the most reasonable method of maintaining order. The middle class, which had won the battle for constitutional liberty at the same time asserted itself as the ultimate source of authority in the State. The individual no

¹ "I am quite sure," writes Descartes, "that the most devoted of the present followers of Aristotle would think themselves happy if they had as much knowledge of nature as he possessed, were it even under the condition that they should never afterwards attain to higher. In this respect, they are like ivy which never strives to rise above the tree that sustains it, and which frequently even returns downwards when it has reached the top."—*Cf. op. cit.*, Part VI, p. 75.

² No accurate statistical data is available upon which to base an estimate of the ratio of individuals in a political sense, to the total population during the early stages of modern politics. The first actual census was not taken in England until 1801. It is of interest that the Constitution of the United States, one of the first exclusively political documents ever enforced, provides that a decennial census be taken; the first census dates from 1790.

longer felt himself a part of a broader humanity, but became an isolated unit, considering himself separate and distinct from all other men, and only affiliated with them in a loosely woven bond of allegiance to the State, which at best was a very limited portion of humanity. The older spiritual unity, which had caused men to believe themselves parts of a given whole, members of a fixed social hierarchy, was discarded. The spiritual content of life became a matter of secondary importance. Social life was so regulated as to give free play to individual initiative. The individual was given a present of his life, so to speak, and told to make the best of it.

CHAPTER IX

POLITICAL LIBERTY]

Man as the Social Unit—The Supremacy of the State—The Individual in Politics—The Individual and the General Will—The Idea of Liberty—Its Political Value—Self-Determination—The Idea of Progress—Its Origins—The Political Emancipation of the Individual.

I

IF we endeavour to discover the content of the life of the individual at the opening of the eighteenth century,¹ we are confronted with the following elements. In the first instance he found his horizon curiously delimited. His religious freedom was in principle unreservedly vouchsafed to him. The era of religious wars had drawn to a close. Politics had asserted for itself a position of first importance in the affairs of men. Man no longer felt himself bound to conform to certain religious practices, though if he chose to do so, he could continue them or abstain therefrom relatively unmolested. What may be termed his spiritual horizon became peopled with shadowy forms. The compulsive force of religion, which had held men bound together in closely compacted social groups, had been supplanted by the liberating force of politics, which referred all problems to the norm of reason.

Individualism, as we have seen, was the result of the bursting of the bonds of the former social order. Man, the social unit of the Middle Ages, was bound; man, the individual of Modern Times, was unbound, free. But the individual in his new condition of freedom,

¹ We have selected this epoch, as throughout this discussion we are using England as the model for our analysis. The spread of constitutional practice to other countries at later dates naturally would modify certain particulars, but in the main, the outline may stand unchallenged.

found new bonds. He had discarded old masters for new. He became the member of a geographical grouping called the State; a subject of the sovereign authority that he had himself set up to rule over him, a God of his own devising. Within the State, he was a member of a political group or party, which, if in a majority for the time being, carried on the functions of government and ruled the State. The first, to be a member of the State, was the birthright of the individual; the second, to belong to a party, a matter of interest or convenience. Armed with these two privileges, the individual confronted life with what we may term a power complex. As a member of the State, he shared in its majesty and power; as a member of a party, he could readily be induced to believe that he controlled the destiny of his country. As long as the right of suffrage remained restricted, this was, in point of fact, in many instances the case.

Such was the groundwork of individualism. It expressed the separateness, the detachment, the independence of man as a political unit. It embodied his right to fill his life according to his best judgment. Reason was the arbiter, and every individual was assumed to be a reasonable being. The social order was composed of such individuals, where every man was for himself, first and foremost. Plato had declared that the city can be no better than the individuals who compose it. Modern political practice adopted this version. But Plato had sacrificed the individual, because of his fear of the evils arising out of self-interest, which led him to advocate the abolition of private property, and even of the family. Here modern practice refused to follow him. It is curious to note that modern political philosophers, starting from the Platonic premise, arrived at a diametrically opposite conclusion. Self-interest, private property, the family in its limited, monogamous sense, were to be given fullest scope for development.

The new doctrine of political liberty, as emphasized by the middle class when it reached full control of the State, was that of a limited liberty. The middle class

was no closed corporation as the aristocracy of the feudal age had been, but merely that section of the social order of a given community which had amassed a quota of private property beyond what was normally required for its immediate needs. To amass more than could be consumed from day to day, to devise methods of exchange of goods, to increase the store of wealth that could be marked as one's own, if need be at the expense of some one else, became the principal aim of the individual in political society. The class which profited most by this system was, as a matter of course, the middle class. In time it absorbed the aristocracy, and dominated the working classes. As the wealth-controlling, rather than wealth-consuming class, it held the purse-strings and distributed the largesses.

The State which it established was founded on the supremacy of the law, a legal State. Politics, by some occult process, neither clearly understood nor carefully inquired into, afforded, so it was believed, fullest scope for the attainment of true liberty. This liberty was incorporated in the laws of the State. It was the duty of the individual, acting through his party, to see to it that the law should safeguard this liberty. It was not difficult by rational argument to prove that liberty was the basis of equality. The fact that equality was held a cause of fear, which had led to the formation of the modern state system, was lost sight of. Equality before the law was the first step gained by the unenfranchised. The progress of equalitarian doctrines was rapid. It seemed reasonable to accept the tenet that "all men are *created* free and equal." But it was not until the closing years of the nineteenth century that this doctrine in a political sense received wide application in the form of universal suffrage. Already the political age had entered the period of decay.

II

In our discussion of the characteristic features of political society in Modern Times, we have not devoted much space to what is known as the theory of State.

To do even partial justice to the various speculations on this subject would require a separate treatise; nor does such discussion come within the scope of this work. We are here writing history; laying bare the sequence of events by referring them to their underlying causes in so far as this is possible, and not advocating a new theory of politics, or attempting to dislodge an old one. Yet it will be seen that we have gone far in determining in outline the principal factors upon which the various theories of State are built. These factors the political philosopher is either wont to neglect or to take for granted.

We have compressed as rigidly as possible our discussion of the outstanding features of political society which have determined the course of events during Modern Times. The theory and practice of politics; the urban character of political society, and its control by the middle class, have been critically examined. In the process the individual, as the unit with which politics deals, has emerged as an historical factor of first importance. Individualism is the basis of political society. Tersely defined, the individual, as politics knows the term, is "man as will." The individual in this sense may be taken as a unit of volition. Such individuality as a given man possesses is taken stock of as his will.

When we speak of an individual looked at from the standpoint of politics, we find that the will overshadows all other characteristics. Personality in its fuller sense finds no place in political society. The only personality which exists is contained in the aggregate of wills, or general will, which is identified with the State. The political State specifically limits itself not to interfere with any facts or acts of a given human being other than those which are expressions of his will. The individual is responsible to the limit of his volition; his acts are interpreted as sanctioned and directed by his will. Shorn of his will, the individual disappears, vanishes into thin air. Seen in this light, man as the individual of whom politics takes cognizance, is actuated solely by his will, strives to enforce his will, to have his

way, to express himself, as it is termed. Such was the individual of the Renaissance with whom politics had to deal.

To restrain the individual and make him fit for social life, was the first task of politics. Self-gratification, self-preservation, and the desire for power which were the characteristics of the individual who gave free rein to his will, had led to anarchy. Henceforth the individual was persuaded or compelled to restrain himself, to curb his will, to surrender a part of it to a higher body, the State. Thus the State, which made social life possible, was established. The State was, in turn, endowed with individuality; it expressed the supreme will of the community made up of individuals who became subject to its laws. To make palatable the new form of compulsion resulting from the supremacy of the will of the State, the fiction of a general will was set up.

III

No agreement has ever been reached as to the nature of the general will. It is patently not the will of all, nor is it often claimed to be. It is not necessarily the will of all of those who obey it, for the will as embodied in a group such as the State, may be and often is radically opposed to what we know as an individual will, yet the individual obeys it.

It is not our purpose to enter into a detailed discussion of the general will or any of its implications, as to a real, actual, or good will.¹ We must recognize

¹ Cf. Bosanquet, *Philosophical Theory of the State* for a typical discussion of this subject. The author, in discussing the real and actual will, is prone to neglect the fact that the individual is the unit of political society. He treats the State as though it were the universe. In his *Principles of Individuality and Value*, p. 311, he declares, "the treatment of the State in this discussion is naturally analagous to the treatment of the universe," or again, "the State is the forum of society which is habitually recognized as a unit lawfully exercising force" (*Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 186). At the opposite pole stands T. H. Green. His view-point is essentially individualist: "The State is a body of persons recognized by each other as having rights and possessing institutions for the maintenance of those rights" (*Principles of Political Obligation*, p. 443). These examples are cited here as both are traceable to Hegel, whose concept of the State in its external aspects, came to dominate practical politics during the nineteenth century. To him the

that the general will, though its existence has never been subject to proof, has played an important part in politics. In our view, political society owed its resiliency and enduring vigour to this fiction, just as the Christian religion owed its vitality and attraction to the concept that "God is love."

The general will as the basis of modern political practice is, as presented, intricate and complex. It finds its best expression in the contractual relations between the governing and the governed, and is based on the assumption that what is willed is invariably the good. It is presumed that as the general will expresses the aims of the majority, it is rational and harmonizes with the purpose of social life. But it soon becomes patent that the individual is the only actual unit of volition, and the addition of such units, which go to form the general will, does not change the character of the will in kind, but only in degree. The only way out of the dilemma appears to be to accept the view suggested by Hegel that, "all States are founded by the sublime force of great men, not by physical strength. The great man has something in his features which others would gladly call their lord. They obey him against their will, their immediate will is his will, but their conscious will is otherwise." This is rhapsody, not history.

In point of fact, the will is a characteristic of individuality which it is difficult to accommodate to any corporate form of existence, unless the distinctive characteristics of the individual are transferred to the corporation. This is what politics undertakes to achieve in erecting the system of sovereign States. Sovereignty, as we have seen, is merely the expression of a supreme will that knows no higher will. Its ultimate source is power to maintain itself; its immediate mode of existence is by the incorporation of this supreme will as law. In setting up the State as sovereign, the individual

State is the supreme will which "recognizes no definite authority but its own; which acknowledges no abstract rules of good or bad, of shamefulness or meanness, craftiness or deception."—Cf. *System der Sittlichkeit, Die Absolute Regierung*.

as he was taken cognisance of as a member of the body politic, was held to be the unit of will. In so far as the political State was concerned, volition exhausted the functions of man. Man, a complex being of the most divergent character which a more profound study of psychology has revealed him to be, was in political society posited as a compact individual or a will unit. Individualism in this political sense excluded all other characteristics save that of will. From the point of view of political society, man as a social being, as member of a community with his many-sided aspects and appetites which no catalogueing can actually exhaust, was lost sight of. Personal prerogatives within a given group were surrendered by the individual for the sake of securing the protection of his rights, or as it came to be known, his liberty. The State became the highest corporation which embodied this liberty.

To the popular mind the characteristic of the will which is the most cherished is "free will," which, expressed in the term political liberty, means "unfettered by any impositions or restraints." The liberty of which politics makes so much, implies that such a form of freedom of the will is realizable. It was not taken into account that Rousseau's famous preamble, "man is born free," implies a form of unrestrained individualism which unfitted man for social existence, and that this individualism had to be curbed.

IV.

Nothing could serve to illumine the true character of political society more adequately than this insistence upon freedom, the cry for liberty which echoes across the pages of the political history of Modern Times. Political society was unable to conceive of man, the individual with which it deals, otherwise than as will. This individual was then posited as the basis of the social organization of the State which was patterned on individualist lines. The State as will, the individual as will, are free. For will is by its nature, according to the consensus of the majority, free. What the con-

sequences of such an interpretation of the will are, is directly traceable in political practice. This has not hitherto been adequately taken into account by the historian.

The history of the political age is almost exclusively taken up with what may be reduced to struggles for freedom. The individual as will is posited as free, yet he must assert his freedom. On the one hand, we have the mass of men who have not yet attained the distinction of individuality which the right to vote confers. This is the arena of political conflict in home affairs. On the other, the sovereign State, or a group of people aiming to achieve sovereignty, struggles to assert its will or the national will as power. In the former instance we have the will incorporated as law; in the latter, as force.

If we cast a critical glance at this question of freedom in its individualist conception as politics deals with it exclusively in the form of will, we find that in point of fact, whether the will is free or determined, amounts for practical purposes, to the same thing. It becomes evident that political freedom is a phrase wholly without meaning, a mere formal expression that was made use of to contrast the alleged advantages of freedom which political society affords, with the former condition of servitude of man as a member of a class or group. This is briefly demonstrable. If the will is free, it must be self-determined (the individual as will, wills it). The act of will of the individual must have a motive, and if he determines his act in reference to this motive, the act is said to be determined by the motive; it is self-determined. It is not necessary to have recourse to the Hegelian interpretation of freedom of the will to explain this self-determination by saying that the object of the will is will.

For political purposes the individual is conceived of as will, and the highest form of freedom which the individual as such is capable of is precisely self-determination. Such self-determination finds expression in what in political parlance became known as "rights." The doctrine of the Rights of Man, which came in

time to supplant the natural laws of Hobbes as the basis of political action, is traceable to this self-determination. Self-help and self-government, which were the characteristic marks of the American political system, are an outgrowth of this same concept of freedom. As will be seen, there is little or no difference between determination and freedom as regards the individual as politics knows him. It is impossible to think of freedom except in relation to some other, or as we should say, determined condition. Just as it is impossible to conceive of an individual whose purpose is independent of the existence of other individuals, so such purpose cannot be held unrestrained by the general purpose of social life. It is impossible to admit, in face of the overwhelming proof to the contrary which a perusal of history affords, that the purpose of political society and that of the individual coincide. The only solution possible from the standpoint of freedom, is to view social life as an experience of individual existence, but as we shall seek to establish, individuality by no means covers the multiplicity of facets in the life of a human being. To cramp man into the strait jacket of individualism, as political society pretends to do, and then offer in return the solace that, as an individual, man is free, is too meagre a fare to nourish for long the human spirit.¹

¹ Modern philosophy has been haunted by the concept of the will. Psychology has centred about the problem. The most varied interpretations have been advanced. Schopenhauer declared: "I do not know my will in its totality, nor do I know it in its unity, nor do I know it perfectly in its essence." For Bergson, will creates itself by willing. Blondel maintains: "Will is the bud and blossom of action." Novalis declared: "Will is finely fashioned character." Ribot asserts: "Will is the 'me' in so much as it reacts to sensations and impressions." Wundt shows that will and attention are intimately related. To Lipp: "My will is not a special power, or special essence in me, it is I." Nietzsche, in outlining his famous doctrine of the Will to Power, declared: "For there is no will, consequently neither a strong nor a weak one. The multiplicity and disintegration of the instincts, the want of system in their relationships, constitute what is known as a 'weak will,' their co-ordination under the government of one individual among them results in a 'strong will.' In the first case, vacillation and a lack of equilibrium is noticeable; in the second, precision and definite direction."

V.

If individual freedom, or free will, is defined as an absence of restraints, which is the popular concept of politics, when we turn to the State we find that freedom implies positive acts. The act of will is towards something which is as yet unachieved. The individual as willing, takes cognizance of himself as a power. He furthermore apparently progresses from what he was before he executed the act of will to what he now is, having performed it. We might here trace to its origin the idea of progress, which is so intimately bound up with a political view of life in Modern Times. To progress was, so it came to be believed, to have power over the life process, to assert one's individuality, to mould the course of events directly by one's will.

It is not to be wondered at that faith in the omnipotence of the will should have made such rapid headway, and that progress should have become the norm of social life. The new concept that man was progressive, that he could perfect himself by his own efforts, had resulted in the transfer of this hitherto exclusive prerogative of the deity known as "God's will," to man, as his will. The authority of the Church had been called into question. Man considered himself in a position to be the arbiter of his spiritual destiny. Whatever authority the State had come to possess, had been conferred upon it, so constitutional practice endeavoured to show, by the will of the individuals composing it. The State, as the highest authority, was held to be free from all restraints. But, far more important than this, the doctrine soon became established that the State not only could, but must, act in accordance with its will. The State was looked upon as an all-powerful instrument of volition, strong enough to overcome all obstacles which might be placed in its way. The will of the State was henceforth to be supreme, the animating agency of social life.

From the execution of Charles I in 1649, to that of Louis XVI in 1793, we may trace the successive steps in the development of the doctrine of political liberty

and the final establishment of the supremacy of the State. The matter of adjusting the relations between the individual and the State was the fundamental factor of the struggles between Parliament and the Crown in England during the seventeenth century. We have shown how the theory of constitutional government was evolved as a method of repressing the exaggerated individualism of the Renaissance, which for purposes of practical politics, may be typified by the career of Charles I. The struggles of the seventeenth century were essentially struggles for political liberty. This liberty shone as an inward light which illumined the individual. It was with a quasi-religious awe that he came to regard his place in the social order. The wars of this century were, as we have seen, struggles for the emancipation of the individual from the trammels of a decaying religious creed. Here, for the first time in history, we find man engaged in the arduous task of separating religion from politics, which led to the establishment of a secular moral code. Men took themselves seriously. They were "vessels of destiny," devout Protestants, who felt that they had a mission to perform in spreading the gospel of the new liberty. The individual did not enjoy political liberty as his birthright, but had to fight a hard struggle to gain it.

CHAPTER X

THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS

The Debt of Politics to Philosophy—The Standpoint of the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Centuries—The Influence of Hegel—The Individualism of the Eighteenth Century—John Law—The Wesleyan Movement—Locke's Doctrines of Religious Toleration and Political Liberty—Private Property—The Doctrine of Equality—The Philosophical Aspects of the French Revolution—Burke.

I

PLATO makes Socrates declare that philosophy must go hand in hand with politics. The validity of this assertion is apt to be overlooked. Though the direct connection between political theory and philosophy has often been referred to, it has not been adequately understood that the course of events in a political age is faithfully reflected in philosophical speculation. The political historian in recent times has grown in the habit of looking upon the philosopher with feelings of superiority or contempt. But in point of fact, political events are only rendered comprehensible when interpreted in connection with the philosophical tendencies of the age in which they take place. The attempt to replace philosophy by a more scientific method of inquiry in our own times, which has tended to discredit philosophy, and rightly so when dealing with events of the new age, should not permit us to neglect a careful survey of the philosophical background of political society, if we would be in a position to evaluate events at their true worth. It is no exaggeration to affirm that if all trace of actual events in political history should disappear, we would be able, with much precision, to chart the course of politics by referring to the philosophical discussions of the age in which they took place. The theory of the State in Modern Times would thus appear not so much

a result of the inevitableness of circumstances as of the acuteness of philosophical speculation in selecting a sound method of interpretation. It is not a question whether philosophy takes up the loose and disjointed facts of politics and moulds them into a concise and well-joined whole, but rather that a nice balance is arrived at between events in history and their philosophical interpretation. When this balance is attained, we come upon circumstances which have the appearance of being inevitable. As an example, Hegel, in his *Philosophy of History*, has pointed out that philosophy shows us "that the real world is as it ought to be."¹ We may here trace the origin of the political complacency which characterises the nineteenth century, more especially the Victorian Age. But, at the same time, we may discover in this utterance the origins of the new doctrine of State absolutism which was to serve as a guide to Bismarck's policy and identify the modern State in its final phase of development. This absolutism is, in point of fact, the negation of individualism which had been the dominant characteristic of politics in the past. Viewed from the opposite side, we may note the beginning of the new "scientific" socialist theories. Marx himself admitted that he owed to Hegel the inspiration of his thesis of communism.²

II

In the seventeenth century philosophical speculation was concerned with the relation of the individual to the universe; on the one hand, with the place of the individual in the State; on the other, of the State in the system of sovereign States. If we might sum up the characteristic features of the age in a single phrase, we would define them as a groping for liberty. Political liberty was handed on to the eighteenth century as a birthright. The new century accepted individualism as a point of departure. We find that England is no longer the centre of active inquiry and political specu-

¹ *Op. Cit.*, p. 38.

² Cf. *Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie*, Preface, pp. iv-vi.

lation. England had blazed the trail of freedom, now France was to broaden it into a highway. The individualism of the eighteenth century was dogmatic and arbitrary. The tendency of the times was to scrutinize social institutions with reference to individual happiness, to place the individual above the social order. The thing that mattered most to the humanitarian philosophers of the eighteenth century was to get back to a "state of nature," to get away from institutions and laws, to the life that pulsates in the veins of every man and woman, in every living creature.

The "happiness of mankind" was a fine phrase that was none too closely examined before it was handed on to the pamphleteers and vulgarizers of philosophical doctrine such as Rousseau and Voltaire, Turgot and Sieyès. The ferment aroused by the new doctrines had spread the belief that the social order owes it to the individual to further his pursuit of happiness, to have due regard for his feelings, his emotions and his appetites. It was the age during which the limitations of national boundaries became irksome to philosophic inquirers. Plans for the establishment of a cosmopolitan world State were discussed. Such a State, it was believed, would assure to the individual greater scope to pursue his happiness. The function of the State was to safeguard the rights of the individual. The right to happiness was foremost among them. If liberty was the birthright of man, all men were held to be endowed with an equal right to happiness. Man's destiny was to achieve happiness; the means to do so was through political equality.

As liberty had been the goal of the men of the seventeenth century, so equality may be said to sum up the demand of the eighteenth century. It was no longer merely a negative equality which a Hobbes had animadverted on as the disturbing factor in social life. Equality was to become a positive need, a unifying bond which was to unite men in the pursuit of happiness. Happiness to the philosophers of the eighteenth century meant the constant gratification of the desires of the individual in their narrowest sense. Whether we look

to the exponents of English hedonism, or to the French humanitarians, we find that the problem was not one of theory. Happiness, as here defined, was something to be experienced in the flesh. "The Confessions" of Rousseau give us a graphic picture of the "return to nature." Voltaire, retiring to his château of Cirey, purchased with money he had earned in successful speculation, accompanied by his mistress, Madame de Chatelet and her *mari complaisant*, is typical of the age. It was as though the reality of the social group, existing as an entity, had been denied. Voltaire's *écrasez l'infâme* did not apply so much to God or Christ as it appeared on the surface to do, but to the social order and the orthodoxy that maintained it.

If we look beneath the surface, we will find that though the dominant idea of the age was equality, the immediate and outward aim was personal gratification. The influences of social life were discounted beyond the point where the individual found means to further his personal fortune and assert his "equal right" to happiness. It was lost sight of that rights are by their nature distinctly social, and belong to the group of which the individual is a member. If the group is decomposed into its members, rights, as such, cease to exist.

It is impossible to arrive at an understanding of the course of events during the eighteenth century without constant reference to the influence of individualism, based on the new equalitarian philosophy which had been developed. The entire social fabric of Europe was permeated by this spirit of rampant individualism. What has been referred to as the liberalism of the age of enlightenment is, in point of fact, merely a mask for self-indulgence of the most diverse and uncompromising individualism. The corruption of the Regency in France and the scandals of the Court of Louis XV are paralleled by the profligacy of the English aristocracy or the lusts of Catherine II. The history of the age is entirely written in the first person. Never was the influence of France more widespread than during the epoch of the "Wars of Succession," when the State was riddled with debt, and a financial wizard such as John Law was

called upon to perform the impossible task of reforming the finances. "Law's system," which was to procure an adequate supply of cheap money to meet the demands of industry, was later to have far-reaching results in bringing about changes in economic life, but its immediate effect was to draw all ranks of the social order together in a common pursuit—feverish speculation. In England the South Sea Company and other bubble schemes, were of similar origin and brought about a like result. Milliners and haberdashers, ladies and gentlemen, princes and paupers, were all engulfed in the mad chase after the new wealth, which would afford them an opportunity to express their individualism.

The equalizing effects of the new economy cannot be overestimated. It brought different conditions and classes of men into close contact; it broke down the respect which still clung about the names of great aristocratic families. In Paris, princes and high prelates waited in the anti-chamber of John Law, the son of an Edinburgh goldsmith. In London, the Prince of Wales, openly engaged in stock jobbing, became a governor of the "Welsh Copper Company," and made £40,000 before he was compelled by a remonstrance of the judges to resign his position. Here we may find an adequate explanation of how it came about that in England profligate ministers were entrusted with the highest public functions, and that the best political brains of the age, men such as Burke, Fox, and the younger Pitt, were all their life long loaded with debt. Fox was notoriously self-indulgent, while the debts of Pitt were paid by the nation, and even the austere Burke owed his political chief, Rockingham, £30,000, to say nothing of such great peers of the realm as Bute, Sandwich and the Bedfords, who frankly sold political preferment and enriched themselves at public expense. In point of fact, the individualism of the age had many of the hideous characteristics which it possessed during the Italian Renaissance, but it lacked the vigour of the individualism of the fifteenth century. For in the eighteenth it was an outgrowth of rationalism and an intellectual egoism which was to find in the slowly

maturing democratic doctrine of equality the reforming influence required to sweep it into oblivion.

III

To gain an idea of the soil in which the new equalitarian doctrines took root, a picture of the age is not out of place : "The masses were ignorant and brutalized, and their numbers and demoralization rapidly increased. The mediæval corporations in town and city were powerless to cope with the growing evils of industrial life; the government pandered to mob passions by public executions, or by unworthy concessions to mob violence, and insulted humanity by the brutal ferocity of its criminal code. . . . Political and religious institutions had crystallized into a species of hereditary or privileged oligarchy, into an officialdom, which though not entirely exclusive or unsympathetic, seemed incapable of change or advance. That nothing but reform from the outside would avail to alter the existing system had already been demonstrated by the politics of the age."¹ These lines do not refer to France on the eve of the Revolution, but to England under the first two Georges. They give a true picture of the spirit of the times. France was in a similar predicament. The picture drawn by Young, just before the outbreak of the Revolution, shows conditions existing there to have been in no wise very different.

In England the religious revival, led by John Wesley and Whitefield, absorbed much of the energy which in France was directed towards politics. Methodism in England proved a much needed outlet for the ferment aroused by the new doctrines of equality. It acted as a safety-valve for the pent-up grievances of the masses. Wesley joined in ridiculing the King and other institutions and practices of ancient prerogative, but remained a loyal Tory at heart. Unlike other Dissenters, he vigorously opposed any disobedience to the existing laws, and it may be said that England was spared the

¹ Cf. "The Eighteenth Century."—*Cambridge Modern History*, vol. vi, p. 80.

excesses of a revolution in a large measure owing to his influence. Methodism was a creed of equality. It became the religion of the masses, and gave to them a point of departure in building up a feeling of self-consciousness among individuals who might rightly demand a share in the good things of life. In this, the work of Wesley, it will be seen, is a counterpart of that of Rousseau. Under other circumstances Methodism might have become a political, rather than a religious doctrine. That it did not do so was due to the fact that the middle class, which had gained control of the body politic in England during the Revolution of 1688, was too strong to permit any political agitation to disturb the structure of the State. Wesley belonged to this class. This accounts in a large measure for the course that Methodism was to follow. The similarity of the work of Wesley and Rousseau is of historical importance. Both appealed directly to the emotions; both did much to awaken the masses to a realization that as individuals they possessed a self-sufficient standard of conduct. In an age of intellectualism they both raised the standard of revolt against it. But Wesleyanism "was opposed to outbursts of emotions, except when they followed certain recognized channels," a restriction which Rousseau's return to nature did not require. Passion, rather than logic, was to show the way to equality. It was but a step to democracy which was to lead to the obliteration of all inequalities among men.

IV

We have entered in some detail into what may be termed the outward traits of the period in order to illustrate the effects of the changes which had so speedily been wrought in the minds of men by the spread of political doctrines, based on the belief that the individual is the rightful arbiter of the universe. If we look for the source of the doctrine that individual happiness is man's highest goal, and freedom the way to attain it, we find it most concisely stated in the work of Locke. In his *Letters on Toleration*, he had successfully

championed the cause that religion is man's private concern, and that the individual is the sole judge of his beliefs. With his age the last flames of religious struggles died out. The ensuing eighteenth century talked much of the "reasonableness of Christianity," or blasphemed against it. But by common consent a man's creed was henceforth held to be a matter of his own choice, just as adherence to a political party might be. Thus, the first liberty that belongs to the individual and conduces to his happiness was, according to Locke, assured.

In his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Locke then came forward in the defence of intellectual liberty. "Men," he declares, "know the value of corporeal liberty, and therefore suffer not willing fetters and chains. To have the mind captivated is certainly the greater evil of the two, and deserves our utmost care and endeavour to preserve the freedom of our better part." He admits that to obtain "liberty of mind" is difficult, but he claims to be able to point out an empirical method of attaining it. Here is another phase of individual liberty which conduces to happiness.

But the third and most important liberty, which is the basis of individual happiness for which all rules of conduct are designed and sovereign States established, is political liberty. In his *Treatise on Government*, he sets forth that individual happiness is the most tangible conception that can be suggested to assure man his proper place in society. Political liberty signifies that man is free to enjoy the rights which are his natural heritage. Among these, his right to happiness is not only the highest, but the most useful. Governments are established to promote it; private property is its foundation. According to Locke, human happiness is bound up with private property. Political liberty is measured in the terms by which property is safeguarded. It is from Locke that the eighteenth century inherited the concept of property, which became the most prized prerogative of the individual, the mark of his freedom,—property in the form of things external to the individual, but possessed by him, over which his

will is supreme, "so that all the power of the State cannot lawfully take it away from him, without his consent, if it is rightfully his."

It is through property that political society took cognizance of the relatively equal importance of individuals. It is in property that the individual expressed his individuality most fully. It is by property that whatever unity the body politic as a State achieves, is united into a cohesive whole. The individual possesses property, as Locke declared, because he "hath mixed labour with it, and thus removed it out of the common state." Property, in this sense, is the playground of the will. Here volition grows strong, vigorous and capable of further growth. Here self-interest becomes paramount. It governs the passions, directs the energies, controls the plans of the individual. Such were the chief elements of the threefold roots of liberty. The principal concern of social life is the pursuit of happiness; property, the means to attain it; and the individual, the measure of all things.

To accommodate civil institutions to this egoistic political philosophy was the work of the eighteenth century. It was soon discovered that the immediate effect of the adoption of the new tenets of property was its levelling influence. Property could, by diligence, thrift, or even more rapidly by successful speculation, be acquired by the individual. A shilling was a shilling, no matter whose pocket it was in. We have noted some of the effects of the mania for speculation during the opening decades of the century. The spread of equalitarian ideas was fed through many other streams. The era of *laissez-faire* was at hand. The thoughts of men were turned more and more towards their own business. They viewed the State from the angle of private interests. Equality, in its political sense, was deemed a necessity of first importance.

V

The doctrine of equality, which is so intimately bound up with the French Revolution, was in point of fact,

first the cause of an English revolution. Though the American Colonies were situated at a great distance from the seat of government in England, this does not alter the fundamental character of the American Revolution. No one can follow the phases of this struggle without becoming convinced that in asserting their right of equality, the American Colonists won a victory for this doctrine, which went far towards sparing England the horrors of a civil war at home. "No taxation without representation" reveals the nature of the equality demanded, which had as its principal object to give security to property.

The ideals of the American Revolution were, in this light, centred about property as the key to happiness. Locke and Rousseau were its apostles. Locke's principle that government exists to secure property, and Rousseau's doctrine that men are born equal in the sense of being endowed with equal rights to "life and liberty," were combined in the popular mind so as to form a single principle, tersely expressed in the American Declaration of Independence as the "pursuit of happiness."

In France bad laws, cruel privileges and oppressive taxation, were remnants of mediævalism which were about to be abolished. These were the outward causes of the Revolution, but the real cause lies deeper. Politics had reached its full development. The idea of equality was a natural corollary of that of liberty, if we bear in mind that man in political society is held to be an individual will. Viewed from an historical standpoint, we find that as Charles I was the victim of the doctrine of liberty, so Louis XVI was the victim of equality. Both were political scapegoats. Henceforth in political parlance at least, the principles of liberty and equality were firmly established. Individualism, which for three centuries had been the guiding motive of social life, had reached maturity. The French Revolution marked its triumph, and already we may note the beginnings of a new theory of social organization.

The French Revolution closes an epoch, but we can hardly agree that it witnessed the dissolution of a society. Those mediæval institutions, which in the eighteenth century still remained, were survivals of form, oppressive

and burdensome, as all merely formal institutions are which have become antiquated. They had already become characterless during the previous century, and were made short shrift of by the Revolution. The eighteenth century was an age of despots, and many other points of cultural similarity with the Italian Renaissance¹ might be cited. But this later age of enlightenment was marked by far more powerful despots than the fifteenth century. Catherine II of Russia, Frederick II of Prussia, Joseph II of Austria, to leave out of account the sovereigns of Western Europe, were engaged in consolidating the absolutism of the State, paving the way for the adoption of the new theory of the supremacy of the State, which was to have such far-reaching consequences during the ensuing century.

What the French Revolution did was to establish firmly the principle of equality, confirm the doctrine of liberty, and enthrone the dominance of property as the bulwark of the individual. But if the Revolution settled the question of political equality, it brought to the surface for the first time the problem that was to confront the nineteenth century—the social question. This question is economic and not political. Politics deals, and rightly understood, can only deal with individuals as such. It establishes institutions suited to the needs of a society in which the individual is the pivot of the social order. Politics takes cognizance, as we have seen, of man as an individual will. It is essentially a rational method of ordering the body politic. It is a confusion of the issues at stake to fail to distinguish the economic from the political factors in the French Revolution. Yet historians of the event are prone to do so. The Revolution, in establishing the doctrine of equality, set the seal of approval on the concept of private property, but at the same time it raised the perplexing question of the distribution of property. It brought to the front the latent injustice of this cardinal tenet of individualism, and roused in the consciousness of some the conviction that beyond the individual and his private rights and interests, there lay a broader, higher interest, that of the community at large.

¹ Cf p 57.

Viewed in this light, the attitude of Burke towards the French Revolution was consistent. He must have foreseen some of the consequences which the raising of the social question would bring about. He must have felt instinctively that his cherished Parliamentary institutions would inevitably be forced to give ground before the impact of the new movement. His lucid insight, his vigorous denunciation of the Revolution, brought to his support a majority of the nation which, in the first flush of exaltation, was inclined to side with the new French doctrines. Burke's mission was to keep upright the structure of the politically organized State. When he declared that the people must labour "to obtain what by labour can be obtained; and when they find, as they commonly do, the success disproportionate to the endeavour, they must be taught the consolation of eternal justice," he was expressing a rigidly sound political view of the economic question, consistent with individualism. But when Morley adds as a biographical commentary, "When we know that a Lyon's silk weaver working as hard as he could for over seventeen hours a day, could not earn money enough to procure the most bare necessities of subsistence, we may know with what benignity of brow eternal justice must have presented itself in the garret of that hapless wretch,"¹ we can plainly see that he injects into the situation an economic, or as we may better say, a social view-point utterly inconsistent with the true spirit of politics, or of government established for the purpose of maintaining private property. Burke belonged to the age of politics, and stands forth as one of its most representative figures. To him the Revolution appeared monstrous, as he foresaw its consequences and deprecated its actual achievement. Many of the eminent statesmen and political philosophers who have come since his day, though occupying prominent positions in public life as did Lord Morley, have had their view-point coloured by the influence of those newer social forces which were undermining the political control of society and the individualism upon which it rested.

¹ Cf. John Morley—*Burke*, p. 161.

CHAPTER XI

POLITICAL EQUALITY

Historical Origin—A French Doctrine—Its Spread—Voltaire—The Supremacy of the State—Nationalism—Effect upon the International State System—Napoleon I—Liberty, Equality and Fraternity—Economic Aspects of Equality—De Quesnay—Influence of Economics on Politics.

IN this survey, we have pointed out that a distinct line of cleavage exists between internal (home) and external (foreign) politics.¹ We have dwelt upon the fact that from England came the stamp and character of those political institutions which were to serve as the model in home affairs ; from France, the complex machinery of foreign politics. The other dominant peoples of the civilized world in Modern Times have, in accordance with their ability, talents and historical factors, developed, and in some instances perfected, one or the other of these two branches of politics by imitating the practice of England, or of France. In this way we may see, that viewed in its internal aspects, the French Revolution was made in England. It is chiefly from Locke that the French political philosophers and pamphleteers borrowed the essential features of the principles which they propagated. It is with the example of the American Colonies and the success of that Revolution—the work of Englishmen defending their rights and their liberties—before them, that the incentive needed to translate theory into practice was to come.

If we seek to distinguish between what was durable and what was ephemeral in the work of the French Revolution, we find that in so far as internal affairs were concerned, nearly all that endured bears the stamp of century-long struggles to establish those doctrines

¹ Cf. p. 32 *et seq.*
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of individual liberty which had been far more successfully vindicated in English Practice. Article I, of the Declaration of the Rights of Man reads: "Men are born free and equal and with equal rights; free and equal they remain." There was nothing manifestly original in this statement, which was taken bodily from similar documents which several American States had made use of more than a decade before. But the French developed the concept of equality on new and independent lines, which departed from the practice of England. This requires analysis if we would be in a position to understand the true basis of the new social doctrines of the nineteenth century.

To individual liberty which had been achieved in England, so that in principle the individual was, in a political sense, free, the French, early in the eighteenth century, adjoined the idea of equality. We must seek in the sceptical pessimism of the late seventeenth century for the philosophical origins of this doctrine. The conviction then current was that man was by nature evil. Pascal believed that virtue is the outcome of a perpetual struggle of man's will against his natural instincts. Like Spinoza and Hobbes, he maintained that might is right for "might is might and right is not." Hobbes had laid the foundation of a doctrine of equality as a corollary of liberty, but it was, as we have seen, a negative equality based on fear. The overcoming of this fear had been achieved in political society. Now the doctrine was advanced that men are by nature equal, and that reason pointed to the way of maintaining this equality, not as a corollary, but as a basis of liberty.

The rationalism of the eighteenth century soon led men to discredit all authority. The leading thinkers of the age, more especially in France, joined in the assault against intolerance which Locke had so boldly launched.¹ Voltaire, in his vituperative attacks on established religion, made it his especial business to place himself on the level of the average man. He used his polemical genius and his rapier-like wit to

¹ Cf. p. 130.

tear to shreds the authority of a philosophy or political doctrine, above the understanding of the average man. What was beyond ordinary understanding, what could not become self-evident at a glance to the half-educated, comfortable bourgeois, Voltaire boldly proclaimed false, or at least incredible. He made himself the champion of the growing middle class and moulded its philistine view-point. He brought about a feeling of equality of mind among men, in the sense of equal ability to understand and sit in judgment upon questions which the great majority had hitherto left alone. He contributed powerfully to spread abroad among the middle class the feeling of discontent due to their inequality with the nobility. It is in this fashion that the idea of equality spread in France. Equality was a demand of the wealthy middle class man of business, who in his daily intercourse with members of the aristocracy, was confronted by the impassable barrier of birth. The cry for equality arose in the first instance in response to this feeling of wounded vanity on the part of a few rich parvenus, of whom Voltaire made himself the spokesman.

Voltaire in his *Lettres Écrites de Londres sur les Anglais*, published in 1734, set forth opinions on political and social questions from which he never departed. For the next forty years he reiterated with monotonous but lively emphasis his "common sense" views on the questions of liberty, equality and property. He drew his inspiration from England. In his own mind, liberty and property were, and to the end must remain, united in one inseparable whole. He outlined a practical foundation for the idea of equality, without extending its meaning.

It is Rousseau, in his doctrine of the sovereignty of the people and the rule of the majority, who gave symmetry to the feeling of equality, and extended it so as to include men in general. This served to exalt the individual above the State, and the Revolution carried the policy of individualism to its extreme in the interpretation it gave to equality. In endeavouring to assure equality among individuals, all corporate bodies were to be suppressed. The law of August 18, 1792, declares:

"An absolutely free State cannot allow any corporation within its bosom." The surviving trade guilds had already been abolished, but now all groupings of men, for whatever purpose, for business or even merely for pleasure, were dissolved. In this the Revolution was wholly logical, a fact which later commentators have often failed to perceive. In suppressing all forms of corporate organization, the leaders of the Revolution sought to insure the highest measure of equality among individuals, even though this equality led to anarchy.

It must be recalled that equality was the cardinal tenet of the French Revolution to which all other considerations were, for the time being, sacrificed. Absolute equality proved itself in practice not merely unfeasible, but despotic. The right of association was a cherished privilege of individual liberty which the equalitarian doctrines of the Revolution had overridden. The immediate consequence was the supremacy of the State. This indirect result of the abolition of all corporations, leaving the State supreme, was to serve as the point of departure for the new doctrines that were beginning to take shape. Individualism had run its course; its cycle of development was complete. It was to be replaced by a new motive of organization in which the individual was by degrees to become once again submerged in the social order.

II

There was a further result of the application of the concept of equality which requires brief mention. The sovereignty of the people as put into practice during the Revolution was intended to assure political equality. It had broken down barriers between classes, had for the time being dissolved all corporations, and left the central government of the State the sole functioning body in the social order. Equal men felt no other bond of union than allegiance to the State. Allegiance to the king was denounced. Party and faction disappeared before the danger of invasion. The cosmopolitan spirit characteristic of rationalism was swept aside, and in its place a new and intense national spirit was aroused.

The men of the Revolution were no longer equal men, but Frenchmen. France as a nation in a corporate sense, composed of members of this sole, supreme corporation, the State, rose to defend herself against foreign invaders. The older concepts of the State current during the eighteenth century vanished before the new spirit of nationalism that united men of the same blood, tradition and language as the sovereign corporation, the Nation-State. Here France was once again in the vanguard. Here was a new basis for the organization of the international State system peculiarly suited to the genius of the French people. Here a new and original departure was to be made in asserting the supremacy of the State in competition for power among States, in a society of nations in which France was to play the leading rôle.

It will be seen that in the realm of internal affairs, though the French overturned nearly all existing institutions of the old régime and reconstructed them along new lines, there was little that endured that was novel or original in their work. They borrowed copiously from England and from the United States, and adapted to their own usages in so far as practical, the models before them. But they performed one signal service. Politics ceased to be a mystery. Government became the concern of the average man. Politics henceforth was to occupy the place that religion had occupied at the close of the Middle Ages. It was taken for granted, intelligently criticized and actively discussed.

The middle class in England had made itself the standard-bearer of political liberty. It had demanded equality as its right. The French had developed this concept as the coefficient of national liberty. Liberty and equality were held to be not abstractions, but concrete characteristics of the individual. The age of abstractions had passed. We no longer hear the high-sounding, humanitarian phrases of the mid-eighteenth century. Abstract man was replaced by the concrete Frenchman, Englishman or German. In the same fashion, the sovereignty of the people which hitherto had at best been a vague notion, was rendered definite and

precise by embodying it in the State, made up of individuals who wore the insignia of nationality as their highest mark of distinction. In the process, a new theory of international relations was evolved. This is the permanent contribution of the French Revolution which again placed France, in spite of the disastrous effects of internal disorders, in a commanding position in world affairs, and made it possible for the French to mould the nature and character of international politics during the ensuing century.

The significance of Napoleon may thus be more properly interpreted. Viewed from the angle of internal affairs, his rise marks the triumph of the theory of equality. The fact that an obscure, Corsican sub-lieutenant should, as a young man, have been able to dominate the Revolution, become ruler of France and of a greater part of Europe, and later the king of kings, justified, so it was believed, the theories which the Revolution had championed. The same spirit which had led the men of 1792 to abolish all corporations and leave the State supreme, basing their action on the tenets of equality, led them in 1802 to accept the dictatorship of Napoleon, and nominate him Consul for life.

The absolutism of Napoleon must not for a moment be confounded with that of the preceding century. The older absolutism maintained that the king is the people. Hobbes had expressed this view to justify his idea of the absolutism of the sovereign. Napoleon, on the contrary, claimed to be acting merely on behalf of the people. But the real historical mission of Napoleon lay in the realm of foreign affairs. He was to spread abroad the new French doctrine of nationalism which awakened the political self-consciousness, the national patriotism of the peoples of Europe, and united them subsequently in strongly consolidated Nation-States. The attempt made by Napoleon to assert the supremacy of France over the new state system established on the basis of sovereign, satellite States, was in accordance with the best French political tradition. It was doomed to failure, though not before the influence of French revolutionary doctrines had been carried to the ends of Europe.

Nationalism, with its wide implications, was to become the determining problem of foreign policy during the nineteenth century.

III

In practice it is a mistake to court failure. When success seems remote, the practical mind is prone to permit events to take their course rather than champion a cause foredoomed to defeat. Theory finds no such barriers in its pathway. What is still unknown, or fragmentarily known, or may fail to be known by the theoretical inquirer, is surrounded in darkness which he merely seeks to penetrate. Failure here is not of such great moment. At least it does not prevent the ready acceptance of some term of identification being given to a new and little known factor that has only been blocked out of the unknown. In this way, we may more readily arrive at an understanding of the third term of the inscription placed on the shield of the French Revolution—liberty, equality, fraternity.

Liberty and equality as they were at the time currently understood, were comprehensible doctrines compatible with the existing mechanism of society. Politics had means and methods of taking care of the practical application of these factors which were in their essence exclusively individualist. But the third term "fraternity" added to these two, was destined to remain merely an empty, nice-sounding word, which rounded off the phrase that became the catch-word of the Revolution. It was emblazoned on the public buildings of France in deep letters, and there remains to this day as a reminder of what the Revolution accomplished; but to some, as an admonition of what was left undone. Liberty and equality were practical, political concepts; fraternity held social implications which were at best vague and unformulated, contrary to the individualist principles of the Revolution, which safeguarded private property and endowed it with a sanctity it had not hitherto possessed.

"The magic of property," Young had remarked in

his commentary on conditions in France, "turns sand to gold," and there were only a few at the time who thought otherwise. In the literature of the eighteenth century, we find many references to the hardships resulting from the unequal distribution of wealth. But the age was concerned principally with matters of politics. Scarcely any are to be found who advocated introducing changes which would lead to the abolition of private property.¹ Rousseau, in spite of his intimate experiences with the question of the unequal distribution of wealth, never gives to the matter more than passing attention. In general, the humanitarians of the age of enlightenment, who could weep with effusion over the ills of society, were content to let it go at that, and pass on to more congenial topics than destitution and the misery of the working classes, which were taken for granted as unavoidable and even necessary conditions, much in the same spirit that Aristotle assumed the necessity of slavery.

The anomaly of discussing equality among men and leaving out of account equality in the distribution of the good things of life, is characteristic of the epoch. The question then foremost in men's minds was that of the means of production and accumulation of wealth, rather than its distribution. It has been wisely remarked that "we are half-dead before we understand our disorders, and half-cured when we do." The disorders of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had led to the formulation of natural laws of political society which came to be axiomatic in the ensuing age. We are not, therefore, surprised to find that in the eighteenth century men sought to formulate laws of an economic society, which since that time have been experimented with, in preparation for such time as they may receive axiomatic acceptance.

¹ *Le Code de la Nature*, issued by Morelly, an obscure publicist, in 1758, offers a systematic and well-thought-out code of communism. It was not intended to be an utopian scheme, but a practical method of assuring a redistribution of wealth, and the abolition of private property. Mably, writing about the same time, expressed similar views, but did not deem them feasible. They are of historical interest as they influenced the writings of the communist school during the early nineteenth century.

IV

The place of property in political society has been reviewed in some detail.¹ Harrington, in his *Oceana* (1652), had outlined what appeared as a sound argument for the justification of private property in political society when he declared: "Power follows the balance of property, especially landed property." In property the individual had the foundation of his power. In land he had a tangible realization of the fixed territory of the State as the basis of political organization which we have referred to. The State was made up of an agglomeration of properties. When, during the middle of the eighteenth century, economic questions came under serious consideration, we find that this conception of property was developed into a system.

The *Tableau Economique* of de Quesnay—the founder of the first school of modern economists—published in 1758, which may be taken as the first comprehensive statement of economic principles, was offered as a remedy for the chaotic fiscal conditions which prevailed. Though his doctrines appear in the light of later experience to have been based on a fallacy, no one can peruse this very complicated and incoherent statement of principles without being impressed with the fact that here it is suggested that a study of economic factors tends to prove that man is not the master of the universe, but inferior to nature, or as they said—the economists were deists—to God. Though they held tenaciously to the doctrine of the age that the individual should have no bars to his freedom, yet they believed that if rulers obeyed the laws of the universe, government could be reduced to supervising functions, and men be educated to accept the principles of economics as the true foundation of the stability of the social order.²

In England, Adam Smith, following the teachings of these precursors of economic science, formulated a sound

¹ Cf. p. 131 *et seq.*

² The economists, or physiocrats, as they later came to be called, were among the first to advocate a system of national, compulsory education which was destined to become such a powerful weapon in the hands of government during the ensuing century.

basis for the development of economics in his attack on the prevalent code of Locke, that the principal manner of increasing a nation's prosperity is by storing up precious metals as "the most solid and substantial part of its movable wealth." This doctrine was the basis of the mercantile system which had to be overthrown before new economic principles, compatible with industrial expansion, could be formulated. Freedom in industry had become a corollary of political freedom. In this field, Adam Smith played a leading rôle. The economic condition of the working classes became the object of inquiry. Attention was for the first time called to the misery, squalor and destitution which were directly traceable to the wage system. The interest aroused remained for the time chiefly historical. The economic remedies offered during the eighteenth century never conflicted with existing political principles in regard to private property, but the influence of economic speculation on the course of political affairs cannot be left out of account. It pointed out a self-evident truth that man cannot live by himself alone ; that he cannot grow wealthy by merely hoarding his wealth ; that he has social responsibilities even more vital than any individual, abstract rights. These responsibilities impose obligations beyond those covered by any merely contractual relations.

It is more than a mere coincidence that at the time when the new economic theories were taking shape, Locke's theory of sovereignty and of the contractual relation between governing and governed, should have become discredited. His theory had been adequate to justify the action of Parliament in promulgating the Bill of Right which had led to the omnipotence of Parliament. It was not until nearly a century later, 1770, that a king of England, George III, was able to gain a controlling voice in the deliberation of his ministers, while we may trace the first beginnings of the supremacy of the Cabinet over Parliament to Pitt's ministry of 1783.

Rousseau had given new life to the contractual hypothesis, but had subordinated it to an all-powerful

majority. The State, greater than any of its members, emerged from the French revolutionary epoch with vastly increased powers. It had become the sole repository of power, of that inalienable, indivisible, unlimited sovereignty which was to characterize it during the nineteenth century. It was no longer held to be composed merely of its individual members, but towered above them and controlled their destiny, marked them as its own. The desire for absolute equality, which for a brief space during the Revolution had led to the abolition of all corporations in France, had left the State supreme, and this supremacy it was never henceforth to abdicate.

The principles of self-determination and self-government had been put to the test in America. They had given most promising results. The system of government established there along republican lines, though it relied on a complicated mechanism of checks and balances, yet provided for a strong, executive authority. As time went on, we may trace the tendency to make of politics a professional occupation. This left to the individual the fullest freedom to concern himself with his economic interests, content with the supervisory powers which his right of ballot conferred.

In Europe, a new theory of State was being advocated, consonant with French principles of nationality, in which the State was, for the first time, held to be an end in itself. In both instances, we may note the gradual integration of the individual in the State, the more or less rapid decay of politics, and the rising interest in economics as the pivotal factor in social life.

CHAPTER XII

PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS

Politics and the Individual—The Function of Psychology—Its Historical Development—Mental Faculties—Wolff—Herbart—Psychological Aspects of the State—The Hegelian Interpretation—Non-Political Considerations—Political Psychology and the State.

I

IT would seem an over-simple method to take any single incident, or even series of incidents, and declare that here such and such an event had its origin ; then such a theory became practical ; there we have the cause of an effect which does not make itself felt for a long cycle of years. Yet we are compelled to proceed in this fashion if we would trace to a common source the important changes which often grow out of small beginnings. It is relatively easy to proclaim the coming dissolution of existing institutions ; it requires no more than usual alertness to put one's finger on the causes of present discontents, but it is more difficult to make it clear how these arose, to trace their origin to a distant source, and remove the covering of superficial and irrelevant relationships and show what lies beneath. By proceeding in this fashion, we may avoid hasty generalizations which are the pitfalls of the historian as well as of the wisest of prophets.

History reveals a nicely adjusted relationship between the course of events and their underlying causes. The fact that these causes can only be traced later does not detract from the importance of seeking to render them precise. In this way it will be seen that the rise of individualism, which became the basis of political society, directed the attention to an inquiry as to what the " individual " was, what were his attributes. Politics, though without ever precisely defining it, conceived of the individual as we have pointed out, as will. But

now a new science was in process of development which was bent on inquiring into the nature of the individual. This was the task of psychology. We may trace with remarkable distinctness the close correlation between the progress made in psychological inquiry, and the decay of politics.

A brief survey will suffice to show that though psychological inquiry long remained in an elementary stage, the rise of this new science was simultaneous with that of politics. We may even find important changes which took place in political practice reflected in psychological method. We here may seek for an explanation of much that appears incongruous in modern history. The stage of political development reached, may in a measure be plotted on the curve of psychological method developed at a given moment. The study of psychology is accompanied by a transformation which we may trace in politics. This close interrelation is of historical interest. A wider knowledge of psychology has tended to discredit politics; it has made the technique of politics appear crude, haphazard, and futile.

Psychology approaches the individual from the standpoint of science. This has led to the integration of the individual in the social process by identifying psychic with social control. But psychology has also revealed the almost unfathomable complexity of mental processes. Man is more than the individual which politics takes or can take into account. From another side, it may be pointed out that recent psychological inquiry had its origins and was pressed with greatest zeal in Germany, as though one might here trace the distinct purpose to discredit politics among a people where politics never became acclimated. Though too much stress must not be placed upon this factor, yet it is of historical interest to recall that the development of socialism and the destruction of the political control of the social order, found in Germany its most coherent advocates.

II

Psychology, as a separate science, is of very recent origin. In many respects it has absorbed fields which

were previously covered by philosophy. Its separation from philosophy dates from the latter nineteenth century. The term psychology, however, in its modern usage, came into currency at the close of the sixteenth century.¹ Hobbes claimed that mental life is continuous, all of a piece, and that man's mind is not cut up into faculties which determine his conduct. He averred that there is in man a tendency to action under the guidance of his appetites which culminates in his will. But Hobbes never went beyond a rather hasty and incidental survey of mental life. He was more interested in politics, though he felt that some psychological foundation was necessary. The perplexed question of the will had led his contemporary, Spinoza, to declare: "There is no mind absolute, or free will, but the mind is determined for willing this or that by cause." In his note to the proof of this thesis, Spinoza avers: "There cannot be found in mind an absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving."² Leibniz also rejected the notion of distinct faculties prevalent in the popular mind. To him the individual is, in his epigrammatic phrase, a unit, *plein de l'avenir, et chargé du passé*.

These early suggestions in regard to the nature of mind were left unheeded, and we find the school of faculty psychology in full possession of the field. Modern psychology, in its proper sense, dates from Wolff's theory (1732) that man is made up of a number of faculties which govern all of his actions. To ascribe to man mental faculties was to endow him with so many water-tight compartments, each having little or nothing to do with any of the others. It was an easy way out of the difficulties which confronted the individual in the explanation of an inconsistent conduct. To have a faculty for a thing, a religious faculty, a moral faculty, a faculty for loving, desiring, understanding, or any others, and to ascribe the various actions of a given individual to the governance of these faculties was a convenient hypothesis which found

¹ It was apparently taken from the title of one of the works of Gochenius, a professor at Marburg (1590).

² Cf. *Ethics*, Part II, Prop. 48. It will be recalled that to Spinoza man was only a mode of the all-inclusive substance.

ready acceptance. This was particularly true during the eighteenth century. It coincided with the convictions of an age during which the average man was taught by a Voltaire that he was the best judge of his own conduct under all circumstances. This faculty psychology reflects the temper of the eighteenth century and serves to explain many of the inconsistencies of conduct in public, as well as private affairs, which would otherwise appear so irreconcilable. Psychology had not yet reached the stage when it might be termed a science.

It was a German, interested primarily in matters of education, who, during the first decade of the nineteenth century, suggested the application of the methods of physics to problems of the mind. Herbart set out to analyse individual experience, and not rely on any given faculties. He held the view that facts of a psychic nature can be calculated, and differentiations explained, by mechanical laws. He gave precision to his hypothesis that the individual is a self, living in a world of its own, and that the life of this self has its rule "not outside, but inside itself." It is with this self that psychology deals. The result of inquiry in this field would, he believed, make it possible to weigh, measure and codify conclusions, and formulate laws of mind not so different from the laws of physics.

Man, in his view, was no longer to be held a mere individual, but was in the way of becoming a person. He first raised the question of the problem of personality, and declared that, as a person, the "self was neither primitive nor independent, but the most conditioned being one can imagine."¹ "The human being of the psychologist," he declares, in his *Lehrbuch der Psychologie*, "is the social and civilized human being who stands on the apex of the history through which the race has passed. In him are found visibly together all the multiplicity of elements which, under the name of mental faculties, are regarded as a universal inheritance of humanity. Whether they are originally in conjunction, whether they are originally a multiplicity, is a matter upon which the facts are silent. . . . The

¹ Cf. *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Sec. 11.

genuine psychological documents lie in the momentary states of individuals, and there is an immeasurably long way from these to the height of the universal concept of man in general."¹

This is the stage which psychological inquiry had reached when we may clearly discern a transformation taking place in politics at the close of the revolutionary epoch. Politics, as we have seen, took cognizance of man as a unit of will—an individual. Individualism had been the guiding motive of social life. The individual had become the centre of the social universe. Individuality found expression in the pursuit of those two political will-o'-the-wisps, "liberty and equality," which a participation in political affairs claimed to vouchsafe. The conduct of affairs had remained in the hands of that class in the social order which had the fullest scope for the expression of its will, the property-owning middle class. By degrees, the spell of mystery which had been woven about the technique of politics, was being cleared away. In this, the new psychology had a silent, but important part. In practice it took the form of education. We will deal subsequently with this phase of the problem. We must here trace the effects of the new theories of State on the place which the individual now came to occupy in the social order.

III

The first outward effect in an historical sense contemporaneous with the psychological speculations of Herbart, is the disappearance of abstract man from the realm of practical politics. Man in general, an abstract concept which the eighteenth century hypostatized as a real factor in the social process, fades into the background of politics and is, as we have seen, replaced by the concrete individual member of the body politic, wearing the insignia of nationality as his mark of identification. The State emerges, endowed with a superior individuality, or in other terms, a superior will. It is no longer identified by its executive, but confers

¹ Cf. *op. cit.*, Sec. II.

upon the latter whatever power he may wield. In brief, the State has become national. It is made up of individuals, of Frenchmen, Englishmen and so forth, and in the light of the new theories then taking shape, each individual as such, in a political sense, possesses no ultimate value, no independent life of his own. The important objects in the social process are no longer the plurality of individuals into which the State may be decomposed, but the aggregate into which these are united. The individual is completely absorbed in the organized political State of which he is a part. The State becomes a super-personal individuality. Its geographical boundaries are the limits of its sovereignty, and within these bounds it countenances no other sovereign authority. It demands unreserved and unequivocal allegiance of its members. Nationality becomes the dominant political ideal. The Nation-State is held to be a definite, tangible, personalized power. Man in the abstract is replaced by the State in the abstract. Man as mind, with which psychology deals, becomes the basis of speculation in regard to an absolute mind, which Hegel identifies with the State. All subsequent political theories of the Nation-State may be traced to this source. The Hegelian view, diversely interpreted, henceforth deeply influenced political practice. This new theory required a re-examination of the fundamentals of politics. Out of the individualism which had by degrees become dominant in the State, a new concept of the State had arisen. It assumed that not only has the State become an end in itself, but that it contains the sum and substance of social life, the fabric of civilization, apart from which the individual has no coherent mode of, nor reason for, existence.

It has often been remarked that the point of view of the eighteenth century was individualist, and that of the nineteenth fundamentally social, but this is only partially in accord with the facts. The socialism of the nineteenth century was not only in a large measure theoretical, but was so shot through with political concepts that it never rose above the level of a destructive doctrine. While the rise of national States extinguished the older

individualism and rendered the individual subservient to the State, we find the State endowed with all of the characteristics of a super-individual. Free from all restraints, the conduct of States in their intercourse with each other presents a picture not unlike that presented by individuals during the Renaissance. Then, unbridled individualism had led to social chaos as witnessed in the Italian peninsula ; now, national States found a broader field for their exploits, and the power of a neighbouring State was the only restraining hand.

Man, according to the new political code, ceased to hold himself a separate unit. He had surrendered his prerogatives of individuality, his will, to the State, and the State as the aggregate of wills had been endowed with powers that no corporate organisation had in the past possessed. The State in this view is "not merely a political fabric, but the entire hierarchy of institutions, by which life is determined, including, e.g. the family trade, the church, the university. It is the structure which gives life and meaning to them all." ¹

IV

If we stop to examine the Hegelian doctrine more closely, we will find that, in point of fact, it is based on the idea of Rousseau that "sovereignty is the exercise of the general will." Every act of the State is an act of will. Hegel devises a very ingenious interpretation of the will as free, that is, self-determined, by insisting that the will is identical with the object willed. He adopted the idea of Machiavelli that, "there is no higher duty for a State than to maintain itself, and to punish every author of anarchy ; the supreme and perhaps the sole political crime." Hegel was confident that force alone can compel obedience, and that for the State the only healthy method to maintain its position is to rely solely on the principle that "might is right." "The rights of a State are the utility of the State, of the State as established and recognized by compacts. . . . War has to decide, not which of the rights asserted

¹ Cf. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 149.

by either party is the true right (for both parties have a true right), but which right has to give way to the other." The State, as Hegel conceives it, is the supreme authority. It is absolute and impersonal. Its prerogatives are those which Hobbes bestows upon the sovereign Leviathan. "But the Hegelian God, imminent in the State, is a higher power than Hobbes knows. He is not mortal, but in his truth an immortal God."¹

Further insight into the Hegelian conception of the State may be gained by citing very briefly his interpretation given to liberty and equality. "Liberty and equality are simple rubrics," Hegel declares, "into which is frequently concentrated what should form the fundamental principle, the final aim and result of the constitution. . . . With the State there arises inequality. . . . The principle of equality, logically carried out, rejects all differences and thus allows no sort of political condition to exist."²

But Hegel, in rejecting the notion of equality, in crushing individualism and erecting the absolute supremacy of the State, still clings to the accepted concept of property as underlying his State system. Man, according to his view, shows his superiority over nature by taking possession of objects in the physical world. The real sources of authority are the laws of possession. "The existence which the person gives to its liberty, is property."³ "The land-owning class is alone competent to participate in political power on account of its property which secures it both against the government and against the uncertainty of trade."⁴

If we seek for the basis of the new theories of State which were formulated during the opening years of the nineteenth century, we will find that the active inquiry carried on in regard to the nature of social institutions, is more and more influenced by non-political considerations. Though the Hegelian theory is essentially

¹ Cf. Wallace W., "Hegel as a Political Critic," in his translation of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, p. 142.

² Cf. *Philosophy of Mind*, Sec. 539.

³ Cf. Hegel, *op. cit.*, Sec. 487.

⁴ Cf. Hegel, *Philosophie des Rechts*, p. 391.

political—the culmination of politics—and the State-system of the nineteenth century has all the outward marks of political institutions, yet close beneath the surface we come upon new cultural factors which cannot be left out of account. In the process of amalgamating and fusing the millions of individual wills and distilling the nectar of the State—the general will—a new sense of obligation arose which led men to re-examine their social creed. It was natural that under such circumstances extremes should be reached, that Marxian communism and Bismarckian imperialism should be referable to the same Hegelian source. How such a transmuting of values could have taken place becomes clear if we hold firmly in view that, with the establishment of the Nation-State, and the acceptance of the theory that the State—the historical unit of the social order—is the sole sovereign entity, and nationality the dominant political idea, politics has fulfilled its cycle of development. What was now required was merely to develop some means of binding the individual inextricably to the State, and of making nationality his most precious possession. The function of the State henceforth was to encompass the whole life of the individual, to gather up within itself, and give expression to his desires, and make possible their realization.

The State is not only to be self-sufficing, in the Greek sense, but is to promote the welfare of its members. It is held to be eternal; its power and greatness are to be measured by the extent of its domain. Its sovereign authority is founded on positive rights of its own. These rights are superior to any law. The State cannot be compelled to act against its will except by force of arms. Political liberty and equality, to use the stock phrase inherited from the Revolution, were to shed a mellow glow, radiating the satisfaction and well-being of the members of the State. The latter, in turn, show their gratitude by a love of country, which is the supreme love of the patriotic citizen. Patriotism is in the nature of a religious experience. The Nation-State has become the immortal God.

CHAPTER XIII

HISTORY AND POLITICS

**The Rôle of the Historian—Political Propaganda—Nationalism as an Historical Doctrine—Savigny—The New Historical Method—
Ranke—The Historical View-point—The Doctrine of Evolution—
Social History.**

I

IT has often been a matter of inquiry among modern students of history whether the philosophers of the eighteenth century in France brought about the ferment in the minds of men which resulted in the Revolution, or whether they merely gathered together and presented in an emphatic and coherent manner the loose ends of discontent current at the time. Both views have staunch supporters, though the evidence would appear to be in favour of the latter view. At all events, all are agreed that philosophical speculation brought forth and put into circulation those ideas of individualism, of the rights of man and the sovereignty of the people, of liberty and equality which became the creed of the Revolution. With the advent of the nineteenth century and the rise of the new doctrine of nationalism, we are confronted with a similar problem, only now the philosophers who influenced the course of events during the eighteenth century have been replaced by a new school of political propagandists, the historians.

It is beyond question that during the nineteenth century the long line of brilliant historians performed for the new doctrines of nationalism and of the Nation-State the task which in the previous century was performed by philosophers. As in the eighteenth century, we are confronted at every turn in politics with philosophers and philosophical opinions, so in

the nineteenth we are met by the historian and historical judgments. Nothing could more clearly bring home the fundamental difference between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the old age and the dawn of the new, than by placing in contrasting lights the philosopher in his setting of rationalism as we find him in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the historian of the nineteenth and twentieth who is groping towards a scientific method.

Did nationalism arise as a result of the new, historical view-point, or did the new historical view-point follow upon the acceptance of nationalism as the cardinal tenet of the new age? A sifting of the evidence shows that, in the first instance, nationalism had its origin in French Revolutionary propaganda. When Roget de Lisle wrote the *Marseillaise* in 1792, he was giving voice to patriotic fervour. His inspiration was historical, not philosophical. So it was when after Jena the wave of national enthusiasm swept over Germany which led to the Wars of Liberation. It was not to an abstract philosophy of national rights, but to concrete examples in history that appeal was made. Nationalism was a revolt against the cosmopolitan spirit so favoured by the philosophers of the eighteenth century. National patriotism was the consequence of the new feeling which an interest in history gave voice to. The egotistical individualism of the previous age was coming to be held a sterile, lifeless, soulless creed, for man has obligations towards his fellow men—in a word, he is social. The new idealism strengthened the growing conviction that in the State man could realize his full destiny, and the study of history revealed a long line of illustrious deeds performed by members of social groups which now sought to realize a greater destiny.

II

THE new national, historical view-point was most eagerly expounded in Germany. There the new theory of State received its most complete and compact formula-

tion. There the revolt against the rationalism of the eighteenth century was carried to extremes. The romanticism of the early nineteenth century had the effect of popularizing an interest in history through the historical romance. The eighteenth century had despised the mediæval age. The historians and historical romancers of the nineteenth century dug it up. Interest in feudal times took the form of tracing the high antiquity of existing national culture and institutions. Everywhere the demand was for life in its passionate, enthralling fullness. The fantastic was preferred to the rational, the imaginative to the soundly accurate. But this romantic period did not long endure, though it left lasting traces on the development of historical science.

History represents the State as an active agency moulding the course of events and reacting as an organic whole. Philosophy presents generalizations which control and mould the social order by a reason superior to it. History is inclusive, pulsating, changing. Philosophy is exclusive, impassive, immutable. This is the interpretation which the historians of the nineteenth century gave to the philosophy of the eighteenth. After the Revolution men sought "life" everywhere. Savigny, the leader of the new historical school, declared that law, like language, is a living thing which grows out of the life of a people and expresses itself in the institutions of a country. He claimed that law grew naturally and unconsciously out of the heart of a nation, and that to codify it was to cramp it within bounds which would check its natural growth. To understand the present, he declared, one must study the past; one must look to the origins of institutions in order to be in a position to weigh their present significance. But this study must be conducted critically, based on original sources. These sources must be analysed, new methods of inquiry must be instituted to sift the data and distinguish its worth.

History, as written by the historians of the new era, was no longer to be merely a superficial narrative, a chronicle of events, or a dressing up of puppets to

perform according to rote as it had been in the eighteenth century, but in the hands of Niebuhr, it became a living account of a political organism, reconstructed after a careful examination of all available evidence. Niebuhr's *Roman History*, in spite of its awkward presentation and the arbitrary manner of selecting evidence, showed what might be done to make the past live again. Henceforth the critical, historical method was to leave no field of research fallow.

The thoroughness of the German historical explorers was to become proverbial. The impetus to modern scientific research, the development of archæology, philology, anthropology, ethnology, our knowledge of antiquity, of Greece, of Rome, of the Renaissance, of literature, of architecture, by an uncovering and study of sources may be traced to this new interest in history. But throughout these various and diverse fields of study, nationalism, as the main interest of history, was never lost sight of. Love of the fatherland inspired these early investigators to reveal the greatness of their national heritage. When history reached a more sober stage and we find Ranke declaring that he relates events "as they actually happened," and that he approaches his subject without prejudice, we may nevertheless detect a feeling of national pride that the lustre of his fame as the greatest historian of Modern Times would redound to the credit of Germany. He established on firm foundations the science of political history. He affirmed that history has a distinct political purpose to perform in recounting the importance of national States in the development of civilization. But whether we look to Germany, or beyond its frontiers, and review the new study of history in France, the United States or England; to the work of the passionate and inaccurate Michelet, the precise Guizot, to Thiers, de Tocqueville, or Taine; to Bancroft's self-satisfied and chauvinist narrative entitled *The History of the United States*; to Parkman, Prescott or Mahan; to Macaulay, or to the distorted pictures drawn by Carlyle, the careless ones by Froude, or the

concise work of the Oxford School of later date, we find everywhere that the underlying motive of history, is to illumine politics and portray national character. "No historian," Treitschke, near the close of the nineteenth century, was led to declare, "who lacks the political mind, can penetrate the heart of history ;" and further, "the State is the outward form which a nation has moulded for itself in the course of history."

III

This brief outline may serve to show that though the new theory of the national State may trace its origins to the Hegelian concept, yet it is to the historians of the age that it owes its development. It is the historians who gathered together the loose-ends of current national feeling, and gave precision to politics by narrating what appears as a true account of the life of the various peoples of the West. It is the historians who preached the new doctrines of nationalism, and led men to accept such ideas as "national greatness" and "national destiny," as the guiding principles of a social life. It is they who spread over the pages of the history of a given people the glamour of high achievement, who brought about a new cult in hero-worship, who fed the flames of nascent nationalism and transformed it into race prejudice and race pride. It is in the study of history that the various peoples of the western world found the inspiration needed to consider themselves better than their national neighbours, to become mutually exclusive, and to place the badge of nationality on every pillar and post to mark the frontier of their land. It is the historians who taught men to accept patriotism as their highest virtue. Jingoism, chauvinism, *Deutschland über Alles*, or the American "God's country," are outgrowths of the same spirit which led directly to the national wars in our own times.

History is still to the average mind, in the main, a chronicle of wars. The national wars of the nineteenth

century, the foundation of national States, the independence of national groups, the oppression and suppression of others which were striving for independence, all made appeal to history, to justify the policy pursued. "Only in war-time does the importance of politics come home to us," Treitschke wrote, and though his was not an ideal type of history, it had the greatest practical influence because of its vigour, directness and passionate nationalism. "The appeal to arms will be valid to the end of history," is another observation from the same pen.

It would be impossible to emphasize too strongly the influence which the development of an historical view-point had on the course of events during the nineteenth century. History leads men to look backward, to review the past and use it as a guide for conduct in the present or to measure the progress which, by comparison with the past, appears to have been made. History vividly impresses upon the mind the idea of progress, sets it up as a fetish, and in the process, progress becomes an end in itself. An historical attitude accompanies the culmination of a given civilization. It marks the close of an age and the opening of a new era. Men feel that they have reached a high peak from which they may, with much satisfaction, survey the panorama which the historian spreads out before them. Historical laws become moral imperatives. Such terms as "historical necessity," the "logic of history," are met with. They give to the course of events an inevitable character, but conduce to political unity and a ready acceptance of the *fait accompli*.

The historians of the nineteenth century performed another important function. They not only broke down the ossified individualism of the eighteenth century with its lifeless cosmopolitanism, but they substituted therefor a vigorous living nationalism, and taught men to feel themselves part of a higher unity—the Nation-State. In developing the idea of the Nation-State, the historians broke through the older political class exclusiveness, and accepting the inheritance of liberty, equality and property, joined thereto social responsi-

bility and political obligation. This led to the rise of the spirit of democracy which characterizes the nineteenth century.

The idea of self-determination is philosophical, and belongs by rights to the eighteenth century; the idea of self-government, "of the people, by the people and for the people," is historical, and belongs to the nineteenth century. It is directly traceable to the insistence upon nationality and the national group rather than the individual; upon the race, the masses, the large agglomeration united in a compact whole which is sovereign and asserts its sovereignty as a State. Land and people linked with a "national tradition," which any skilled historian knew how to exploit, or even if need arise, invent, were the materials required for national state building. Most of these historians, however, apparently have failed to realize that democracy was the basis of the doctrine of nationality of which they made themselves such active propagandists. Yet, it is upon the groundwork of democracy, the result of the many confluent causes, in a decaying political society of which the historian made himself the spokesman, that the new social doctrines flourished which hastened the dissolution of political society. Among these, we must cite here the doctrine of evolution which became so closely interwoven with the spirit of the new age.

The prestige and popularity of the evolutionary hypothesis may be traced to the widespread acceptance of an historical, in contradistinction to a philosophical view-point. Democracy had dethroned the individual from all position of privilege in the body politic before Darwin enunciated his *Origin of Species*. The historians had for nearly half a century emphasized the influence of the past upon the present, and that the present is the outcome of the past, before such an hypothesis as that of the "survival of the fittest" could gain credence. The complacent attitude towards existing social conditions during the mid-nineteenth century which we have referred to, made men accept more readily their individual subservience in the face of

collective, national preeminence. To assign a place to man in the series of organic types, and make use of the idea of progress then current, was the application of historical method which resulted in the theory of evolution.

The dominant influence of the doctrine of evolution upon all branches of human knowledge was characteristic of the latter decades of the nineteenth century. The change in mental attitude which resulted has often been ascribed as the cause of the transformation which took place in social and political theories, but the opposite order is more in accord with the facts. The growth of the conviction that there is no absolute, but only a conditional form of good government; that all things are relative; that fixity or certainty are unattainable; that everything is in flux, in a state of continuous becoming; that there is no finality, no fixed standard, whether of morals or of conduct in public or later even in private affairs, are all only too readily ascribed to the influence of evolutionary theories. But a more profound examination will reveal that these uncertainties are symptoms of a decaying social order, which for convenience sake, are referred to an all-inclusive burden bearer, in this instance, the doctrine of evolution. They are symptoms of deep discontents which mark the change taking place in social values, the transition from individual to social standards, from a political to a non-political social order.

Here history joins hands with psychology, and we may trace the efforts of history to rid itself of the incubus of politics. It led to the acceptance of the idea which Macaulay was the first tentatively to assert, that the era of political history was over, and that its place must be taken by the history of civilization. The idea that politics does not fill the "orbit of history," just as it cannot fill the life of man, was violently combatted. Nevertheless, it made slow but steady headway. The new field of social history was actively worked. But political history held its position of preeminence, and the tradition of politics remained intact and was handed on to the twentieth century.

CHAPTER XIV

THE HISTORICAL STATE

The Orbit of History—The German Interpretation of Nationalism—The Political and the Historical State—Consequences of the Historical View-point—Democracy and Nationalism

I

IF we wish to sum up in a sentence the sequence of history in Modern Times, we find that England in the seventeenth, France in the eighteenth, and Germany in the nineteenth century, were the centres from which the theory of social organization radiated. This terse statement is of necessity incomplete, as we may trace the influence of Grotius and Althusius in the Low Countries in the seventeenth century, to say nothing of Vico and Campanella in Italy, while the example of the United States in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries cannot be left out of account. But in the main, this generalization will hold good. This change of the centre of gravity which we may term historical, is of great importance in weighing the transformation which took place in politics during the last century, and marks the final stage of its flowering, and already shows many symptoms of incipient decay.

It is a favourite phrase of historians, that in the nineteenth century Germany comes once again into the orbit of history. The modern political age arose out of the Reformation in Germany. Its first distinctive milestone was the Thirty Years War, and then for more than two centuries, Northern Germany sinks below the tide-level of history, only to emerge fully in the nineteenth century and bring to a conclusion the era of politics, to tear down the structure of the political State system which stands in the pathway of further

social development. This somewhat fatalistic interpretation is marked in the nineteenth century by the adoption of the French doctrine of nationalism, which was tossed off during a period of effervescence by that vigorous and exuberant race. But to the French, nationalism was a political doctrine, a plan for a constructive foreign policy, consonant with the new temper of the Revolutionary epoch. To the Germans and other peoples who were to strive for national unity and independence as sovereign States, it was different. It was welcomed as a gospel of salvation. The Germans now offered a new and concise theory of political organization based on the principle of racial homogeneity and cultural unity, and affirmed its validity by an appeal to history. This appeal was rendered coherent by what is termed elsewhere public opinion, or better, public approval.

Much emphasis has been laid upon the part public opinion played in moulding events which led up to the French Revolution, and subsequently, upon the course of politics in general. But this opinion was of necessity restricted to a small group of politicians and pamphleteers. The great majority, even of the more educated, never gave any thought to matters of politics. Goethe, in *Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, makes Werner, the well-to-do merchant, declare, "I can assure you that I never thought about the State in my life. . . . I have paid my taxes, charges and dues for no other reason than that it was the established usage."¹ It was not until much later in the century that public opinion became the occult force in political life, and influenced the course of events. Its mouthpiece was the press. Its source may be traced to the textbooks of history used in the schools.

The new German theory of State was not based on public opinion. In a political sense, it left the State and its mechanism out of account and made direct appeal to the passionate elements in man's character. There was nothing rational in this doctrine of nationalism ; it was at best romantic. But it was inspiring,

¹ Cf. *op. cit.*, chap. viii.

ennobling in that it made men look beyond themselves, and joined them in the pursuit of what appeared to be noble, even if chimerical ends. It presented a new doctrine of political liberty which differed radically from the English theory. The English thesis of political liberty was that it belonged by right to the individual. The new German ideal was that political liberty was conferred upon the individual by the State. The English conception had set up a wide divergence and hostility between governing and governed. Liberty consisted in doing all of those things which the law does not specifically prohibit. It was distinctly individual, and showed traces of its negative origins as a protest against inequality between governing and governed.

The new German nationalism posited that it was only in the State that the individual reached that grade of cultural development that made it possible for him to realize his freedom. It is in the laws of the State that liberty is contained. The laws do not merely safeguard individual liberties, but are the expression of liberty. The State in this conception is the most admirable, efficient, and at the same time essential guarantee, that makes the realization of a good life possible. To insure the greatest good to its members, the State must be all-powerful and rise above them, clothed in majesty and splendour—a truly sovereign State. The State in this German conception was no longer held to be composed of individuals; it did not discuss matters of contractual relations between governed and governing, but talked about the nation, racial superiority, national homogeneity, national culture. It was, as we have had occasion to point out, an historical, not a philosophical creation. It propounded no new technique of politics. Its historical propagators showed a deep ignorance of matters of practical politics. English constitutional methods were, in the main, made use of to afford a workable mechanism for the functioning of the body politic. The field of administration was more widely extended, and the State undertook to perform many functions

which, under the English system, were left to private initiative.

From France, the Germans borrowed the methods of diplomacy, of foreign relations, of alliances and personal intercourse between sovereigns. But it was never lost sight of that it was in its armies that the Nation-State had not merely a weapon of external defence, but the basis of its internal stability. The conscript armies of the Revolution had been hot-beds of nationalism. Conscription was to serve as the foundation of German nationalism, in educating national pride, in teaching loyalty, devotion and duty to the State and, in preparing the nation to fulfil its "manifest destiny."

II

Thus the nineteenth century witnessed the culmination of the doctrines of politics, which ushered in Modern Times. In the Nation-State, the cycle of cultural development begun during the Renaissance was completed. The individual as the unit of the State, and the State as a super-individual member of a state-system, the English and French doctrines of politics was the ground upon which the Nation-State was raised. Seen in this light, Germany, as a State, viewed from the angle of politics, was an artificial creation, based on the non-political creed it had made out of nationality. It was artificial in the sense that it responded to an historical, not to a political idea, and made the new interpretation it gave to the doctrine of nationality serve as a political vehicle. In so doing, the Germans adapted and refashioned English and French political methods, but created nothing. We look in vain for anything new or even original in the German State in so far as practical politics is concerned. In point of fact, the German Empire was a psychological, not a political structure. Nationalism, as the Germans interpreted it, was in the nature of a natural law, it was historical, and not as it was to the French, merely a part of a political programme. The subordination of the individual to the State was, in

Germany, carried to greater limits than elsewhere in the West, owing to a congenital indifference to those political privileges and prerogatives which elsewhere were so highly valued. "When a price can be paid, an equivalent can be substituted. It is that which is above price and which consequently admits of no equivalent that possesses real value." These words of Kant apply with much precision to the attitude of the average German towards politics. Though political liberty in its individualist conception was not above price, national liberty was held the most precious gift of social life. This indifference to home politics was in part due to the fact that the Germans had never been trained to examine political premises with care, but in a larger part to a natural inability to appreciate the individualist view-point which politics entails. Politics remained to them a closed book. From the days when Frederick the Great wrote his *Anti-Machiavelli*, which has so often been interpreted as merely a blind for his own Machiavellianism, to the outbreak of the European War, we may see an unbroken chain of examples of the inability of the Germans to understand the methods of politics. For an examination of Frederick's policy and that of his successors reveals that they were unable to grasp the fundamentals of politics as currently understood.

What we may term a non-political attitude has always been a marked characteristic of the Germans. We find that political liberty among them never had any other meaning than that of diversity or particularity. Like their conception of equality, it was social and not political. The ruling class joined the army, and left government and politics in general open to others. The army may stand as typical of the German concept of the State, as the negation of the individual. It incarnates the State as a really great Leviathan, infallible and omnipotent above all political obligation, and relying on its might to enforce its superiority, both in home and foreign affairs. Patriotism, loyalty, allegiance, all of these complex psychological influences were conjoined to replace the older political concep-

tions, which made the State a means of adjusting the intercourse between individuals, and found their highest expression in liberty and equality.

III

The Nation-State was, in spite of the new elements introduced, political. Its life revolved exclusively in the realm of politics. The fact that the German mind understood only fragmentarily the nature of political method led the Germans to emphasize the political character of their institutions, and their historians to proclaim the preeminence of politics at a time when political practice was already on the verge of decline.

The Nation-State thus appears as an effort to unite the two antithetical political and social factors (individualism and socialism) in the typical Hegelian fashion and produce a higher synthesis. In practice, the union of opposites tends to neutralize the good points of each, and not to produce a higher type. In the realm of practical politics, it helped to undermine the technique of politics and disrupt the system of national States. It may be averred that the purpose of the Hegelian doctrines was destructive in preparation for the social order of the future. It cannot be gainsaid that they influenced many of the ablest minds during the nineteenth century, and that the historical state-system made possible the high cultural development of that age, and the spreading of European influence throughout the world. But we must not over-emphasize the influence of Hegel. He served merely a point of departure selected for purposes of convenience. It is the historians who were the real propagators of the new theories of the Nation-State.

The influence of the study of history upon the growth of social doctrines cannot be too often insisted upon if we are to gain a proper perspective of the new order. It is in history that political doctrines and national achievements were fused and presented as a homogeneous whole. It is by history that men were taught to think in terms of nationality, to give con-

sideration to the State and its government which in the past had been left in the hands of specialists. The function of the historian was held to be that of instructor and preceptor of politicians and propagandists of nationalism. The honour of being called *Præceptor Germaniæ*, conferred upon Ranke, was no mere empty title, but what the historian might well have believed to be a recognition of his just deserts. From another side, historical studies had a great influence on the national mind. History was conceived as true in comparison with philosophy which could do no better than to seek the truth. History was based on facts, on events that took place, and such facts were not speculative but actual. The question that it was possible to give a biased interpretation of such facts was at the time not raised.

In history, the State became a living reality, a personality, not as in philosophical discussions merely a logical hypothesis or an abstraction of complex relations and rights. The historical view-point brought with it the breath of life into political affairs, and gave to public policy a self-sufficient basis. Skilful historical interpretation could be made use of at any time to sanction the course of action pursued. During this epoch, history became the history of the world; not only of the world of the present, but of all ages and of all climes. Beyond the confines of Europe, it became the burden bearer of European culture, a proof of the superiority of the Western World, measured in the terms of progress which the new historical method so vividly illustrated. At the same time, it brought the outlying realms of the globe into the current of the new historical unity. It showed how other peoples might imitate European methods and enter the orbit of history by following the course mapped out by the peoples of the West. While history remained in the main national and political, it pointed the way to a new and broader concept, to a union of nations, to humanity. What theology had been to the Church, philosophy had been to the political State, but now with the rise of history and a historical view-point, a

new social synthesis was required. History, apparently the handmaid of politics, was in reality preparing for the overthrow of politics and the acceptance of a broader thesis of social organization.

IV

The study of history and the acceptance of the historical view-point which we come upon during the nineteenth century, transformed the character of politics. The middle class, desirous of retaining its political ascendancy, and as the property owning class for the time being in a position to do so, readily adopted the new historical doctrines, identified itself completely with the State, suppressed whatever class consciousness it had inherited from Revolutionary days, and frankly espoused the cause of nationality. Though nationalism was variously interpreted, and in England never gained as strong a foothold as on the Continent, yet during the three decades, 1815-1848, the interests of the State became identified with those of the ruling middle class. The policy of the State was directed towards securing a firm basis for the protection of property at home, and extending the field of profitable enterprise abroad. In France, nationalism had, as we have seen, become a political programme. The plans to erect independent national States, formed out of suppressed nationalities whether Poles, Italians, Czechs, or Irish, received much doctrinaire support. But in England, individualism remained firmly rooted and served as the basis of all political action; though it was never displaced, it accommodated itself to the new needs of the times. The revolutionary outbreaks of 1830 and 1848 in continental Europe revealed the full force of the new doctrine of nationalism and the prestige which the constitutional system had attained. The two issues, constitutionalism and nationalism, were at the time amalgamated, and served as the basis for the widespread agitation for political liberty. But the revolutions which took place in 1848 were based on a theoretical political idealism incompatible with the

political aims they sought to attain; they therefore failed to achieve tangible results. Nationalism, however, was a fundamentally sound doctrine. This is proved by the fact that within two decades its most vigorous exponents, the Germans and Italians, and at a later date all the other peoples seeking national independence, and even "unredeemed" provinces seeking incorporation with the mother country, gained the desired ends.

A close examination reveals that nationalism had become the burden-bearer of the new democratic doctrines that were spreading across the world in this final stage of politics. Though it is apparently on the surface difficult to perceive the connection, the intimate relation between American democracy and German nationalism may be made very clear. Both were working towards the same end. Both were outgrowths of the doctrines of equality which are the characteristic feature of democracy. When Lincoln issued his famous statement of democratic principles that government "of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth," he was putting into homely language the identical sentiment which Savigny had perhaps more consistently expressed three decades before in his declaration that "the State has its origin and naturally arises in the people, through the people, for the people."¹

¹ Cf. *System des Römischen Rechts*, Bk. I, chap. ii, sec. 10. "Dass der Staat, ursprünglich und naturgemäss in einen Volk, durch das Volk und für das Volk entsteht." The close similarity of this language with that of Lincoln would seem to indicate that the latter may have borrowed it from Savigny. Savigny died in 1861, and it is probable that some publicity was given to his death which may have come into the hands of Lincoln and attracted his attention to Savigny's doctrine.

CHAPTER XV

PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICAL POLITICS

The Nation-State as Constitutional—The American Constitutional Idea — De Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* — Its Scope and Significance—Business and Politics—The Faults of Democracy—The Question of Divided Sovereignty—The American Civil War and German Unity—Lincoln and Bismarck.

I

THE Nation-State was by definition constitutional. The legal basis of government which a constitution implies was the only workable method of organizing this new form of State, consonant with the principle that authority in the State is derived from the nation, is the realization of its national aims. The nation was composed of individuals who participated in the privileges accruing to those belonging to a given political group. The will of the nation found expression in the constitution.

Hegel had maintained that the constitution is inseparable from the idea of the State. A constitution implies a nation of which it becomes the organic law. The whole history of political agitation, since the days of the French Revolution, had been and was to continue to be centred about this question of constitutional liberties. By the constitution not only the rights of the individual were to be guaranteed, but a system of checks and balances between the various branches and powers of government was to be established, consonant with the individualist character of the Nation-State.

The constitution was to satisfy the growing demand for a share in government by the people, and at the same time find a place for the monarch in the scheme of politics as the autonomous executive head of the State. Historical tradition was, at the time, too strong

to admit of any other thesis than that the king granted the constitution. This left the king his prerogatives as separate from those of the rest of the nation, even though these were determined by the constitution, and he ruled in the name of the people.

But the idea of equality, left as a permanent heritage by the Revolution, had for a time cooled the ardour of political propagandists. The new theory of nationalism was engrossing the attention of the politically alert section of the population in the chief countries of Europe. France had reverted to a modified constitutional form of the older monarchical régime. The dread of the recrudescence of revolutionary violence had rendered the middle class conservative. The veiled threat of Thiers, contained in his brilliant study on the French Revolution, issued at this time, that though "liberty" had not yet come, it was coming, had led even ardent liberals such as Guizot to combat any further extension of equitarian doctrines as contained in the demand for universal suffrage which would lead, as he feared, to the tyranny of the majority. Guizot even went so far as to declare that absolute political authority does not vest either in prince or people as was currently believed, but that representative institutions fulfil their functions without the need of recourse to such a power.

II

In England, the middle class, after putting through the Reform Act, was in the throes of the acute stage of its struggle with Chartism (1834-1838). After overcoming this obstacle, it settled down to enjoy its triumph and dominated the body politic undisturbed. In Germany, nationalism was becoming the burning question of the hour. The feeling that the national unity of the German people was historically inevitable had spread among the more alert elements of the population. But a workable means to achieve this end had not been suggested, and to many seemed impossible of realization in a land where the inhabitants were bound by traditions of particularism.

It was at this juncture (1835), that de Tocqueville issued the first volume of his studies on the practical results of American democracy. For nearly a half century the Americans and the political system established by them had dropped out of the sight of Europe. In the days of the Declaration of Independence and the subsequent establishment of the United States, interest in American affairs was rife among the liberals of Europe. Political philosophers watched with keen interest the efforts made across the seas to realize in practical form their cherished theories of political liberty and equality. The constitutions of the various American States, published by order of Congress in 1781, were soon translated into French, and had a wide circulation in Europe.¹ Thomas Paine, in his vehement pamphlet on *The Rights of Man*, had declared that "the American Constitutions were to liberty what grammar is to language." While the American experiment in State building was followed with sympathy, scepticism prevailed as to the possibility of establishing a stable republican government over a wide territory. Further it was noted that no unity or consistency was to be found in American usage of those very important concepts such as "the people," "liberty," or "equality," so dear to the eighteenth century mind. Authority was vested in "the people," but who the people were, was left by the Americans an open question, and a closer examination revealed that the political philosophy which underlay the American Revolution belonged rather to the seventeenth than to the eighteenth century. Harrington's *Oceana*, the writings of Sidney, and above all, those of Locke, were at the back of the minds of those Americans who outwardly made use of the phraseology of Rousseau and the theories of Montesquieu.

It was clear, however, that whatever vagaries and inconsistencies might be detected in the use or misuse of terms, the framing of a constitution which was to embody the organic law of the States was, by the Americans, held to be the work of a constituent assembly. Constitution making was the special work of au

¹ Cf. Jellenick, *Declaration of Rights*, p. 18.

organ created for this specific purpose. When the Articles of Confederation, which had left sovereignty all too loosely delimited in the hands of the separate States and the central authority was found unable to insure stability, a constitutional convention assembled at Philadelphia (1787), and framed a new constitution, better adapted to the needs of a stronger central authority. The influence of the American example on the course of events in France was, in this mechanical aspect of constitution making, immediate and direct. The Constitutions of 1791, '93 and '95 all show traces of American principles and acknowledge the American conception that a statement of political philosophy must be incorporated in the organic law of the land. The purpose of the Constitution is to offer a possible working basis for the realization of these philosophical theories.

During the Napoleonic era the peoples of Europe had no time to pay attention to what the Americans might be doing. Momentous events nearer home engrossed their attention. The Constitutions of the Consulate and the Empire, though written instruments, contained none of the political phraseology of the Revolutionary epoch, except that the source of all authority in the State was vested in the people, who sanctioned Napoleon's assumption of the reins of government as dictator, and later the establishment of the Empire by plebiscite.

Then followed the period of reaction known as the Restoration. Nationalism was condemned by the Congress of Vienna as a pernicious doctrine. The Holy Alliance was active in suppressing all traces of the political liberties won during Revolutionary days, in an effort to re-establish the *ancien régime*. To suppress the rising demand for political liberty, national unity, and independence, taxed the full strength of the various governments. The Government of the United States raised its voice in protest against the extension of reaction to the American continent. The Monroe Doctrine called the attention of Europe to American affairs, but as the Holy Alliance desisted from its plans in America, no further interest was taken.

In spite of the repressive measures of the various European governments, constitutional principles were making steady headway on the Continent. The new historical spirit which had arisen was displacing the older, dogmatic, philosophical view-point. Though historians were busily engaged in laying the foundations of historical science, in support of constitutionalism and nationalism, no new theories of State, no new statement of liberal principles had been issued which might rally the adherents of reform, when de Tocqueville published his *Democracy in America*.

III

It is difficult to ascribe proper limits to the influence of this work. It has been said, "as Polybius' conception of the Roman constitution formed the basis of all systematic speculation on the subject among the Romans themselves, and as Montesquieu furnished the English with the first coherent theory of their constitution, so Tocqueville's exposition of the American democracy has been the source of many of the common-places in the conception of their institutions that has become traditional among the peoples of the United States."¹ De Tocqueville not only called attention to the successful working of the American state-system and clarified the opinions of Europeans in regard to the concept of popular sovereignty, but he dispelled the fear so prevalent at the time that universal suffrage inevitably meant the tyranny of the majority, and in practice led to despotism. These were some of the direct consequences. But more important than this, he gave precision to the idea of the American federal system. He pointed out that the central government had the power to enforce its authority directly through its own officials without recourse to the intervention of the separate States, while the States were the repositories of all authority not specifically conferred upon the central government. He emphasized the prevalence of decentralization in bringing about a dilution of govern-

¹ Cf. Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, p. 271.

ment in a land where "government is not deemed a good, but a necessary evil."¹ He explained how, though history taught that republics never long endured, in America we come upon an exception, owing chiefly to the position of influence given by the laws of the land to the judiciary. Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, provides that "the judicial powers shall extend to all cases, in law and equity arising under this constitution. . . ." This appeared to de Tocqueville to be the chief safeguard of a democratic republic.²

When we seek for a more precise definition of democracy we are confronted with many difficulties. De Tocqueville was imbued with the new historical spirit of the age. He did not hold a dogmatic view of democracy as something which might be achieved by a people by their conscious effort, or by the will of a legislature, but rather that it was the destiny of all powerful institutions eventually to become democratic. He tells us himself in the opening pages of his work : "This entire book that you are about to read was written under the spell of a sort of religious terror produced in the mind of the author at the sight of this irresistible revolution which for so many centuries, through so many obstacles, we may see advancing through the ruins which it has made."³

Throughout his work, which on the surface extols democracy and appears as a panegyric of equality, we find this instinctive terror before the unknown character of the spirit of democracy which has again come among men. This note of pessimism is maintained to the end, and at the close of Volume III, written fifteen years later, we find him declaring : "The world that is

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 37.

² Three things concur more than all others to the maintenance of the democratic republic of the United States :

1. The federal form, which enables the Union to enjoy the power of a great Republic and the security of a small one.
2. The local institutions, which by moderating the despotism of the majority, foster a taste for liberty, and teach the art of being free.
3. The system of the judicial power, in correcting the caprices of a democracy, without being able to prevent the acts of the majority, is able to slow them down and to guide them.

Op. cit., vol. ii, p. 207.

³ *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 8.

arising is still half covered by the debris of the world that is decaying, and in the immense confusion no one can tell what of the old institutions or customs will remain."¹ He hit upon a profound historical truth when he declared: "If we peruse the pages of our history we scarcely come upon important events during the past seven hundred years which did not further equality. The Crusaders and the English Wars decimated the nobility and brought about a division of landed property: the discovery of firearms led to equality between the noble and his villain on the field of battle. . . . Protestantism maintained that all men are equally able to find the path to heaven. America shows a thousand new paths to fortune, and offers to the obscure adventurer riches and power."² But he did not know how to interpret it aright. The study of American political institutions showed him, as he clearly tells us, that these institutions were not the cause of the prosperity which reigned there, but the effect. "The passions which most deeply stir the Americans are commercial, not political, or rather they carry over into the field of politics their business methods."³ Business, not politics, was the chief incentive to the maintenance of public order in America. Though de Tocqueville notes this, he draws no conclusion from his observation of the subservience of political to economic interests other than to ascribe to it the origin of American prosperity, or to become lyrical and predict that as Rome conquered the world, so the United States by its commerce will conquer the seas.

IV.

But democracy and political equality, rather than the United States, were the great interest of de Tocqueville. He makes use of American institutions and American practice as pegs for his analyses. His terror of democracy, which he hints at in the opening pages, never leaves him. Under a surface of suavity, and often

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 542.

² *Op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 204.

³ *Op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 6.

inordinate praise, we feel that he instinctively realized the destructive nature of democracy. He emphasizes with monotonous reiteration the pettiness, the narrowness, the dead-level which characterizes people living in ages of democracy. "Equality does not destroy the imagination, it limits it, and only permits it to take flight provided that it skims close to the surface of the earth."¹ Or again, "The wealthy in the United States are satisfied with having a large number of petty desires; they never give themselves up to disorderly practices. They fall in ways of ineptitude rather than debauchery."² These examples could be piled one upon another, showing that de Tocqueville, in spite of his apparent praise of democracy, looked upon it as a deadening scourge. He foresaw that the spread of the doctrines of equality was inevitable. He seems to have appreciated that in spite of the outward peace and prosperity which he notes as accompanying the acceptance of equalitarian principles in the United States, democracy is a symptom of destruction which will overtake existing political institutions. But he never gives precision to this feeling; he never openly attacks the spread of democratic doctrine. We find his suspicions that all is not well under a democratic régime in passages such as: "Nearly all peoples that have acted with vigour in determining the course of events, that conceived and executed great designs, from the days of the Romans to those of the English, were directed by an aristocracy."³

But the faults of democracy are, in his eyes, far outweighed by its benefits, and the mechanism of the American federal system, as he so clearly showed, was admirably adapted to insure a smooth functioning of government in a democratic age.

The immediate practical effect in Europe of de Tocqueville's work was not so much to bring America into the orbit of European interest as to give an impetus to German plans for establishing a federal government under Prussian hegemony and increase the agitation for

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 337.

² *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 105.

Op. cit., vol. iii, p. 214.

universal suffrage by showing how the system worked in America without leading either to disorder or to despotism. German political leaders were struck by the analogy between conditions in their country and in America. The fact that in the United States the separate States were all republics, and that in Germany the thirty-three separate units composing the German Confederation were nearly all monarchies, was not held a valid reason for not establishing a central authority patterned on the American model. German investigators did not fail to discover that in spite of de Tocqueville's clear analysis, no consensus of opinion had been reached in the United States as to the precise boundary line between the rights of the separate States and those of the central government. The vexed question of "States' rights" was to continue to be agitated there until the Civil War.

In the meantime the revolutionary outbreaks of 1848 gave the representatives of the various German States an opportunity to frame a constitution. The main purpose of the German Revolution was to achieve national unity. The desire to give expression to the long pent-up feelings of nationalism, and form a compact, united Germany, under the leadership of Prussia, was foremost in the minds of the delegates assembled at Frankfort in 1849. The American federal system offered the best means, so it was believed, to achieve this result. The United States appeared to the German framers of the constitution as a living example of a strong central authority with power enough to enforce its will. By following this example it was confidently believed it would be possible to found a strongly-knit, national, united Germany; a federal government which would leave to the German State a sufficient cultural autonomy to satisfy the innate particularism of the German people. The failure to put into effect this constitution was due to ulterior causes, chief among these the refusal of the King of Prussia to accept the crown of the new united Germany, and the visionary, impractical nature of the revolutionary outbreaks of that time. But the impression left throughout Germany by this abortive

attempt and the example of the American federal system was not lost sight of.

The German politicians watched with keen interest the struggle that was going on in America between the federal and the State governments. Their own loosely-knit union, which promoted internal dissensions and consequent weakness, made it possible for them to understand the problems which were then exciting American opinion. Though to the English and the French, slavery in its humanitarian aspects was of chief concern, to the Germans the deeper problem of constitutional practice was of principal importance. The question of the division of sovereignty and the consequences it involved continued to engross the attention of the Germans. In America it required a hard-fought war to establish in practice the principle that a State has no right to secede from the Union, and that national unity stands above all State rights. It is an historical fact of much interest, which has not hitherto been insisted upon, that the triumph of the Unionist cause in the Civil War was followed by the establishment of the North German Confederation in 1867, with the King of Prussia as its President, which led three years later to the proclamation of the German Empire and the completion of the long task of organizing a strongly-compacted, national, federal government in Germany.

V

It is no exaggeration to declare that Bismarck, in establishing the *Bundestaat*, made use of the American precedent. The vigorous assertion of the supremacy of the federal government in America, and the bringing into line of the recalcitrant States, led directly to the enforcement of the doctrine of State absolutism in Germany. The fact that in America sovereignty was declared to vest in the people as a whole as represented by their central government, did not alter the fundamental basis of its absolutism. The American "democratic" federal system was made over and fitted to the needs of German nationalism; for the idea of

nationalism was not alien to the temper of American democracy. Hamilton vigorously expressed this in his statement that, "a nation without a national government is an awful spectacle."

In spite of the monarchist twist given to the doctrine of nationality by the Germans and other European peoples, it was, in its essence, a democratic doctrine. De Tocqueville had first called the attention of Europe to the underlying principle of the American system, that ultimate power must rest in the hands of the central authority. The Civil War had proved that this central authority was strong enough to compel even a large number of refractory States to acknowledge the supremacy of the federal government, not only against their expressed will, but against what they deemed their best interests. This long and bloody war had vindicated the principle of undivided national sovereignty. The United States emerged a nation, no longer a confederation of sovereign States. This is the foundation of American democracy; it became the guiding principle of German nationalism. In both instances the central authority had to vindicate its supremacy on the field of battle. The fact that in America the war was fought to prevent the dissolution of the Union, and in Germany to bring about union, does not alter their fundamental similarity. In both cases the central authority had by armed force to prove itself indispensable.

The methods adopted were similar. In the enforcement of the principles of national unity in America and in Germany little or no consideration for the will of the peoples incorporated was shown. The people of South Carolina and Georgia were treated with as ruthless a hand by the Union authorities, and with as little deference by the Union soldiery as were the inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein or Alsace-Lorraine by the Germans. The well-worn principles of liberty and equality, of self-determination of peoples, went by the board in the United States quite as much as they did in Germany in dealing with the regions incorporated. During the Reconstruction in the United States similar arbitrary methods were enforced in the South by the federal

government as were made use of by the central authorities in Germany to consolidate their new Empire. Both were based on the principle that might confers right, and that the power and best interests of the national government stand not only far above those of the individual as "gold is above iron," but that they are supreme and absolute, above the will of any, even a large section of the people composing it. The inalienable right of a people to cast off the yoke of its oppressors, which Rousseau had so dramatically formulated, the right which the American Colonists had availed themselves of in casting off the rule of England, was denied to the seceding States by Lincoln at Washington, as it was in similar circumstances, *mutatis mutandis*, by Bismarck at Berlin.

It is not the place here to point out in detail the similarity in the structure of the American and German State system. Sufficient indication has been given to show the close connection between the two. What we are more concerned with is the rapid spread of democracy.

CHAPTER XVI

THE PROGRESS OF DEMOCRACY

Effect on Home and Foreign Affairs—Constitutionalism and Nationalism
—The Right to Vote—Levelling Down—Patriotism—Bryce—The
Debasement of the Individual—Universal Suffrage.

I

THE most remarkable historical factor of recent times has been the steady progress of democracy. If we seek to put our finger on the vital elements underlying democratic principles, we find ourselves far removed from the usual conception of the term. De Tocqueville refers indifferently to a "democratic age," a "century of equality," or a "democratic government." Since his day the use of the term has become even looser and more inconsistent. In our view his first usage is the correct one. Democracy expresses the temper of the times and cannot be properly attached as the specific label of a form of government. We have elsewhere sought to make it clear how a democratic age invariably accompanies the decay of existing institutions and is the identifying mark of such decay, the tangible indication of decadence. It is in this sense that the term democracy may be adequately understood.

It is necessary here to clear away further misconceptions which surround the idea of democracy if we are to be able to set forth clearly how it is acting as the dissolvent of political institutions, and confirm our view of the passing of politics as the cultural focus of social life. In political practice democracy takes tangible

form in the development of all of the implications of constitutionalism and nationalism. Of the first, England was the model which served as the basis of the internal ordering of the State. It could be most readily expanded to give expression to democratic tendencies. The French made use of the second as the corner-stone of their foreign policy.

The Second Empire, established after the short-lived Republic of 1848, has been termed a democratic autocracy. Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, had procured the ratification of his imperial power by universal, manhood suffrage, and at once made himself the champion of nationalism. The principle no longer received mere lip-service on the part of the French. Napoleon III put armies in the field to vindicate the right of nations to form independent sovereign states. To the French, nationalism remained a political principle which was, for the time, dexterously made use of to assert the predominance of France in European affairs. Thus, with French aid, the national unity of Italy was given its first great impetus. The French took a good measure of compensation for services rendered, by annexing Nice and Savoy. German unity was also indirectly promoted by the French, but when they sought for compensation for their services they found themselves confronted by a greater democratic force than had hitherto appeared on the scene, in the form of German nationalism, which opposed the annexation of any strip of German or other territory to France.

The rising tide of democracy was about to break over the throne of the last Napoleon. At home, he had neglected to conciliate the constitutional liberties of the people. Abroad, French foreign policy found itself confronted by a new and powerful antagonist. Napoleon III had demanded tangible compensation from Germany for permitting the Germans to proceed with their plans of national unity. As the champions of the principle of nationality, the French believed that they were justified in claiming an adequate return such as they had received from the Italians. Nor was the Berlin government inclined to deny the validity of the French claim.

But the German people, through their newly-established Reichstag, which purported to voice the spirit of German democracy, vigorously combatted the French demands, and compelled the French to relinquish their claim to Luxemburg. Here the German thesis of nationalism for the first time came in direct conflict with the older nationalist doctrine of France, and was strong enough to thwart French plans of expansion. The war which followed vindicated the theory of national unity as a democratic basis for state building. The overthrow of the Second Empire, and the establishment of the Third Republic left the path clear for the triumphant progress of democracy in continental Europe. The French Republic, the German Empire, the Kingdom of Italy, all interpret different phases of the new democracy that was being actively developed in England, and found its most unrestrained expression in the United States.

II

In home affairs universal suffrage became the technical test of the enforcement of the thesis of democracy. The propaganda for the extension of the right to vote became insistent, and spread with unparalleled rapidity. The adoption of the constitutional form of government based on universal suffrage came to be considered the distinguishing mark of higher civilization. Henceforth all peoples sought to share in the benefits which it was believed devolved from such government.

In Europe the lower classes hitherto excluded from participation in political affairs and without political knowledge or traditions, demanded as their right a share in government. Beyond the confines of the Western world democratic institutions were imitated by peoples who had never gone through any of the previous stages of political development, and had no clear conception of the nature or significance of politics. Japan, Turkey, and the Balkan peoples adopted in principle the constitutional form of government. Groups of Indians, Russians, Chinese, Egyptians carried on an active prop-

aganda to secure the recognition of the political rights of these peoples. These rights were inextricably bound up with the principle of nationality. Democracy made headway, clad in the garb of nationalism, from which it henceforth was never to divest itself. Constitutional government, as the formal embodiment of democratic ideals in political institutions, became the goal of national ambitions. The term democracy was caught up in the meshes of the constitutional mechanism, and we hear henceforth of little but that the aim, the ideal of free peoples, is to establish a democratic government.

It was lost sight of that democracy is a symptom of the decadent spirit of an epoch with reference to its pivotal institutions. It was never considered that history, which was so constantly invoked to justify national ambitions, shows clearly that democratic epochs are accompanied by the decay of these institutions. It was thought even by the most clear-headed and otherwise shrewd politicians that democracy was the high goal of political enlightenment—a symptom of political vigour. It was believed that democracy meant the arrangement of the social order with the view to promoting the best interests of the greatest number, by the rule of the majority. This was to be secured by removing all forms of political disabilities from all members of the community and establishing a legal equality as exemplified by the right to vote. In point of fact, democracy emphasized the hold of the property owning middle class over the machinery of government, and showed clearly that private property was becoming the vital cause of social conflict.

What may be termed purely political questions receded from the forefront of men's minds and were replaced by economic and social considerations which came to dictate public policy. The wide distribution of the benefits of political equality which democratic institutions professed to assure, threw into high relief existing economic and social inequalities. This tended to awaken class antagonism, and to give a new feeling

of self-conscious class solidarity to the dispossessed, who aimed to obtain, not rights, but a share of the material good things of life.

III

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century democratic political influences became paramount throughout the world. In the days when politics was at the height of its development, inequalities in the qualifications for the suffrage were believed to secure a healthy diversity in the make-up of political bodies, and political inequality was thought to be essential to secure public order and private welfare. Now all such doctrines were swept into limbo, and political equality proclaimed as the common birth-right. At the same time we may note that a gradual shifting of the centre of gravity was taking place. The apathy with which political problems were considered contrasted sharply with the vigorous and lively interest taken in economic questions.

The few outspoken opponents of democracy to be found at this time, and their opposition was, in the main, doctrinaire, strove in vain to stem the onrushing tide by decrying the "levelling down" which resulted from the enactment of laws sanctioning extension of the suffrage. To them democracy was, however, as inevitable as it was odious. "I do not think that anyone who seriously considers the force and the universality of the movement of our generation in the direction of democracy," Lecky wrote in 1890, "can doubt that this conception of government will necessarily, at least for a considerable time, dominate in all civilized countries, and the real question for politicians is the form it is likely to take, and the means by which its characteristic evils can best be mitigated. . . . Democracy destroys the balance of opinions, interests and classes on which constitutional liberty mainly depends, and its constant tendency is to impair the efficiency and authority of parliaments, which have hitherto proved the chief organs of political liberty." ¹

¹ Cf. W. E. H. Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i, p. 212.

But this interpretation of democracy fails to take into account that it was invigorated and owed its rapid spread to the spiritual content of the idea of nationalism and of the Nation-State, as the embodiment of the loftiest ideals of social life. Patriotism became the new form of worship of the individual. The State to which he belonged became the object of this worship. Seen in this light, democracy in its nationalist interpretation appeared as a "levelling up." The individual was completely absorbed in the State of which he was a member, and the political privileges which he exercised were so many bonds of allegiance to the State.

The United States, which had in principle given the widest range to democratic doctrines, became the model. To the propagandists of democracy its people became the object of adulation.

Lord Bryce, in extolling the Americans, confers by inference even higher praise on his own English compatriots, and unites the concepts of democracy and nationalism in the following: "I have seen," he writes, in discussing democratic institutions and the evolution of a distinctly American type, "the last experiment which mankind has tried, and the last which it can ever hope to try under equally favourable conditions. A race of unequalled energy and unsurpassed variety of gifts, a race apt for conquest and for the arts of peace, which has covered the world with the triumphs of its sword, and planted its laws in a hundred islands of the sea, sent its choicest children to a new land, rich with the benefits of nature, with no enemies to fear from Europe, and few of those evils which Europe inherits from its feudal past until they have overtopped the parent trunk. . . . America marks the highest level, not only of material well-being, but of intelligence and happiness which the race has yet attained."

IV.

The Nation-State, as an end in itself, it was believed, could realize its highest destiny by the frank acceptance of democratic dogmas. National patriotism

served to attenuate and qualify the arbitrary character of democratic development. It is in the name of democracy as in that of nationality, and by an appeal to patriotism, that the infringement upon the liberty of the individual by the State took place, culminating in laws of despotic paternalism such as were enacted in the United States chiefly in the nature of prohibitions. It is in the name of democracy as an enforcement of equality that conscriptive measures were resorted to by the State, and the compulsion placed upon the individual to perform certain duties, however distasteful these might be to him, such as military service. These encroachments upon the liberties of the individual, which "free government" had been established to secure, were now under democratic forms justified by arguments of the higher needs of the State. The debasement of political practice which ensued ; the demagogic methods made use of by those aspiring to public office to curry the favour of the mob in order to win the votes necessary for election ; the pandering to the cupidity and selfish interests of the electors in order to retain office ; the ignorance and lack of interest of the great majority regarding the nature of the political issues at stake ; the general political apathy of the electorate, and the gradual disappearance of clearly defined differences between the aims of the parties competing for power and office ; the expansion of the arbitrary authority of the executive ; the taking over by the State of many non-political functions ; the use of taxation as a means of social coercion : these were some of the immediate results of the spread of democracy, and indicate in what measure it acted as the dissolvent of political institutions.

Even Lord Bryce had to admit that in the main democracy had failed of its great purpose as he conceived it, in that "it has brought no nearer friendly feeling and the sense of human brotherhood among peoples of the world towards one another. Neither has it created good-will and a sense of unity and civic fellowship within each of these peoples. . . . It has not purified or dignified politics . . . has not induced that

satisfaction and contentment with itself as the best form of government." ¹

The vigour of the State grew under democratic control in direct proportion to the debasement of the individual elector. The acts of the State were surrounded by a halo of glory which drew its brilliance from the patriotism of its members. The achievements of governments in asserting their omnipotence, whether in annexing territory or humiliating a weaker State ; the display of power of the State ; the enforcement of its policy, backed, if need be, by force, no matter how blameworthy the motives or devious the methods employed, were vociferously applauded, provided that the outward form was consistent with the orthodox tenets of "liberty and equality." Democracy gave to these terms a new meaning.

It was no longer taught that happiness is the aim of the individual, and political liberty the means to attain it, but that duty is his highest privilege, and the consequent greatness and power of the State would insure equality among its members. Liberty was henceforth the prerogative of the State ; equality that of the individual. The idea of liberty was fused with that of sovereignty as the sign of national power. As far as

¹ Cf. *Modern Democracies*, vol. ii, p. 584. He enumerates the services democracy in his opinion has, or has not, rendered, as follows :

- I. It has maintained public order while securing the liberty of the individual citizen.
- II. It has given a civil administration as efficient as other forms of government have provided.
- III. Its legislature has been more generally directed to the welfare of the poorer classes than has been that of other governments.
- IV. It has not been inconstant or ungrateful.
- V. It has not weakened patriotism or courage.
- VI. It has been often wasteful and usually extravagant.
- VII. It has not produced general contentment in each nation.
- VIII. It has done little to improve international relations and ensure peace ; has not diminished class selfishness (witness Australia and New Zealand) ; has not fostered a cosmopolitan humanitarianism nor mitigated the dislike of men of different colour.
- IX. It has not extinguished corruption and the malign influences wealth can exert upon government.
- X. It has not removed the fear of revolutions.
- XI. It has not enlisted in the service of the State a sufficient number of the most honest and capable citizens.
- XII. Nevertheless it has, taken all in all, given better practical results than either the Rule of One Man or the Rule of a Class, for it has at least extinguished many of the evils by which they were defaced.

Cf. *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 617.

the individual was concerned, men no longer struggled for political freedom. They were willing to accept in its stead the alleged benefits of equality. Political liberty, taken for granted, lost its especial significance ; equality found expression in the Nation-State.

V

It is characteristic of democracy to substitute equality for liberty. We have noted elsewhere how the democratizing of the war process led to the overthrow of the feudal régime, and the substitution of politics as the pivotal factor of social life. With the spread of democracy in political affairs which took place in the latter part of the nineteenth century, we find a corresponding decline of politics. It is no mere coincidence that universal suffrage should have appeared practically simultaneously with universal military service and universal education. They are the three typical expressions of the idea of equality, the significant signs of the democratizing of politics. Closely examined, it will readily be seen that neither universal suffrage, military service or education are compatible with the older concepts of politics, with the high ideals of a vigorous, political society organized to insure individual freedom, to safeguard private property, and foster an exclusive individualist view-point, consistent with a middle class ideal of a rational and good life.

We have dealt briefly with the question of universal suffrage. We have noted how the spread of representative institutions brought in its train the demand of the masses for a share in government as conferred by the right to vote. The agitation was carried on along many lines to break down the barriers between those privileged to vote and those excluded from this privilege. The example of the United States was cited in support of universal suffrage. It had not led to anarchical conditions there, and was not likely to lead to disorders elsewhere. In point of fact, before universal suffrage was granted, the chief interest had begun to shift from politics.

The main lines of political action had become fixed, and it was currently believed must remain as they were forever. Those interested in politics were concerned with matters of detail. Political liberty had been secured. No new system of political organization beyond that of representative government could be suggested. The introduction of universal suffrage could not alter the fundamental nature of its institutions, though it might influence their functions. The form of the State remained as in the past. It was geographically subdivided into electoral districts containing a relatively equal number of inhabitants. It was, as before, ruled by parties who now more than ever competed for office as a matter of routine. No profound divergence of policy or programme divided the followers of a party. The newly enfranchised masses concerned themselves little with questions of politics. They were by the very impact of numbers discrediting the exclusive and valued prerogative of being an elector, which had in the past been so jealously guarded as a token of liberty. The result was an increasing subservience of the individual to the State, and the encroachment of the State in domains other than political. The State in turn made use of coercive action to assert for itself powers which it had never in the past possessed. "The excellence of popular government lies not so much in its wisdom as in its strength,"¹ expressed the new ideal of democracy.

Universal suffrage was proving itself to be in the nature of a new form of discipline. In theory it incorporated all of the male adult population in serried ranks as followers of party leaders. The power of the electorate was transformed first into the power of the State. The craving for equality and the spread of democracy led directly to the cult of power as represented by mere numbers. The frank cult of power as an end in itself, which is so characteristic of the democratic era, is thus a direct outgrowth of the disciplinary nature of the doctrine of equality.

¹ Cf. Bryce, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 20.

CHAPTER XVII

MILITARISM AND POLITICS

The Genesis of Militarism—Relation to Universal Suffrage—Taine—Effects of the New System—Militarism and Industrialism—The Era of Armed Peace—Political Consequences—The German System—French and British Aims Compared—Japan as a Military Power—National Assertiveness of the United States—True Rôle of Militarism—The Hague Conferences—Political Patriotism—Capitalist Aims.

I

EVERY historical inquirer is struck by the rise of militarism as coincident with the spread of democracy. Nationalism, which expresses in a concise term the democratic nature of the allegiance of the individual to the State, gave, as we have seen, what appeared as a spiritual content to an otherwise barren political life. Patriotism aroused the belligerent instincts of the social group in inverse ratio to the repression of individual liberties. The idea of equality led to the ready acceptance of the concept of duty, more especially in so far as service to the State was concerned. Duty to the State found its most tangible expression in what is termed militarism.

It is not necessary to go far afield to explain the genesis of the modern military system. It is not necessary to have recourse to a conspiracy of capitalists to enslave the masses and keep them in subjection in spite of their newly won political freedom, nor to blame Hegelian philosophy or Prussianism. In point of fact, universal suffrage carries an implication of democratic obligation which expresses itself on the one side as universal education and on the other as universal military service, or militarism. Militarism is the embodiment of the State as power ; education in the

first instance prepares to promote this power, but in a measure points beyond it.

Militarism is, when analysed, nothing more than the carrying over into the field of political action of the momentum of universal suffrage, and endowing the State with a powerful weapon for the execution of its policy, for the maintenance of internal order, the warding off external aggression, or for use in expansion. In a democratic State where its entire population has, in theory at least, a share in the control of the government, it is only natural that the people should have to share in its support. Seen in this light, militarism is organized patriotism. The great standing armies or navies which militarism implies, served as the rallying centres of nationalism, as they did for the protection of private property which, it must never be lost sight of, is the avowed and specific purpose of the political State.

Militarism appears as the physical power of the State. The size and efficiency of its military establishment confers upon the State its rank in the hierarchy of States. The Great Powers were those where militarism was the most highly developed, where the expenditure on armaments reached the highest figures, where the manufacture of arms and munitions was most extensively carried on and could be most rapidly expanded. World Powers were those whose naval forces could, in addition, police the seven seas, and insure immediate protection of the life and property of their "nationals." The term "State" disappeared as militarism was developed, and we have in its stead the constant use of "Powers," such as the "signatory Powers" in a treaty, or a "concert of Powers." The term citizen or subject made way for the term "national" as indicating the individual member of the State.

Taine has eloquently set forth the close connection between the two great democratic forces of modern times, universal suffrage and universal military service. In discussing the effects of the doctrine of political equality on the status of the individual after the Revolu-

tion, he writes : " Henceforth if man is born a voter, he is born a conscript ; he has contracted a new obligation of far-reaching consequences ; the State, which in the past had a lien only on his property now has a lien on the individual himself. From war to war, the results of this institution have become more aggravated ; like an epidemic it has spread from State to State ; at present (1890) it already includes the entire continent of Europe, and rules with its natural companion which inevitably precedes or follows it ; with its twin brother, universal suffrage . . . such are the results of the new régime ; military obligation is the counterpart, the ransom paid for political rights. Probably in the end, men will realize that the two do not balance, and that such an empty right is poorly compensated for by such a heavy burden." ¹

II

The manifold influences of militarism cannot here be enlarged upon. It gave to the State the basis of its power and added to its stature and omnipotence. It increased taxation beyond a point hitherto dreamed possible. Yet this burden was willingly and even cheerfully borne. It afforded to the State that sense of security and power which encouraged it to undertake new enterprise. It fostered discipline among the unruly elements of the population, and acted as a powerful agency in translating into practice the current theories of equality. The school of the barracks was a continuation of common schooling, especially in those countries where the idea of political liberty and equality was not of indigenous growth. In states such as Great Britain, or the United States, where a more highly developed public opinion served the purposes of discipline, compulsory military service never took root, under normal circumstances, owing in part also to their favoured geographical position. But under the stress of emergency, these countries also adopted compulsory

¹ Cf. *Les Origines de la France Contemporaine : Le Régime Moderne*, vol. i, pp. 289-291.

service and thus offer no exception to the current ideals of militarism.

The habit of discipline which military training inculcated was useful in accustoming men to the needs of industrial life. It taught the value of concerted action ; it showed the advantage to be derived from co-operation and unity of purpose. It strengthened the bond of patriotic loyalty and gave men a feeling of being a living part of the State. But above all, its immediate effect was to make possible the supremacy of the State, and its expansion beyond its national boundaries. It brought the world within the control of the Western Powers. The despatch of a fleet to distant waters was speedily followed up by the use of force in the annexation of the territory, or the coercion, of backward peoples who had not entered into the paths of progress. The conquest of the world, and its division between the five Great Powers, was a concomitant of democracy.

The cultural effects of European national expansion, which are directly traceable to militarism, cannot be overestimated. It brought the peoples of the world into closer contact. It gave rise indirectly to a notion of humanity, by bringing into the news of the day what was going on in all parts of the world. While it rendered the State exclusive, in the sense of increasing national patriotism and national self-consciousness, it helped to degrade politics to a complete subservience to economic motive which underlay colonial enterprise. It acted for the time being to preserve peace.

The era of militarism was an age of peace. For the first time in the history of Modern Times, for nearly half a century the Western World was untroubled by a great war. During this period, the process of the gradual transformation of the social order was making slow but steady progress. The effects of universal education had time to make themselves felt. The stimulus which militarism directly gave to new inventions such as the telegraph, telephone, motor-transport, to the construction of railways, the building of a vast merchant marine, to the development of

explosives, armour plate and other chemical processes which were of value in the art of war, had even greater value in the arts of peace, and in the development of industrialism.

Militarism was thus indirectly more than a mere organization of the physical force of the State for war. It was a useful educative agency and stimulant of industrial life. It was in its origins essentially democratic in the sense that universal military service was an outgrowth of the concept of equality and duty towards the State. The desire to extend the blessings of the "true" civilization; the conception that the title to property must justify itself by diligent exploitation, at least in so far as the backward peoples overseas were concerned; the protection of interests rather than of rights—in brief, what was currently termed imperialism—rested on the foundation of militarism.

The foreign policy of States came under the domination of their armaments. Militarism introduced an element of discipline and executive exactness in the carrying out of political programmes. The slipshod, incoherent methods of diplomacy, guided by secretaries of State who had to keep one eye on their political constituencies and the other on Parliament, made it natural that the actual guidance of public policy should fall into the hands of those capitalists who were pursuing a consistent programme of industrial expansion only incidentally political.

III

To the capitalist, every worker is a soldier, and every soldier is a worker. The question of favours, in the political sense, to be received from them as electors, does not enter as it does in the calculations of the politician. Thus the discipline of militarism was from another side breaking down political prestige, and leaving the way clear for the new industrialism. Lecky, writing during the last decade of the nineteenth century, cogently observes: "And while parliamentary govern-

ment is everywhere showing signs of inefficiency and discredit, the armies of Europe are steadily strengthening, absorbing more and more the force and manhood of Christendom. Some observers are beginning to ask themselves whether these two things are always likely to go together, and always to maintain their present relation—whether eagles will always be governed by parrots.”¹

Lecky, as well as many of his contemporaries and successors, misinterpreted the nature of militarism. While noting the decay of political institutions, they failed to perceive the industrial society in process of formation. The “eagles” in question are not, as was intended, to be found in the ranks of the soldiery, but in industry—the capitalists or their nominees. They were already the dictating agents of the growing militarism. They saw to it that war should not prematurely disturb the growth of industry. In fact, to militarism in its modern, democratic sense, war is an incident. It may be compared to the flower; it is not the plant. Though the development of military power inevitably leads to war, its purpose, viewed historically, was in the first instance to maintain peace, at least until the new industrialism had been firmly established. Without the half century of armed peace, democracy, acting as the dissolvant of politics, could not have accomplished its work of disintegration either so smoothly or so rapidly. Without the security afforded by the peace of this epoch, the new conception of man's subservient position in the universe, which the theory of evolution had demonstrated, could not have made headway or have led to the wide acceptance of the conviction that man's destiny is social and not individual. A new sense of solidarity had arisen among those bound by the same economic interests such as we find in the trade unions, or in holders of shares in a stock company.

The development of natural science, which is one of the most salient features of this period, turns the thoughts of men away from the older ideas of liberty.

¹ *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i, pp. 261-262.

Science is ruled by laws of an inflexible determinism. Man, viewed scientifically, is a unit of instincts and behaviour, not primarily of volition. This view precludes attaching value to isolated action, or to those characteristics of initiative and individualism which the will inculcates. On the contrary, it taught the value of, and at the same time made possible the complex network of social regulation, of sanitation, education, housing, reduction of the hours of work, the minimum wage and the normal day, which became the chief field of legislative enactment and the principal concern of home politics. The result was a gradual transformation of the older ideas of exploitation of man by man, and the ruthless harshness of the competitive system, into a relatively co-ordinated and smoothly functioning economic system, in which the interests of the community at large took precedence over the rights or will of any individual or group of individuals.

Politics was no longer indirectly controlled by doctrines of abstract rights of remote origin, but directly concerned with economic questions, with promoting the general welfare of the members of the State. The older precepts of political liberty were becoming superfluous, or at least no longer the essential co-ordinating force of social life. The decay of private initiative led to the increase of the strength and power of the State, and its absolute sovereignty. At the same time, we find new corporations of vast and far-reaching economic strength and consequent political influence, combinations in industrial enterprise stretching out far beyond the limits of the national boundaries of a given State. To keep pace, the State was obliged to assume new duties, to undertake new enterprises, for which its machinery was, in the main, unsuited. State tutelage, state interference in trade disputes, in the support of commercial enterprise abroad, in checking capitalist greed at home, or in regulating trade union demands, was earnestly solicited by the interested parties. The naïve faith placed in the value of legislative enactment to afford permanent remedies of what appeared as the evils of industrialism, until not merely state-aid but the

nationalizing of the means of production, distribution and exchange, or state socialism was demanded, is not new in history. Among all peoples the decay of political society is accompanied by similar phenomena. The examples of Rome, and later of Byzantium, are cases in point, and offer many fruitful analogies with the conditions referred to.

IV

Such are in outline some of the effects of militarism on the course of internal affairs, directly traceable to the era of peace which it assured. But it is in the realm of foreign affairs that the effects of militarism were even more far-reaching. Let us cast a brief glance at the course of events in the confirmation of our view.

As in the United States democratic principles were first most widely applied and universal suffrage was there first put to the test, so in Germany universal military service was first established as a natural consequence of the acceptance of nationalism as the foundation of the state structure. German militarism has often been anathematized as a diabolical institution, imposed upon a slavishly-minded people by an autocratic government. Such a view is not merely unscientific, but is not in accord with the facts. Though it is admitted that the ideas of political liberty and the basic concepts of politics in general never took root in Germany, Prussian militarism, whatever its origins, from a purely mechanical standpoint such as traced by some historians to the excellent military training system inaugurated by the father of Frederick the Great, was, in principle, an application of the democratic doctrine of nationalism. Militarism in Germany performed the function of democratic discipline which in England and the United States, was performed by public opinion and a more keen appreciation of the value of universal suffrage. It made possible the rapid economic development of the State, its rise to a position of preponderance in world affairs in the

brief space of forty years. It served to prepare the way for the transformation of the State from a political machine into an administrative corporation, and thus Germany became the antagonist of the two great political States of the West, France and Great Britain, in the final fruitless effort of politics to shake off the clutch of industrialism and its growing subservience to economics, in the war which marks the dissolution of political society.

If proof were needed that compulsory, military service is not hostile to the spirit of democracy, but is in fact based on the concept of equality and acted as a powerful agency for the levelling and intermingling of classes, we would but have to cite the fact that nearly all the States, not merely of Europe but of the civilized world, great and small alike, organized their armed forces on the German pattern. Prussian militarism was the most forceful expression of the new democratic concept of nationalism which in autocratic Russia, as in republican France, or in Japan, just awakened from a feudal régime, found equally ardent supporters. While outwardly militarism gave to the State that semblance of absolutism which is characterized by a blind obedience to its absolute will, such as we have the best-known example of in Germany, here as in France, Great Britain or the United States, the forces of democracy were at work, dictating political policy and rendering the politically-organized State merely the shell of social life.

For the time being, however, the State appeared in fact as well as in name, the supreme corporation, a modern Leviathan. The submission of the individual to the State which resulted, left governments free from internal disorders to pursue an active foreign policy. No political revolution of any importance troubled the peoples of the world during the long era of armed peace from the Franco-Prussian war to the opening of the decade which preceded the World War. During this period, the increase of armaments kept pace with the increasing industrial expansion. It was estimated in 1904 that the five great continental European Powers

could place over twenty million men in the field, while their permanent peace footing was in excess of two millions. These figures do not include the naval establishments of the various States, nor the military forces which Powers such as the British Empire, the United States and Japan were soon to arm and equip.

Turning to the realm of practical affairs, we find that Berlin, as the headquarters of the foremost representative of militarism, had become the centre of foreign affairs. France, though weakened by the disastrous war of 1870 and the loss of rich provinces, had adopted a militarist programme, and was again making ready to regain control of the course of foreign politics and pursue her traditional policy of seeking the hegemony of Europe. The political history of the period under review is concerned chiefly with the plans of the French to assert their political preeminence, and the efforts made by Germany to thwart this design. It is not implied that this was the conscious programme of the German government after Bismarck had been removed from office. There are no indications that his successors, and more especially William II, possessed the political acumen necessary to perceive the true nature of French plans.

The Triple Alliance, which was to consolidate the political position of Germany, and the Reinsurance Treaty of 1884 with Russia, which was to assure the absolute security of the new Empire, were neutralized by the political deftness of the French in arranging their alliance with Russia, and subsequently in bringing about that masterly combination, when viewed from the angle of French foreign politics, the Triple Entente. We cannot but again admire the political genius of the French in erecting this framework for their policy. In comparison, the steps taken at Berlin appear like the blundering progress of a blind giant.

No one can follow the complicated political negotiations, which culminated in the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1895, the period of tension with Great Britain over the Fashoda incident in 1898, so skilfully made use of as an occasion for a *détente* and the beginning of

amicable relations with England which led directly to the Entente, and finally the weaning of the British Government from its attitude of friendly toleration of German power, which was soon transformed into undisguised hostility, without being impressed by the astuteness and far-sightedness of French plans. The subsequent formation of the Triple Entente, which for the first time brought about friendly relations between the governments of London and of the Tsar, was the culmination of this carefully matured programme of policy in which militarism played a chief part. French gold flowed in a steady stream into Russia in return for the increase of their military effectives, and the perfecting of the fighting strength of the Russians. Great Britain, though chiefly concerned with the broader field of world affairs, in seeking to keep together her vast Empire and in building up among her overseas possessions a spirit of imperial loyalty which might be called upon when the war for which militarism was preparing should come, was, after 1900, compelled to abandon the policy of "splendid isolation," and henceforth take an active part in European politics. In doing so, Great Britain heartily fell in with the French plans of securing the isolation of Germany in Europe.

The Entente Cordiale, which dates from 1903, saw the beginning of that active policy which the Germans call the *Einkreisungspolitik*, or policy of enforced isolation, which was to surround Germany with a cordon of hostile States, and re-establish the balance of power, upset by the efficiency of Germany militarism. In pursuing this policy, France was inspired by political motives, while the aims of the British, which were the means of insuring its success and coincided with the methods adopted by France, were, in the main, economic. Great Britain wished to check the industrial expansion of Germany which was threatening British industry. France was content to pursue her political programme aiming at the hegemony of Europe. The lack of political acumen on the part of the German Government which led it to confuse these two distinct

issues, to antagonize British national feeling and threaten British security, are well illustrated by the famous Kruger telegram incident, and the activities of the German Naval League in clamouring for, and securing the official sanction for the building of a great navy. It is not to be denied that the menace of Germany had by this time become a reality. To re-establish the balance of power, which was the only cause which could draw Great Britain into the maelstrom of European politics, was cleverly made use of by the French to secure British adherence to their plans. In order to have a free hand in Europe, Great Britain had in 1902, entered into an *entente* with Japan. This *entente*, followed as it was by the successful war of the Japanese against Russia, brought Japan as a member of the militarist group into the ranks of the Great Powers, and gave the Japanese the prestige needed to pursue in the Orient a policy of political expansion, modelled on European lines ; while it made it possible for Great Britain to concentrate a great portion of her fleet in the vicinity of home waters.

In the same way, the United States, which in the past had played little or no part in foreign affairs, showed signs of this new spirit of national assertiveness, characteristic of militarism, in the Venezuela crisis of 1895. The Monroe Doctrine, which was the only coherent guide in American foreign policy, was then given a new and aggressive interpretation when the Secretary of State of the United States in his dispatch to London declared : " To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interpretation." Henceforth, the preponderant position of the United States in American affairs was recognized by the European Powers. The friendly settlement of the dispute whereby Great Britain tacitly admitted the American right of intervention, established a new precedent in American foreign policy, and directed the attention of the American people to foreign affairs. After the war with Spain, the United States became a power to be reckoned with in world affairs. By the

annexation of Porto Rico and the Philippines and its supervision over Cuba, the United States became involved in international politics, and entered into the ranks of the militarist Powers by the construction of a great navy. By participating in the suppression of the Boxer rising in China ; by the action in Panama in 1903 and the methods adopted to secure control of the strip of territory known as the Canal Zone, and the construction of the Canal at the expense of the State, it was clear that the United States was committed to the new militarism, and brought thereby into close relation with the European Powers.

In our view, militarism, while ostensibly a tool of politics, and in form subservient to politics—the incorporation of nationalism as a disciplined force in the service of the State—was, at the same time, a powerful agency in bringing about the destruction of the political State system. Militarism served the dual purpose of maintaining peace and threatening war ; it was an element of discipline and patriotism ; it served to assure the honour and prestige of the Nation-State, yet was actively sapping politics of its vigour and vitality by leading the State into pathways of over-expansion, and the pursuit of policies with which politics was ultimately unable to deal.

V

If we compare modern and ancient democracies and seek for a parallel of modern militarism, we find in ancient times a similar voluntary subordination of all citizens to discipline for the purpose of procuring a guarantee of security through military service. Militarism, in this limited sense, was the characteristic mark of the absolutism of the States of classical antiquity. It was the sole guarantee of national security. We find this condition reproduced externally in the modern democratic era. But whereas in the past national security rested solely on military efficiency, in Modern Times, militarism was the cover under which industrial efficiency was developed.

Militarism was not primarily engaged in maintaining the security of the Nation-State, but in paving the way for industrialism and the overthrow of politics. As long as industrialism has not been fully developed, the need for discipline which militarism inculcates did not make itself felt and the older political organization of the State remained unchallenged. But with the development of industry on a large scale coincident with the spread of democracy, a new basis of subordination was required in order to insure the efficiency which a scientific development of industry demanded.

Politics, which offers as we have seen, an individualist interpretation of social phenomena, had developed best in an exclusive, limited national atmosphere. The modern, political State as Power, resting in principle on the foundations of universal suffrage and militarism, sought to maintain its isolated position. Yet the relatively permanent combination of States, such as we find them in the Triple Alliance, and later to a more limited extent in the Triple Entente, indicates that this isolation was no longer possible. A new international spirit had for some time past been growing up, which expressed itself politically in the conferences of the Hague, and in industrialism on the other side in international labour movements, and on the other, in the vast and constantly growing combinations of capitalist enterprise which left national boundaries entirely out of account.

It is significant that the principal object of the Hague conferences was to seek a method of "putting a limit to the progressive development of armaments."¹ But neither the first nor the second so-called "Peace Conferences" of 1899 and 1907 held at the Hague, accomplished anything definite in this direction. They did, however, promote a more ready acceptance of the principle of arbitration of disputes where questions of vital interests, independence or national honour were

¹ Cf. The Imperial Rescript, issued August 24, 1898, by the Tsar of Russia, inviting all the Powers represented at his Court to an international conference.

not involved. In fact, a Permanent Court of Arbitration was established, and many arbitration conventions were negotiated between friendly Powers. But the reservations,¹ as may be inferred, were subject to too various interpretation to give to international relations a more systematic and orderly aspect, or modify the code governing the conduct of States in their relations with each other.

Though in the field of practical politics internationalism made little headway, another picture is presented when we examine the industrial efforts towards internationalism, both on the side of the workers and of the capitalists. The influence of capitalism in promoting militarism, and the policy of the great armament firms in the preparation for war, forms one of the most characteristic chapters in the evolution towards industrialism, and the degradation of the political state. While politics, as we have indicated, did all in its power to promote an exclusive, national, patriotic view-point by relying on the armed strength of the State, it is in this field of armaments that international capitalist combination was first attained."

VI

The power of the Nation-State rests in the last analysis on the patriotism of its members, on the idea of the cultural supremacy of a particular State, inspired by a particular ideal. Patriotism in this sense is of recent origin, and owes its development to the spread of democracy and the implications of equality. It was essentially a middle class view-point which by active and thorough propaganda in the schoolroom, press and pulpit, had been disseminated with great skill and un-

¹ The arbitration agreements, negotiated by the United States with various States in 1908, contain the following clause of reservation to be found in all similar documents: "Differences which may arise of a legal nature or relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two Contracting Parties, and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration established at The Hague by the convention of the 29th of July, 1899, provided nevertheless that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honour of the two Contracting States, and do not concern the interests of third Parties."

remitting zeal by well-intentioned educators, administrators and politicians. They sought to obliterate all class distinctions and replace them by a united loyalty to the State, consonant with the modern theories of political equality. But as Tolstoy has noted, "the most serious and most respectable members of the working classes show a complete indifference to, and even contempt for patriotic manifestations of every kind . . . the labouring population is too intensely and too exclusively preoccupied with the care of providing for its own subsistence to take an interest in those political questions which lie at the root of patriotism."¹ If this is true of the working classes in general, it is also true that if one assumes an industrial view-point it is not difficult to rise above the idea of nationhood and the limitations of national boundaries arbitrarily imposed by a political mode of thought. If at the one extreme of the social scale, we find that the tendency towards internationalism as manifested in the international labour movements remained for the most part utopian in character and of little practical effect, we are confronted with an entirely different result in the same field of internationalism when we examine the activities of the capitalists.

It is one of the anomalies of the social process which a careful study of history makes clear, that often what at the time appear as hostile forces which expend great energy vigorously combating each other, are in reality working towards the same end. Seen in this light, the struggle between the working classes and the capitalists shows that the former misinterpreted the aims of capitalism and erroneously placed their high hopes on the extension of democracy. It is largely due to the fact that the middle class had, in the main, acted as the intermediary between the capitalist and the industrial proletariat, that the political view-point expressed as nationalism and democracy has clouded the unity of purpose which animates the captains and the soldiery in the armies of industry. We are not here concerned with the motives of capitalists as indi-

¹ Cf. *Patriotism and the Christian Spirit*, p. 80.

viduals in pursuing their aims of private gain, nor with those of the workers in securing a living wage and improved working conditions, but with the actual historical results which ensued from the development of capitalism, and their effect upon the course of political events and of politics in general.

We must abandon our narrow, political view-point if we are to be in a position to judge aright the action of capitalism in promoting militarism, in preparing for the great war between States, and at the same time forming industrial combinations which left all questions of political loyalty out of account. In this, the great armament firms played a leading part. No one can read the interesting account of how militarism was developed and *Europe Armed for War*¹ without being impressed by the vigour of the industrial forces at work which were furnishing the political State with the weapons of its own destruction.

Many examples could be cited to prove the inter-

¹ Cf. W. Newbold's pamphlet, so entitled, which gives considerable data on this point. The following extract taken from this work, gives a good illustration of the methods adopted by capitalist enterprise: "In 1894, soon after the British Admiralty had ordered 17,000 tons of Harveyized armour for the new 'scare' programme, and when the Russians, French, Germans and Italians had adopted it, the Harvey International Steel Company was incorporated. These were its first directors:

Charles Cammell. (Great Britain.)

Charles E. Ellis (John Brown & Co.). (Great Britain.)

Edward M. Fox (Harvey Steel Company of New Jersey). (U.S.A.)

Maurice Gény (Schneider et Cie). (France.)

Léon Lévy (Chairman, Chatillon Commenty Cie.). (France.)

Joseph de Montgolfier (Compagnie de la Marine et des Chemins de Fer). (France.)

Joseph Ott (A.-G. Dillinger Hüttenwerke). (Germany.)

Ludwig Klüpfel (A.-G. Friedrich Krupp). (Germany.)

Albert Vickers. (Great Britain.)

And this was in the days when France and Russia were our (Great Britain) fiercest rivals, and when those two nations were contesting with Germany for military pre-eminence.

But scarcely were the Harveyized steel plates the accepted fashion when Ernst Ehrenburger perfected the superior Krupp cementation process in 1896. Next year the British, French and American companies were permitted to share the lucrative secret, and the Harvey companies socialised the new methods in the interests of the armament international.

The cost of the new installation was enormous, and so was that of the new armour, but the nation paid up cheerfully and the firms suffered no inconvenience, but speedily found the ample reward of genius.

The Harvey armour soon brought the armour-clad armaments back to favour, even greater than ever, and greatly encouraged the building programme."—*Op. cit.*, p. 40.

national character not only of the armament and other industries, but also of financial and banking corporations. It could readily be shown in how far these directly influenced foreign politics. It has often been claimed that it was the great armament firms that made practical the Triple Entente, and promoted the aggressive policies which many governments embarked upon. By means of interlocking, international directorates and direct contact with the governing classes in the various States, by subsidizing the press, and endowing institutions of higher education, and by an elaborate publicity campaign, a spirit of hostility between states was kept alive and the jingoist patriotism of the peoples of the Western World was stimulated for the purpose of increasing business.

It is habitual to aver that this elaborate system was built up for the sole purpose of strengthening the hold of the capitalist class, defined as a body of wealthy middle-class employers, upon the workers. It is difficult to distinguish the actual underlying motive of individual action in any given case, nor is it, as we have seen, for our purpose important. But we must note that international capitalist groups, such as the armament syndicates, whether as individuals its members appreciated it or not—and the latter assumption is the more general—were, in point of fact, acting as powerful dissolvents of the Nation-State, not only by proving how industrialism is cramped by national boundaries, but by furnishing the State with the means of waging the most destructive war in history.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE IMPLICATIONS OF UNIVERSAL EDUCATION

Politics and Education—The Idea of State Education—Compulsory Education—Its Enforcement—Economic Aspects—The German System—Political Propaganda—The True Function of Education—Faith and Belief—The Doctrine of State Absolutism.

I

WE must now turn and survey very briefly the third implication of democracy—universal education. Whereas universal suffrage and universal military service may be termed the active, destructive agents of political society, universal education, in co-operating in the task of bringing about the overthrow of politics, belongs to the new social order, and while a negative force in politics is a positive agency of social reconstruction in industrialism.

The idea of political equality and the right of suffrage implies a minimum educational test for all. In a democratic age with universal suffrage as the basis of the political organization of the State, to know how to read and write is not so much a concern of immediate benefit to the individual as a powerful element of social discipline. Literacy is all that is in the first instance contained in the term universal education. The right to vote presupposes the right to learn how to read. This thesis was developed into the right of access to intellectual opportunities, until at the close of the political age, we find the two doctrines precisely formulated ; first, that it is the duty of society to furnish the means of education, whereby the individual can develop all of his capacities to the fullest ; second, that the individual is, as a

member of the social order, in duty bound to do so. But this concept of education goes far beyond what was originally intended when the idea of universal education was introduced.

Politics and the politically organized State are only remotely concerned with what may be termed the inner life of the individual. Politics serves to regulate behaviour, not conscience or intellectual abilities. The State owed its greatest development to its policy of allowing fullest liberty to the individual to think as he liked, and manage his own mode of life. It imposed restraints upon disturbing activities which might threaten the normal flow of social intercourse, but never conceived it as its duty to promote the welfare of the individual, or compel him to take advantage of opportunities such as education might afford. Approached from a purely political angle, compulsory education, like compulsory military service, is an encroachment on individual liberty. Though the latter may be justified by the needs of the State, and the actual perils of a given situation, to justify compulsory education requires an even more radical departure from the concepts of politics, and those "natural liberties" which it claims to safeguard.

From a political standpoint, education is a vested interest, the property of the select few. This was the idea of education prevalent during the eighteenth century in the two great political States, France and England. It was consistent with the concept of individualism as the basis of a healthy, political society, and with the doctrines of natural liberty current at that time. Any interference on the part of the State in this sphere would have been regarded, and was long thereafter regarded, as violating the general principles upon which the prosperity and happiness of the community depends.

It is significant that the idea that education should be undertaken by the State did not originate in political circles, but was first advanced in France by the Physiocrats,¹ who were primarily concerned with formu-

¹ Cf. p. 143.

lating the basis of economics. Adam Smith was among the first to advocate that elementary education should be controlled by the State, though he deprecated all State interference with higher education. A century later, John Stuart Mill, inspired in the main by the same views of *laissez-faire*, and resenting all interference on the part of the State with the natural liberties of the individual, nevertheless made an exception in the case of education, and advocated an educational test as the best gauge of fitness to exercise the right of suffrage. He declared that the State should provide means for both elementary and higher education and that elementary education should be made compulsory.

II

If we review the history of the development of the doctrine of universal education, we will find that it is not by neglect or accident that England lagged so far behind other civilized States in the matter of establishing universal free education. We may here gain a more profound insight into the true nature of politics, and discover that an instinctive perception prevailed among the governing middle class that the fundamental concepts of politics are incompatible with the idea of universal education. The fact that it was not until 1833 that a grant was for the first time made in England to assist popular education, and that it was not until 1870 that an Act of Parliament provided for schools in districts where the existing elementary educational facilities were deemed insufficient, and not until 1891 that free, universal, elementary education was sanctioned by law, while the Act of 1902 gives for the first time power to the local authorities "to take such steps as seem desirable after consultation with the Board of Education to supply or aid the supply of education other than elementary," shows how tenaciously the struggle was fought by the middle class to impede the spread of educational facilities for the masses. It reveals that here as elsewhere, it was only after it was shown that universal education might be

made use of as a means of inculcating habits of patriotism and national loyalty, and thus support the exclusive individualism of the Nation-State, that what had reluctantly been granted was now lavishly endowed. This is especially true of the United States, where education came to be relied upon as the surest safeguard of democracy. In all countries in the West, with the possible exception of Germany, we meet with similar conditions. In France, universal elementary education, established in principle after the Revolution, was not modernized to fit in with the needs of the times until 1889.

In Germany, we meet with a different set of circumstances. Already in the early eighteenth century, we find that compulsory education in the elementary grades was provided for by law in some of the German States, and in 1807, a thorough system of national education was initiated in Prussia. After 1860, elementary education was here given free, and teachers became servants of the State. The perfection to which the educational system was carried, the establishment of technical and commercial schools made of Germany the chief centre of such learning in Modern Times. But if we examine this educational system more closely, we may perceive much to confirm the conviction of the limited, political sense of the governing classes in Germany, who never conceived of universal elementary education as a possible agency which might undermine the established state-system.

If we seek for an explanation, it is to be found in the fact that education was in Germany conceived in its psychological, and not its political aspects.¹ The power of influencing conduct and shaping the destiny of the individual, of making him a devoted and loyal servant of the State, was nowhere else so skilfully promoted, when once it was realized that this purpose was a need of State. This nationalist bias of education which Fichte had made use of in his *Addresses to the German*

¹ Cf. pp. 149 *et seq.*, Herbart's psychological suggestions of *Five Formal Steps*, or successive stages in learning a lesson : 1. "preparation, presentation, association, formulation, application" became the accepted basis of educational method subsequently adopted in most countries.

Nation, was put in far more precise terms by William II in 1890 when he declared in the course of a speech : "It is our duty to educate our people to become young Germans, not young Greeks and Romans. We must make German the basis, and German composition must be the centre upon which everything turns." The following year, England adopted free universal education, and in the United States and other countries, more attention was paid henceforth to national history and citizenship as the basis of the curriculum.

The spread of democracy tended to accelerate the spread of educational facilities. Elementary education was held the best training school for useful citizenship. But the main impetus to education came in the first instance from beyond the bounds of politics. The value of education was felt chiefly in economic life. Modern industrialism required a disciplined intelligence, which it was believed the rudiments of education could best afford. It was only later that national education came to be relied upon as offering means of solution of the many problems which beset the path of politics. A blind faith was for a long time placed in the ability of education to raise the status of the individual and promote human happiness without tampering with the existing social order. Democratic government, resting on the broad basis of an educated people, was the fond dream of the philanthropically-minded, political reformer, who agitated in favour of providing a complete system of education so that all of the children of all classes could receive an identical education, and according to their shown abilities in the elementary schools, pass on to the highest and most specialized technical schools which would be free to all. In this way, a national uniformity would be attained, which in promoting the greatness and power of the State would assure the political allegiance and loyalty of the individual to the existing order.

III

The enthusiasm for universal education which we meet with at the close of the nineteenth century on the

part of the students as showing a pathway to economic emancipation, contrasts sharply with the political motives which we may detect as having been injected into the school system of the various States at that time. No one can examine the curriculum or look into the elementary text-books of history, geography and even of literature, without being impressed by the national bias which inspires the course of instruction. The teaching of patriotism in its most egotistic sense ; the emotional appeal made to unformed minds by clever national, or we might better say, political propaganda ; the interpretation of events so as to bring forth a particular lesson in political greatness, or point to a moral redounding to national credit ; the efforts made to render attractive and vital the mechanical duties of citizenship, useful for party loyalty and political discipline ; the omission, or at best the slurring over, of unsavoury details in national history ; the use made of anniversaries of political events, and the birthdays of political figures as national holidays to impress upon plastic minds the omnipotence of the State and the high honours to be obtained by political services ; such are but a few of the salient features of the political propaganda carried on under the guise of education, which the modern State made compulsory.

But the true value of education is not to be sought in the political loyalty and patriotic discipline which were inculcated in the schoolroom, but in its effect upon the growth of industrialism. Education, to use the words of Æschylus, served " To make blind hopes inhabit mortal souls." These hopes were far removed from the field of politics ; they were, in the main, unconcerned even with questions of equality ; they were to serve as guides pointing the way to a new liberty, for which the coming generation was to strive. For education seemed to offer the means of emancipation from economic slavery, which had become the intolerable servitude of the new age, and from which men now believed they saw a way out.

Universal education was a new form of social machinery which was to lift the burden of economic

oppression. As at the close of the Middle Ages, it was by the new education offered by the humanists that the road to political liberty was first opened, and secular education became the cultural basis of the Renaissance, which raised the middle class from a position of social servitude and expressed itself in self-development and self-government, in safeguarding the rights, protecting the property, and finally in the promotion of individual interests, so at the close of the political age education was again to serve as a guide to freedom.

IV.

During the long struggle for individual liberty, politics acted as the inspiring motive of social life. Political liberty was the high goal of man's endeavour. When in its time political liberty was in principle attained, history shows us that it was followed by the demand for equality, or a share of this liberty by those excluded from enjoying it. Political equality was, in the first instance, brought about through the American and French Revolutions. During the nineteenth century, the idea of equality, and the best means to insure it, were uppermost in the minds of men. This craving for equality in its political aspects found satisfaction in representative government based on universal suffrage. The spread of the constitutional system and the consolidation of national States, sums up the main theme of the political history of the period. Democratic government, it was confidently believed, offered the best solution for the problem of devising an orderly arrangement of social life. But the glaring inequalities of the economic status of individuals held to be politically equal, brought about the shifting of interest from politics to economics.

It is not suggested that this was a sudden transition which took place after the introduction of universal elementary education at the close of the last century. It is not averred that in general, men's thoughts went beyond the framework of politics, or even that the leaders of the new industrialism emancipated themselves

from the preconceptions of politics, or a political mode of thought. But at the time when education was placed within the reach of the economically oppressed classes, we find a craving for a new freedom similar to the freedom which the politically oppressed middle class craved for at the beginning of Modern Times. The longing for this new form of liberty, so characteristic of the peoples of the Western World will, it may be inferred, save their civilization once again from the destruction which it is currently predicted by the prophets of misfortune is about to overtake it.

If democracy is, as we confidently believe, a symptom of decadence, and the acceptance of the tenets of political equality removed from the arena of social endeavour, the mainspring of incentive to growth and development, yet this decadence, history shows, is in the nature of a partial atrophy, and does not imply the absence of other means of vigorous social development.

V

Civilizations have as their basis certain ideas, which when they lose their force, entail the destruction of the existing order. But as long as a new faith can be substituted before the old faith is overthrown, the decay of a civilization is, for a time at least, prevented, though the social order may thereby be transformed. In this transformation, education in some form or other, is an essential *sine qua non* of success. What the method or scope of this education may be, is, in the main, unimportant, as long as it appears to offer a sound basis for faith in the new liberty that is to be attained. Religion, politics or economics, the arts of war or of peace, science, philosophy or history are, when analysed, nothing more than so many firm foundations of faith.

Faith is the groundwork of belief. All voluntary action is based on belief not subject to the influence of the fluctuations of theory. It is this manifest form of faith which we call liberty. A belief is a liberty which can be applied in practice. It is a closed con-

cept which remains unshaken and unchanged, and makes possible the undeviating course of successful action. Theory, on the contrary, implies a sceptical detachment, an open-mindedness which precludes the ready acceptance of the not proven. A new theory is in the first instance a revolt against some accepted belief, which further inquiry has proved unfounded. It is in theory that visions of liberty arise ; it is here that new ideas of freedom germinate. It is by education that they are transformed into beliefs. Looked at from this angle, belief is the form of common bondage which makes the realization of a theory of freedom possible. Thus, freedom is followed by a period of bondage, or to put it in another way, the ultimate development of the implications of freedom lead to the craving for bondage which in turn causes decay, and paves the way for a new form of freedom.

Both faith and belief are integral parts of the life process, and require constant renewal, possibility of development, growth or change. When an old faith has been shaken, and belief is no longer susceptible of change, when no revolts within the orbit of accepted theory take place, and no development seems possible in practice, then we witness the atrophy or decadence referred to. Such was the case with political society, and the individualist organization it implies, at the time when universal education was introduced and made use of to bolster up the sagging political structure. The positive value of education is not, however, to be sought in any of the political beliefs that the State was teaching, and thus bring within the range of political influence those classes which were just awakening to a self-conscious realization of their social status, but in the faith in a new form of liberty. Education was held to offer the best means to attain it.

When we survey the rapid decay of political beliefs in recent times,—Le Bon has well remarked that "Middle class society has aged as much in a century as the aristocracy did in a thousand years"—we may perceive how powerfully popular education served democracy in acting as a dissolvent of the old faith in

the State in all countries, in spite of, or possibly because of, the active, political propaganda and the compulsive methods which came into vogue. Driven three abreast under the yoke of democracy, universal suffrage, militarism and education were to assure complete equality, mould the individual into one national pattern and compel his docile subservience to the absolute State. This is the doctrine of State absolutism which was forced upon politics in spite of the individualism which it purported to defend.¹

How was this change brought about? How was it that individualism in its most complete form, which was the political tradition of those liberal reformers such as J. S. Mill, who so urgently demanded the establishment of universal education by the State as the best protection of their most cherished political doctrines of individual liberty, should have led within little more than a generation to the current acceptance of the absolutism of the State?

¹ Cf. Speech by Sir Henry Jones, at Bangor, May 1916, in the course of which he declared, "the State had a right to compel provided it stood for its own welfare. It owned us; we belonged to it. We derived the very substance of our soul from the organised community in which we live, and which we called the State."—Quoted by J. A. Hobson in *Democracy After the War*, p. 118.

CHAPTER XIX

UTILITARIANISM AND POLITICS

The Utility of Education—Public Opinion and the Press—Bentham—The Basis of Utilitarianism—Scientific Individualism—Self-Interest and Duty—The Scope of Government—J. S. Mill—Social Responsibility—The Manchester School—Realpolitik.

I

IT is characteristic of social institutions that when they are on the eve of dissolution, desperate attempts are made to regenerate them from within, while equally desperate attempts are being made to compass their overthrow. Liberalism is the name given to the former, radicalism to the latter method. The Liberal movement, which came to maturity during the latter nineteenth century, and has lasted down to recent times, aimed at checking the decay of political institutions. Universal education was the means relied upon to carry through what appeared as a far-sighted programme of political reconstruction. To inculcate in the minds of the young at an early age the idea that life is a struggle for survival; that every man gets what he is entitled to, no more and no less; that the result attained is the sole test of merit, and that the winning of the reward is the measure of value; that the welfare of the community must be left to work itself out without interfering with self-interest; such were some of the tenets of that "happiness" which, as the sole end of human action, was "the test by which to judge all human conduct." ¹ It was based on the assumption that all men are born equal, and that competition alone can bring out the best that the individual has to offer. The spirit of self-assertiveness, which the acceptance of this view-point

¹ Cf. J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*, p. 58.

promoted, led to the frenzied desire for success which stamps the social life of the epoch. It permeated the class-room, and under the guise of stimulating the zeal of the students, made of the school a breeding ground of ambitious self-seeking, which was characterized as the noblest aim of a useful life. Though a spirit of national loyalty was inculcated, it was an egotistic loyalty to an exclusive, political State, hostile to all other States, jealous of the achievements of all other peoples who might come within the field of competition.

"Modern democratic theory," in the words of Lord Bryce, "rests on two doctrines as its two sustaining pillars: that the gift of suffrage creates the will to use it, and that the gift of knowledge creates the capacity to use the suffrage aright."¹ This typical, latter-day liberal interpretation of the purpose of education conceives of it as conferring the gift of knowledge, but is apparently blind to the fact that this knowledge would inevitably be used, not for the purpose of maintaining the beliefs in political democracy, and the economic bondage it implies, but to explore new realms of liberty lying beyond the field of politics.²

Far from achieving tangible results in promoting an enlightened interest in politics, universal education served to increase the domination of the small group of professional politicians, party leaders, publicists and captains of industry whose contributions filled the campaign chests. They speedily realized that they could rely on the docility, or rather the political indifference, of the masses. This gave to public opinion, formed by the press, a supreme influence which reacted directly in discrediting parliamentary government.

The authority of the printed page supplanted the influence of the spoken word, which had been the main-

¹ Cf. *Modern Democracies*, vol. i, p. 79.

² Lord Bryce notes that "attainments in learning and science do little to make men wise in politics," (*op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 89), but he was unable or unwilling to abandon his allegiance to the democratic ideal in spite of the note of discouragement we meet with so repeatedly throughout this last work in defence of liberalism, the requiem of politics, as it may well be called. To use his own concluding words, "throughout the course of history, every winter of despondency has been followed by a joyous springtime of Hope."—*Op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 670.

stay of politics. The growing influence of the printed page that issues its judgment as a fiat, and not as in politics is so essential, as the result of discussion and debate, rendered acceptable the concept of the supremacy of the State as the highest fiat-issuing authority, even among a large section of the middle class which had hitherto defended most tenaciously the concept of individual liberties as its natural right.

From another side, we may trace the growing absolutism of the State in direct ratio to the awakening on the part of the newly-educated to the inherent horrors of individualism, and the sterility of the liberal political doctrines advanced to defend it. It was becoming increasingly obvious that men are not "born equal" in any true sense of the term, and that the inequalities of capacity or opportunity far overbalance any equality which politics, in its democratic interpretation, claimed to confer. In fact, it was beginning to be widely believed that the conception of equality glibly popularized as "the rule of the whole people" expressing their sovereign will by their votes, was an illusion, and led to the oppression of those who were not endowed by birth, exceptional ability or opportunity with the bulwark of the individual, property.

This social, as opposed to an individualist view, rejected the principle that competition can bring out the best there is in man, and denied that self-interest is a valid social incentive. The "socialists" demanded, on the contrary, a scientific regulation of all social problems, based not on competition and the slipshod methods made use of by politics, but by co-operation and remedies scientifically determined according to the needs and means of each section of the community.

II

It is necessary at this point to survey in some detail the two opposing yet closely related forces, utilitarianism and socialism. The followers of the former sought to reform the body politic by developing to the utmost all of the political implications of individualism ; the latter

denied the validity of these implications, and sought to formulate the basis of new social arrangements.

When, after the overthrow of Napoleon I, the people of England found time to take serious stock of their political institutions, and in 1824 the industrial workers had been successful in making the first great step forward, by securing the legal right to organize trade unions, and were beginning to agitate for participation in political affairs, many proposals were brought forward for the reform of the body politic. Among these, the most coherent and well-worked-out programme of reform was to be found in the utilitarian doctrines which Jeremy Bentham¹ had for half a century been engaged in advocating. In spite of the fact that the utilitarians were numerically only a small group, their influence made itself felt far beyond the limits of Great Britain, and until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, dominated the course of political reformation, which for the time not only checked the more rapid decay of political institutions and the spread of Socialist doctrines, but in a great measure made possible the noteworthy cultural achievements of the nineteenth century, by giving to political motive the stimulus of a fully worked-out code of moral conduct.

Seen in this light, utilitarianism is one of the great liberal movements of history. Though Bentham was the founder of the movement, it was developed, improved and finally transformed by a group of such great disciples as Ricardo, James Mill, Austin, Grote and John Stuart Mill, to mention but a few of the best known. It is of interest to analyse the method Bentham adopted to arrive at his conclusions. We will discover in some instances a striking similarity with that of the Socialists. Bentham directed his first attack against the sanctity of established legal practice.² Not tradition, custom or lazy usage, but utility was to him the test

¹ Bentham was born in 1748 and wrote his *Fragment on Government* in 1776; he lived until 1832, the year that the Reform Act was passed. Thus his long life spans the entire period of the American and French Revolutions to the beginning of active Socialist propaganda.

² His first work, *Fragment on Government*, which contains in the main all of his political philosophy was a polemic against Blackstone's famous *Commentaries on the Laws of England*, published in 1769.

by which the validity of laws are to be measured, and he defined utility in its political as well as its ethical sense as the greatest happiness of the greatest number.¹ In discarding all of the older legal apparatus of tradition and high antiquity as the source of authority, Bentham proposed to make a clean sweep of existing codes, and offer in their stead a system of laws suited to the present-day needs of the people to whom they were to apply, and thus substitute a "scientific" legal system of practical value for the antiquated codes in force. So confident was he of his method, that he offered to supply a complete and truly scientific body of law for any given community, based on the actual needs of the people for whom it was prepared.²

Bentham had no sentimental illusions about human nature, or a state of nature in general, which preoccupied the minds of political philosophers of the eighteenth century. He dismissed the favourite political tenet popularized by Rousseau, which subsequently became the point of departure of democratic propaganda, of a contractual relation between the governing and the governed. To Bentham the law was the expression of a sovereign will which a given people habitually obey. This sovereignty is the characteristic mark of an independent, political society.³ In his view, consent of the governed is not a fundamental factor in politics. The sole underlying motive of all action, and especially of political action, is self-interest. Obedience is not voluntarily conceded by the governed, but is a necessity in order to make social life tolerable. It is to the best interest of the individual to obey the government, which exists for the sole purpose of promoting his happiness.

¹ Utilitarianism so interpreted, is by no means original. It is peculiar to all English ethical speculation. We may discover traces of it in Bacon, Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Butler and Hume. It may be termed the basic doctrine of the secular moral code developed as the natural corollary of politics.—Cf. p. 52.

² In 1811, he made a formal proposal to the President of the United States that he be granted authority to frame a legal code for the American people consonant with the "high purpose of the Republic."

³ Austin's precise definition of sovereignty reads: "If a *determinate* human superior *act* in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive *habitual* obedience from the *bulk* of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent."—Cf. *Jurisprudence*, vol. i, p. 226.

No government can be justified on any other grounds. In perusing parts of Bentham's political writings, we seem to be listening to Hobbes. The authority of government, "though not infinite, must unavoidably, I think, unless limited by express convention, be allowed to be indefinite."¹ In laying the foundation of his doctrine of utilitarianism, and in the new interpretation he gave to individualism, Bentham dissented vigorously from the currently accepted views regarding the loosely defined "rights" of individuals, which were the basis of the equalitarian doctrines incorporated in such democratic instruments as the American Declaration of Independence, or the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of a Citizen of 1789. To him, a "right" was a term without meaning, except in so far as it implies a duty,² while duty is measured by self-interest. This is the foundation of the utilitarian position. Within this frame, Bentham elaborated a system of distinctions between political, religious and moral duties with their corresponding rights. With keen perception, he realized the need for clear, concise thinking on this subject, and if he was led into the opposite extreme of rigidity, he performed a valuable service in offering a consistent, logically-constructed political system that the average man could make use of if he chose. The vague notion of natural rights, of contractual relations and obligations, the mystical nature of current political theories had led to the ready acceptance of those high-sounding but empty phrases of the Revolution, political liberty and equality. Those who most ardently opposed revolutionary teachings such as Burke or even Hegel, had not been able to free themselves from this inherent mysticism which enveloped all political speculation. The phrase-makers of the Revolution, who had adopted and juggled with terms such as "natural rights," "sovereignty of the people," "the general will," "liberty and freedom," "equality and fraternity," had not been improved upon by the obscure and disjointed utterances of Hegel, or the ponderous eloquence of Burke.³

¹ Cf. *Fragment on Government*, chap. iv, Sec. XXIII.

² Cf. "Society is indeed a contract. . . . Each contract of each particular State is a clause in the great primæval contract of eternal society,

III

To the men of the post-Napoleonic period, settling down to a normal life again, disgusted or disillusioned, and eager to pursue their own affairs, the utilitarian doctrine was a precise and well-defined code which could be made use of by any man. Utilitarianism offered a rigid, yet highly practical political and ethical system which was admirably adapted to insure social stability by denying those "natural rights" which had been the cause of revolutionary ferment, and demanding implicit obedience to the State as the duty of the individual—in other words, the highest dictate of his self-interest.

Individualism in this new form was given scientific precision and definition, compatible with the needs of the times. The age that was opening was an age of science, and it is to science that all utilitarians and socialists alike were to have recourse to justify their theories of social organization. This "scientific" implication in utilitarianism is its most important feature. The doctrine that duty has no other basis than self-interest was not new. It was current in Greece during the fourth century, B.C., and has been made use of at repeated intervals to justify the need for authority in government. But what is new is the scientific spirit in which Bentham and his successors sought to discover a means of justifying political institutions, and to construct a scientific code of laws.

Austin's contribution to the science of jurisprudence, though the desire for "scientific" method obscured from him vital psychological and historical factors, was of far-reaching importance. He carried the work, begun by Bentham along this line, to its logical conclusion. He rejected the concept of liberty as unessential to politics. "Political or civil liberty," he declares, "is not more worthy of eulogy than political or legal restraint."¹ The value of liberty or restraint depends

linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and the invisible world according to a fixed compact, sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures each in their appointed place."—Cf. *Reflections on the French Revolution*. Works of Burke, vol. iii, p. 359.

¹ Cf. *Jurisprudence*, vol. i, pp. 281 et seq.

on the ends that it promotes and the happiness that it insures. All government must justify itself by its utility, and is maintained by habit rather than by design. But if usefulness is measured by the happiness that it promotes, and happiness is in turn based on self-interest, which in political society finds expression in duty, yet Austin, while adhering strictly to the standard of a quantitatively commensurable happiness, applies the test of utility not to any given people or community, but to the sum total of human beings, to mankind in general.

All of the utilitarians held in deep distrust those doctrines of natural rights and social contracts which were the foundation of democratic theories. While advocating unlimited freedom for the individual and aiming at promoting his happiness, they were the foremost opponents of democracy. They proposed a plan of reform of the body politic consonant with the underlying individualist tenets upon which the vigour of politics depended. They strove to arrest the spread of democracy by bringing politics in line with the new scientific spirit of the nineteenth century. In order to do so, they sought to restate the case for individualism with definiteness and precision, and at the same time define the limits and scope of the sphere of action of the State. John Stuart Mill sums it up as follows :

That the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise or even right. . . . The only part of the conduct of any one for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his body and mind, the individual is sovereign.*

Here is what may be termed a "scientific" statement of individualism. Here all of its implications are

* Cf. *Essay on Liberty*.

followed through with a ruthless logic. The community neither assumed nor was justified in assuming any responsibility for the individual. Society is pictured as a struggle, not necessarily of equals, but of those whom the chance of existence has brought into contact, and competition must be relied upon to see to it that the strongest will survive. Here we may see the basis of those evolutionary doctrines which were to influence so deeply the course of scientific speculation and of history. The "survival of the fittest" is distinctly a utilitarian hypothesis. In the last analysis *laissez-faire* is the only reliable guide of conduct.

There was nothing vague or uncertain in the ideas of the utilitarians. *Laissez-faire* was only a means to an end, and this end was a definite measure of happiness which would accrue to each individual, according to his deserts. "To be free" meant "to be free to be unhappy," if need be, according to the utilitarian viewpoint, though as unhappiness does not coincide with self-interest, it will not long be tolerated. The utilitarians advocated as a natural corollary of their "scientific" individualism, doctrines which later were incorporated in socialist programmes.¹ But these socialist tendencies must not be insisted upon, as they reveal a misunderstanding on the part of the utilitarians of the aims of socialism, though we may discover analogies between the method of "scientific" individualism and "scientific" socialism.

The utilitarians were among the first to point to the close relation between economic and political questions in general, and give to political economy scientific precision. Mill's views of "social well-being" brought the term "social" into the realm of political argument. His use of "society" and "government" rather than

¹ Bentham was the first to propose, that the State should use its power of taxation to seek to adjust the inequalities of income due to private ownership, and that an increasing ratio of private industrial property, received as rent by the State should be used for the benefit of the national exchequer. This proposal was adopted by the Socialists. J. S. Mill, in his autobiography, somewhat naively classes himself "decidedly under the general designation of Socialist," and even goes so far as to advocate "common ownership of raw materials of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labour."

"State" emphasized a distinction which was exploited during the following generation to define and defend the supremacy of the State. In spite of the repellent aspects of individualism as it appeared to the succeeding epoch, Mill completed the work of the utilitarians by erecting "scientific individualism" into a complete and coherent system. He defended individual freedom of action and of thought with a skill and vigour that has never been surpassed. He repudiated the interference of government in the affairs of the individual, though he departed from the earlier utilitarian position in what he calls representative government, by conferring upon it absolute power: "the whole people, or some numerous portion of them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves, the ultimate controlling power which in every constitution must reside somewhere."¹

Here Mill apparently capitulates to democracy, but he does not intend to do so. He, like all utilitarians, reveals a distinct distrust of democratic doctrine. This is made plain in his proposal to obviate the evils of democracy in free institutions, and especially its most odious feature, the tyranny of the majority, by securing an adequate representation for minorities through what has become known as proportional representation. On the other hand he eagerly espoused the cause of the extension of the suffrage, and was among the first to demand votes for women, but he was careful to hedge about the right to vote with educational tests which would safeguard government, as he fondly believed, from the encroachments of democracy.

IV.

As we review the history of the ensuing half century we will note that democracy found no difficulty in making use of much that was of use to it in utilitarianism, while it was easy to brand the remainder as a rigid and ruthless doctrine of unmitigated selfishness. But utilitarianism cannot so readily be dismissed. In this brief survey we have touched only upon a few of its

¹ Cf. *Representative Government*, chap. v.

political aspects. It offered in addition a coherent and systematic economic and ethical code which was firmly entrenched behind politics. The application of some of Ricardo's principles became the gospel of economic science. The competitive ideal, and all of those well-known aspects of individualism incorporated in the blanket term of the Manchester School, which became the bulwark of liberalism, are traceable to the same source. To overthrow it meant the inevitable abandonment of politics as the focal factor of social life.

The utilitarians in setting forth so clearly, we might almost say too clearly, the implications of scientific individualism, based themselves not on the vagaries of political theory, but on concrete realities. It is this very concreteness which brought to light the harshness and brutality of individualism, and served to discredit politics. Yet it must not be lost sight of that utilitarianism represents the political and ethical philosophy of the middle class at the height of its development. It is to be looked upon as the great reform movement within the limits of politics similar to that other great movement of reform which took place within the limits of religion during the sixteenth century. It cannot be rightly judged by any other standards. Utilitarianism in this aspect must not be compared to the Protestant Reformation, but rather to the work of the Jesuits. Ignatius Loyola instructed his disciples to choose men to carry on his purpose "less marked by pure goodness than by firmness of character and ability in the conduct of affairs, since men who are not apt for public business do not suit the requirements of this Company." Though the Utilitarians left no such instructions, and we can find few traces that they conceived of the ultimate application of their doctrines in affairs of State as they came to be applied, yet it is men of this stamp who developed the doctrines of political realism, of *Realpolitik*.

If we transpose to the realm of government and of the State in its international relations the doctrines of "scientific individualism," we will find that its principles became the ethical code of sovereign States.

Lincoln, Disraeli, Cavour and Bismarck applied to the political problems confronting them those doctrines of self-interest and that interpretation of duty which were the fundamental tenets of utilitarianism. The political absolutism of the State, the code of conduct of States in their relations with each other, are referable to the same source. The party of aggressive nationalism and imperialist expansion, the realists in politics, made good use of the lessons of the utilitarians, to assert the untrammelled freedom of the sovereign State to do or leave undone whatever it saw fit. Its members arrogated to themselves and applied the doctrines of Bentham and Mill to suit their purpose and vindicate the absolutism of the State. Seen in this light, utilitarianism achieved its object by giving to politics a new lease on life. Just as the Jesuits, guided by the motive of reasserting religious supremacy, were led to espouse the cause of what at the time was held political liberalism in preaching that "the King is merely a delegate of the people with whom all power finally rests," which was intended to serve their purpose of affirming the ascendancy of the Pope, though it had a diametrically opposite effect, so the teachings of the utilitarians were made use of to mould the new social doctrines of industrialism in line with political traditions, and thus ultimately paved the way for the ascendancy of industrialism as the Jesuits in their day had paved the way for that of politics.

CHAPTER XX

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SOCIALISM

Socialism Contrasted with Individualism—A Non-Political Concept—A View of Life—The Nexus of the Social Question—Private Property—Socialism and Science—St. Simon—The Vulnerability of Private Property—Trade Unions—The Co-operative Movement—Socialism and Democracy.

I

WE have dwelt at some length on utilitarianism because of its great and lasting influence on the political conduct of States. In its true sense, utilitarianism was like Jesuitism, a doctrine for the élite. It has well been said that "Rousseau fired a thousand for one whom Benthamism convinced,"¹ but that one usually counted for more than many thousand in moulding the course of politics. While utilitarian doctrines were despised by the masses, few have hitherto discerned the very close relation which exists between utilitarianism and socialism.

When we turn to socialism we are confronted with a more complex phenomenon. It has been well observed that man invents new institutions more readily than he finds names to identify them. This is particularly true of socialism. In a general way, as contrasted with individualism, the term admirably serves the purpose intended, but subsequent refinement of definition has obscured this contrast. To-day the term has lost much of its primary significance, and includes many vague notions and shades of meaning, so that no agreement as to the meaning of the term any longer exists, in spite of the repeated efforts made to redefine it.

It is not our purpose to review even in outline the salient definitions of socialism, and of its numerous

¹ Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, vol. i, p. 51.

subsidiary doctrines. What we are concerned with is the study of the influences which have reacted upon politics; among these, none have been more powerful than socialism.

Properly to understand socialist doctrines we must abandon our political preconceptions. It is only in our own day that this is at last possible. When we review the works of the long line of writers on socialism from St. Simon to Marx, Engels, Sorel and Kautsky, and the efforts made to apply socialist doctrines, we see that invariably the point of departure was political. The method of inquiry, as of application, was political. This in a large measure accounts for the lack of precision existing in the general mind regarding the true nature of socialism. This accounts for the confusion by some of socialism with democracy, and the belief often held that a socialist State must be democratic; by others, of socialism with that type of autocratic State interference as enforced by Bismarck.

Socialism is, however, not concerned either with questions of political equality or of liberty. It is not, as a matter of fact, concerned with politics at all. Socialism, in its proper sense, implies that individualism and the political society which supports it must be abandoned. Socialism scraps politics as the pivotal factor in social life, and while retaining political forms and much of its administrative machinery as useful to social discipline, replaces politics and its individualist implications by "economic" and "social" standards as the norms of social life. Just as politics was, during the Middle Ages, a branch of theology, so socialism proposes to make of politics a branch of economics. Just as political liberty was the first high aim of the new society in Modern Times, so economic liberty is the first step towards the realization of the most elementary socialist doctrines. Just as political equality was realized after nearly two centuries of ceaseless struggle and with its attainment the period of democracy set in, which marks the decadence of politics, so economic equality must be left to be evolved in future centuries. For the time being socialism, or we would prefer the more specific

term, industrialism, is inspired with the aim of securing economic liberty. This implies the passing of political society. Let us see if we can arrive at a clear understanding of what this signifies, and in how far socialism has hitherto been successful in undermining politics.

II

It is perhaps useful to point out that socialism, in its original sense, means nothing more than a view of life—life as a corporate existence—apart from which the individual as such has no commensurable value. The individual belongs to the community, he is the “property” of the community, and has no property rights in it. Here is the nexus of the social question and the economic view which it illustrates. “The end of political society is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These Rights are liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression.”¹

The bulwark of the individual, as he emerged “free and equal” in political society at the close of the Revolutionary epoch, was property. Though the Revolution had firmly entrenched the property rights of the individual, property had not come through the ordeal unmolested. In France, revolutionary governments had laid violent hands on Church property, as on that of the nobility, and even of the Protestants. We have seen² how the middle class, which was the new property-owning class, had moulded political arrangements so as to safeguard its private interests; how the pursuit of wealth had become the principal concern of the individual in all stations of life, and had tended to break down the social inequalities between the nobility and the wealthy middle class, one of the chief origins of equalitarian, revolutionary propaganda. The Industrial Revolution in England had introduced new methods in industry, and had thereby expanded the scope and power of economic enterprise. Economic science, profiting by

¹ *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, of the National Assembly of France, August, 1791.

² Cf. pp. 131, 143.

the lucid expositions of Adam Smith, was developing independently of politics, and lending the support of its authority to substantiate the claims of the owners of the instruments of production to an autocratic control of industry.

We see emerging a new class of capitalists or industrial *entrepreneurs* who, closely affiliated with the holders of public office in the State, were using the machinery of government for the protection of their interests. At the same time, the general unrest that prevailed after the close of the Napoleonic period, the misery and suffering left by the long wars again called attention to the destitution among the working classes. They had not benefited by the Revolution which had been made solely in the interest of the middle class to secure political equality. In fact, many of the privileges which the workers had enjoyed under the old régime, such as trade clubs and remnants of the guild systems, had been swept away and left the individual worker more isolated and helpless than before.

The demand for increased industrial efficiency, and the expansion of the new factory system had accentuated the economic servitude of the masses, and made them wholly dependent upon the caprice and goodwill of the property-owning class. The theory that labour is a product, and like any other product, must take its chances in the open market, and be subject to the general rules of supply and demand, was the foundation of the prevailing economic code. To check the arbitrary use of the uncontrolled power of the capitalists over the wage-earning classes, and relieve the evils resulting therefrom, the workers banded themselves into trade unions for the purpose of replacing the older individualist system of hiring of labour, by collective bargaining. The trade unions were finally legalized in 1825. This was the first step in the long struggle of the wage-earners towards the new freedom.

At the time when Ricardo and James Mill were formulating the utilitarian economic theories which gave to the owners of the means of production, the sole and absolute right to the product of industry, and established

on a "scientific" basis the economic theories which were to govern industrial life for a greater part of the century, and the utilitarians were engaged in stating the case for scientific individualism, based on the inexorable law of competition, at the time when Malthus was offering his ruthless suggestions for the control of population as the only means of remedying the lot of the masses, a small group of men was busy laying the foundations of those social doctrines which Marx was a generation later to develop and call "scientific socialism" or communism.

III

The historical origins of modern socialism are well known. Fourier and St. Simon in France, as well as Owen in England, sought to devise a new scheme of social organization. During the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century, when questions of political reforms were being urgently pressed, and the extension of the privileges of political equality and constitutional government were insistently demanded by the masses, the social innovators sought to devise some method of alleviating the sufferings of the poor by a more just distribution of property. While Fourier and Owen advocated concrete plans of social reorganization, and experimentally put them into effect with very scant success, St. Simon presented the most coherent statement of the new socialist doctrines, and is therefore looked upon as the founder of modern socialist theory.

It is characteristic of all of the reform movements of the nineteenth century to refer directly to science. Individualism sought for scientific support, and socialism here found substantiation of its hypothesis. It is the development of science, St. Simon claimed, that would make it possible to improve the general condition of mankind. With science at the service of the useful and fine arts, the State of the future is to be governed not by the merely consuming, but by the producing classes. The ingenious though fantastic proposals he made for the reorganization of the government of France, which

while leaving the existing monarchy standing, would include a sort of scientific parliament of three houses; a house of invention, composed of civil engineers, painters, poets, authors; a house of examination, consisting of physicists and mathematicians; and a house of execution, made up of the heads of industrial enterprise: of which, the first would present, the second examine, and the third adopt and execute all projects of legislation, well illustrates the nature of socialist speculation during this early stage, which Marx so aptly termed utopian.¹

But the importance of the early socialists must not be overlooked. They not merely focussed attention on the misery of the working classes, but sought for practical means to alleviate it. They pointed out the defects in the political system, not with a view to achieving constitutional reforms, or an extension of political privileges, but to revise the premises upon which the social order was based by substituting a social for an individualist standpoint.

Private property was the tower of strength of individualism. By the Revolution property had been declared the most important natural right. In fact it was the basis of liberty and the corner-stone of politics, no matter from what angle politics was approached. Without property, none of the claims either of liberty or equality, security or resistance to oppression, the natural rights of man in political society could be substantiated. The utilitarians, in rejecting the doctrine of natural rights, had systematically expanded the new doctrine of self-interest, which gave to private property a scientific basis and fortified it more strongly than before.

Property, however, remained the most vulnerable possession of the existing order. For it could be made patent to even the most obtuse mind that when, as was the case during the nineteenth century, ideas of political equality were so broadly disseminated, this

¹ Owen's *Book of the New Moral World*, Fourier's *Theorie de l'Unité Universelle*, St. Simon's *Du Système Industriel*, and *Nouveau Christianisme* all have the freshness and naïveté of the primitives in all branches of human endeavour.

equality was, to say the least, a very empty satisfaction to the average workingman in face of the glaring economic and social inequalities which he met with at every turn.

Not only the socialists attacked property. The most famous indictment of property came from the pen of Proudhon, the founder of that extreme form of individualism which he called anarchy. To him "politics is the science of liberty," for it is reason, not will, that must determine the course of social conduct; will is embodied in government; therefore, all government must disappear. The same type of argument is used to prove that all property is theft. Property arose by force, was maintained by violence, and finds its fullest protection in government. Both property, and the government which maintains it, are illegitimate; both must disappear. Proudhon violently denied the validity of all socialist tenets, and sought to prove that unrestrained individualism is man's highest aim, his natural right. But it is quite evident that he meant by this term, individualism, something very different from its usual meaning, as his attack on private property¹ shows, as well as the fact that among the few followers he had, the most important of these, such as Bakunin, joined the socialists and formed the left wing of the party.

Though socialist propaganda was for the time being left in the hands of a few intellectuals, who were busily engaged in formulating plans for a new social system, the workers themselves were concerned with more practical problems. We may leave out of account the purely political movements such as that of the Chartists in England, or the part played by a section of the working classes in the Paris Revolution of 1830. The aim in both these cases was to secure economic advantages by political means, though they failed to achieve any tangible result. They are of interest chiefly as marking the beginning of the new tactics of the masses

¹ His *Qu'est-ce-que-c'est la Propriété* was published in 1840. His thesis that the "science of government belongs to one of the sections of the Academy of Sciences, whose permanent secretary is necessarily Prime Minister" (*op. cit.* p. 265), illustrates from another side the obsession of science and the "primitive" nature of Anarchy.

to make their influence felt as a separate class in the social order. It is more important to trace the growth of the two great peaceful means devised by the workers themselves to bring about the desired results.

IV.

Under the pressure of economic necessity the members of a given trade had banded together not merely to discuss grievances, but to devise the best means to remedy them. This had led to the formation of those powerful unions of producers, trade unions, which kept pace with the growth of industrial enterprise, and from year to year increased in membership and in economic and political power. Not only were the trade unions soon in a position to stand out against the arbitrary demands of the capitalist employer, to organize and finance strikes as weapons of coercion, and to pay a stipend to their out-of-work members, but also to undertake to secure the legal enforcement of some of their demands by legislative enactment. Though the trade unions concerned themselves chiefly with strictly economic questions, and outlined no programme for any violent change of the existing political order, yet the political influence of the working classes was slowly emerging, and their growing class consciousness reacted upon political institutions. "When workmen meet together to discuss their grievances—still more when they form associations of national extent, raise an independent revenue, elect permanent representative committees, and proceed to bargain and agitate as corporate bodies, they are forming within the State a spontaneous democracy of their own."¹

We can see here the reason why trade unionism, and later labour movements in general, were so tenaciously opposed by those most keenly interested in the survival of the political State. It serves to explain the change of policy which took place during the last quarter of the nineteenth century; henceforth, the State was to take in hand programmes of social reform. Here we have

¹ Cf. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, p. 808.

the origins of Disraeli's programme of "social sanitation" and Bismarck's extensive scheme of social legislation, of old age pensions, state insurance, and improved factory acts. The long list of new social "duties" imposed upon the State, beginning with universal free education and culminating in unemployment doles and laws enacted to promote the welfare of the working classes, are all part of the same tendency. In spite of much political propaganda, undertaken by a few leaders as representatives of the masses, nowhere did the working classes, at the time, show any evidence of having a clear idea of the nature of political power, or conceive of politics otherwise than as a means to attain economic ends. The trade unions made themselves the aggressive agencies for bettering the economic condition of the workers, and attacked the problem in a realist spirit, seeking to secure by every available means of coercion of the employers, or pressure upon the established agencies of government, the needed reforms. As a result, there was spread abroad, at least among the rising generation, the conviction of the plausibility, if not the urgency, of political reforms aiming at the recognition of the social value of the producer who provides for the needs of the community. But these wage-earning producers did not wait upon such recognition; in order to strengthen their position they banded themselves together into associations of consumers.

V

It was in 1844 that twenty-eight poor Rochdale weavers formed the first co-operative society for the purpose of supplying their own needs more advantageously than was possible by the usual channels of trade. From these small beginnings the co-operative movement, like trade unions of which it may be held the counterpart, has spread across the civilized world. The history of the co-operative movement forms one of the most significant chapters of the social history of Modern Times. Exclusively of working class origin, the idea was taken up and developed by the middle

class. Co-operative building societies in the United States, co-operative banks and credit associations in Germany, Italy and France, and even co-operative agricultural societies such as those to be found in Denmark and Ireland, indicate some of the ramifications of this vast movement.¹

The trade unions and the co-operative societies, the one a league of producers, the other of consumers—though the same individual might belong to both organizations—contributed to shape the course of social development. In both instances their membership was recruited from the wage-earning classes. In both instances the workers had as their immediate concern the improvement of their economic status, and had no direct interest in the broader issues of political affairs, except in so far as they might conduce to this end.

Trade unions and co-operative associations were, in point of fact, in the nature of "States within the State." Both had regulative functions to perform within the social order, and in so far as they performed these functions, they tended to supplant the political agencies which had hitherto performed them, or rather suggested the possibility of new means of regulation of social life without the need of political agencies. But it was held by some of the leaders of the social movement, known as social reformers rather than socialists, that, "It is in their capacity of citizens, not as trade unionists, that the manual workers will have to decide between the rival forms of social organization, and to make up their minds as to how they wish the economic rent of the nation's land and capital to be distributed."²

¹ Though the co-operative movement was primarily intended merely as a distribution agency for the benefit of consumers, to obviate the evils of the competitive system, it also was sought to introduce "co-operative production." After many initial failures, such as that of the "self-governing workshops" of the Christian Socialists of 1848, the success of co-operative production is testified to by the fact that many of the existing co-operative societies have entered the field of manufacturing to provide directly for the needs of their members. "Five of the largest flour mills in England," Sidney Webb, writing in 1910, states, "producing annually food for two million persons, and the most extensive boot and shoe factory in the United Kingdom, turning out more than a million pairs a year, are both owned and managed by the federated two million co-operatives."—Cf. "Social Movements," in vol. xii, *The Cambridge Modern History*.

² Cf. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Industrial Democracy*, p. 832.

It is not merely as producers and consumers, but in addition as citizens of a political democracy, that the way is pointed out to the wage-earners to secure economic freedom. Here we have a typical expression of the view which seeks to subordinate socialism and its economic implications to politics and the politically organized State. Democracy, in this sense, is defined as "an expedient—perhaps the only practical expedient—for the prevention of the concentration in any single individual or in any single class, of what inevitably becomes when so consecrated a terrible engine of oppression."¹

¹ Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 845.

CHAPTER XXI

PLANS OF SOCIAL REORGANIZATION

Social Democracy — Stein — Interest in Social Problems — Comte — Sociology — Historical Materialism — Marx — The First Internationale — Spencer — Biological Analogies — Military and Industrial Society — Social Efficiency.

I

THE attempt to unite political democracy and socialism was suggested as a way out of the difficulty of reconciling the economic demands of the working classes with the tenets of political equality. It was claimed that historically, socialist doctrines are merely an outgrowth of the doctrines of "liberty and equality" which Locke and Rousseau had so clearly enunciated. These, it was claimed, need only be transposed to the field of economics in order to insure all of the benefits to the wage-earners which had accrued to the middle class by means of political liberty and equality. It was lost sight of that while politics is concerned with rights, economics has to do with obligations. The efforts to introduce ideas of obligation into politics, to reconcile the economic concepts of socialism with political democracy, and, by clever juggling of rights and obligations, produce the hybrid, "social democracy" met with considerable success.

The first and best exposition of this seeking after compromise, which does not, as subsequent theorists so often did, shirk the logical conclusion of some of their premises, is to be found in the work of Stein.¹ He sets forth with great precision the reasons why man in society struggles to obtain property. To Stein property

¹ Cf. Lorenz von Stein. His writings on this phase of socialism are apparently not well known outside of Germany. His first work, published in 1844, in which he predicted the social revolution, is said to have had considerable influence on Marx. His *Begriff der Gesellschaft*, 1849, contains a complete statement of his views on the subject.

is both material and spiritual. He then proceeds to outline the historical factors which lead, on the one hand, to corporate movements such as guilds, castes and privileged orders, a social organization of society in which the State does not attain a position of pre-eminence, and on the other, to an individualist organization where politics becomes the chief interest, and the State the controlling organ of social life. To him freedom consists in overthrowing those in whose hands power happens to be vested. The origin of all subversive movements is thus a craving for liberty, and to a less degree for equality. Stein implies that subversive movements perform a useful function, but he is careful to affirm that they attain their ends best, not by violence, but through the "cultural" development of those classes seeking to overthrow the existing order. In our times political democracy, combined with socialist economic teachings into social democracy, will, he is confident, achieve the desired end. Politics, under the influence of democracy, will guide legislation to re-enforce the demands which socialism will expertly formulate, and public policy will, in consequence, be carried out in accordance with the needs of industrial society. Social democracy is to achieve its results by reform rather than by revolution.

This brief sketch cannot do full justice to the skilful handling of this complex subject by Stein. He was convinced that class warfare and the social revolution were inevitable. He was the first to point to these two most important factors of modern, social development. He noted the inadequacy of utopian, socialist movements to achieve tangible results. But he was at heart a conservative, and wished to see events follow a peaceful course, and therefore sought a workable compromise.

II

The widespread interest in social problems, and the influence of science¹ led to the formulation of another important, social hypothesis of a constructive nature,

¹ Cf. The famous formula of Comte, *Science d'où prevoyance, d'où action*.—*Cours de Philosophie Positive*, vol. i, p. 51.

which offered a complete plan of social reconstruction on a scientific basis. This was the work of Auguste Comte. A pupil of St. Simon, he quarrelled with the founder of socialism, and abandoning orthodox socialist teachings, developed what he termed the new science of society, or sociology. In elaborating his positivist philosophic system, he sought to make politics an exact science by freeing it from the reactionary dogmas which encumbered its logical development. He rejected absolutism in all of its forms. He denied the validity of revolutionary propaganda, and introduced physical factors as determinants of politics.

To Comte the three great agencies of social development are race, climate and political action. Of these, the last-named is of greatest importance to sociology. The political leader to achieve permanent fame must be in close touch with the spirit of his age; for politics is merely a guide to social progress, not a cause of such progress, which must be sought elsewhere. He bases his entire system on his celebrated law of three stages of the growth of the social order, which he called theological, metaphysical, and lastly, positive or scientific. In modern politics, the first is illustrated by the doctrine of the divine right of kings; the second, by the doctrines of the social contract and individual liberty and equality; the third, or scientific stage, now opens before us.¹

Comte sought to show that this last stage—its scientific nature he elaborated in his development of what he calls "social statics" and "social dynamics"—is based on the two great corresponding principles of "Order and Progress," which here are joined in a synthesis.

We cannot follow Comte through the ramifications of his complex system. He laid the foundations of the scientific study of social conditions. He drew his analogies from physical science with great skill, and closely related sociology to biology; in fact, called them the two branches of one science. He saw clearly that industry was to become the chief interest of the new age, and that the aim of society was to stimulate

¹ Comte wrote his essay *Système de Politique Positive*, which contains this idea, in 1822, but did not round out his complete system until 1854.

the means of production and regulate distribution. To achieve this end, he advocated the division of labour and co-operation. But he had no illusions that the political State system could maintain itself by any other means than by force. His confidence in the possibility of speeding up social progress under the guidance of science was so great that he outlined an elaborate social system, which went far beyond the limits of politics and the political State, or even those of the utopian socialists. Here a priest caste were to be the rulers, who were to have in their hands the governance of a scientifically ordered society.

It is difficult to over-estimate Comte's influence. He directed the energies of social inquirers towards searching for sound foundations upon which to erect their theories. He opened up new paths for research, and effectively checked the romantic tendencies current in socialist speculation. His teachings influenced the utilitarian school, as J. S. Mill was himself eager to acknowledge. He thus prepared the ground for the new science of sociology, which developed independently of socialism, though concerned in the main with the same problems.

Sociology, however, soon settled down into the rut of research and evolved theories of society, based on close adherence to biological method. It neglected history, except in so far as history could be made to serve this method, and confined itself to the study of the organic principles of man's relation to society and of the social order in general. Socialism, on the contrary, made scientific progress in the field of practical politics by a direct appeal to history, and evolved the hypothesis of historical materialism as the underlying doctrine of the new socialist theories. It preached social revolution.

III

It was during the fifth decade of the nineteenth century, when the agitation on the part of the middle class for the extension of the constitutional system and representative government in those countries where it had not as yet been introduced was becoming active, and

the grip of scientific method had begun to lay firm hold upon the minds of men, that the socialist movement developed a "scientific" programme of action. This is set forth in the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848.¹

Scientific socialism, as Marx rightly called his new communist doctrine, not merely to distinguish it from other previous socialist theories, but to show that it was not a theory but a method, bases its arguments on a new interpretation of history. According to this new view, all historical development can be traced to its "economic substructure." History is merely the narration of the struggle between those who possess the means of production and those who do not; a class conflict in which those who are excluded from sharing the benefits derived from such ownership seek to gain control of public affairs, in order to promote their own welfare and better their condition. History, according to this view, may be divided into three great, economic epochs: slavery, serfdom and capitalism. According to Marx, the new age is to be one of co-operative production. When this is attained, and not until then, class warfare will cease.

Scientific, historical criticism, according to this thesis, brings to light the fact that economic factors are responsible for all social development, and that the meaning of every episode in history can be explained by a purely economic motive. It rejected the view then currently accepted, that politics was the chief civilizing agency in social life. This was a middle class interpretation which over-emphasized the importance of the individual and placed too heavy a burden upon his shoulders. The working class, or Proletariat, as Marx first called it, would in due time succeed in its struggle against the present owners of the means of production, and, overthrowing the capitalist system, substitute a frankly economic, social order.

The abolition of private property and class warfare are the means advocated to attain the desired results. Marx, in laying the foundations of scientific socialism,

¹ The main line of argument, as set forth in the *Manifesto*, is too well known to require repetition here.

sought to make economics the pivotal factor in social life, in place of politics. In doing so, he rejected the doctrines of political liberty and equality, the juridic basis of the State, and the individualist, competitive theories of the *laissez-faire* school. He proclaimed that in such an individualist society justice, liberty and equality can never be anything more than an illusion; for the individual in political society, ostensibly free, is in reality the slave of his economic status. But in his anxiety to prove his point, Marx overstepped the mark and destroyed the validity of much of his argument, by failing to note that the economic factors which he discovers were, in past ages, only of incidental importance, and were, in his own day, just beginning to reach a stage of determining, historical value. Yet we must not overlook the skilful use he makes of scientific, historical method, at that time coming into general use, to prove that the time will come when economics will replace politics as the chief concern of social life.

If we look beneath the surface and endeavour to grasp the meaning of the economic interpretation of history, we will find that Marx and his followers never went far beyond a purely political view-point.¹ He substituted the term "economics" for "politics," and often merely gives new names to political factors in history, but sheds little or no new light on their significance.² Thus political wars between States, he replaces by war between classes, and calls it economic conflict. His doctrine of the abolition of middle class private property is carried over bodily from the field of politics, which involved the abolition of aristocratic, feudal property. If we examine what is meant by the success of the social revolution, it will be discovered to be little more than the attainment of political power by the proletariat.

In spite of these limitations, the influence of scientific socialism was as deep as it was widespread. It brought socialist doctrine in line with the realist spirit of the new age. It made it a powerful weapon of attack against the vigorous utilitarianism which had stiffened

¹ Cf. p. 42.

² Cf. *Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie*.

the resisting power of the middle class. Yet there was a certain mystical quality about the Marxian doctrine that made of socialism something more than merely "a religion of the stomach." Throughout the works of Marx we hear the refrain echoed from one idea to the next, "it is necessary, it is inevitable." There is something prophetic in this reiteration. The same inevitable necessity that makes the sun rise will bring about the desired change in the social order. If the social revolution succeeded at any given time or place, it is because it was destined to succeed; if it failed, it was destined to fail, but it will ultimately succeed "when the proper time comes." The very vagueness of what the society of the future was to be like when scientific socialism had triumphed, contrasted sharply with the rigid uniformity, simplicity and directness of the method to be used to achieve it. Thus, while every scientific socialist could build his own particular "air castle" of the State of the future, and choose the place he would occupy in it, all were united in following the same means to attain it.

Marx, though his speculative inquiries were suggestive and stimulating, in spite of, and probably because of, their shortcomings and innate fatalism, directed his main energies towards preparing for the advent of the social revolution which he preached. Class antagonism was to him the fuel that was to feed the flames of the revolution. To give to the working classes a corporate sense of their own social significance, to breed a spirit of hostility and bitterness towards the middle class, which was in his eyes the class of social oppressors, was his immediate aim.

At the time when political leaders were engaged in fostering a spirit of national patriotism, and were beginning to make use of those methods of political propaganda in the press and in the schoolroom, to develop that spirit of national loyalty which became known as jingoism and chauvinism, Marx and his followers sought to instil in the minds of the workers a spirit very similar to that which the State called patriotism, but which as class allegiance, was termed, class antagonism. They made skilful use of the discontent

prevalent among the industrial workers, whose sole method of securing satisfaction for their grievances was through the trade unions, by pointing out that an international working men's organization would have such power that no government of a State could any longer treat the unions as a negligible quantity. To accomplish this and promote closer contact between the proletariat of various countries, and carry out the formula of the Manifesto, "Proletariat of all countries, unite!", Marx took a large part in the work of the first International Congress of Workers, held in 1864, which became known as the First Internationale. In drawing up its programme, Marx did not include a plan for the destruction of the existing political organization, though the fundamental tenets of scientific socialism were adhered to. In spite of this moderation, after a period of rapid growth, internal dissensions broke up the organization, and it was not revived until the last decade of the century. "The time was not ripe for social revolution."

Nationalism was too strong a doctrine to be replaced by any international ideology that could be suggested. But the First Internationale was not without practical results. It pointed out the plausibility of an international organization of society, without the mediation of the politically organized State. For the time being, revolutionary methods were abandoned, and the socialists in various countries sought to consolidate their position by close affiliation with the trade unions, in order to secure the urgently needed reforms by political means. However, the doctrines of scientific socialism were not lost sight of, and became the basis of socialist propaganda.

IV

One further plan of social reorganization requires brief mention in concluding this survey. It is that of Herbert Spencer, who developed and extended to their utmost the utilitarian doctrines of scientific individualism. He incorporated in his theory the doctrine of evolution, which was the topic of the hour when he began to write. To him society is an organism which grows, matures and

dies like any other organism. He developed with greatest care and no little skill the method suggested by Comte of biological analogies. As a result, he evolved a thesis of extreme individualism, but in so doing, departed from the utilitarians by accepting, theoretically at least, the hypothesis of natural laws and natural rights. These act as a limitation on the authority of the State, and he concludes with his well-known doctrine, "that every man shall be free to do what he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."

Spencer, with laborious care, constructed an elaborate sociological system. He made use of inductive science, of physiology and biology, to prove his points, step by step, and substantiated his arguments by an extensive array of analogies, drawn chiefly from inquiries into social conditions among primitive peoples. In the end he claims to have discovered two main types of society, the military and the industrial, and that the flow of evolution leads man to the latter. Industrial society is higher, nobler than military society. In tracing the decline of the military type, and the rise of the industrial, he shows that in the process of evolution the State, in its present form, may be expected to disappear. He implies that in due time all government will disappear, in fact everything that stands in the way of the individual will disappear, compulsion and co-operation in all of its forms will become superfluous, and a blissful condition of high "altruism" attained where

"Love is an unerring light,
And joy its own security."

In spite of his optimism, Spencer was not a sentimentalist. He gave to the world that trenchant phrase, "the survival of the fittest," which instilled into social life a spirit of competition, even more brutal than had in the past prevailed. He joined hands again with the utilitarians in proclaiming that "the pursuit of individual happiness, within those limits prescribed by social conditions, is the first requisite to the attainment of the greatest general happiness." But we see here a con-

sideration for general happiness which the utilitarians had disregarded. The introduction of the word "social" is of much significance. Thus, in defining the goal of evolution of mankind, he declared, "pleasure will eventually accompany every mode of action demanded by social conditions."

Spencer frankly forecasts the end of political society, while remaining a firm adherent of its cardinal principle—individualism. To be sure, his conception of individualism requires for its proper understanding a new term, more properly, "personality," as we should now call it. Like the utilitarians, he made no clear distinction in his use of the term "state" or "government," and like Mill, used "society" to identify either. He adapted the hypothesis of evolution to social conditions. Progress, which he defined as a development towards greater perfection, results, not from following a course of least resistance, of *laissez-faire*, but through social efficiency. In the struggle for survival, social organization is of value, but social efficiency is of greater advantage. Here we have a main channel leading into the concept of state absolutism as the agency best able to promote social efficiency. This was diametrically opposed to the end Spencer had in view.

The influence of the evolutionary hypothesis on all phases of social speculation was to become very marked, but it tended to reinforce the Hegelian concept of the absolute State, rather than to promote the untrammelled individualism that Spencer had predicted. It came to be accepted that the evolution of the social process was developing in the individual, not those characteristics and qualities most useful to him in his struggle with his fellow men, but those which would contribute most to the efficiency of society, in the conflict by which it was gradually evolving a higher type of social order. Henceforth, social efficiency was to take precedence over individual prerogative, and as the State appeared as the most fitting organ to promote this efficiency, its absolutism was willingly accepted. In the process the State was coming to be considered no longer merely a definite political unit, but the repository of social power.

CHAPTER XXII

THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY

The Rise of an Economic View-point—The Shift from Politics to Economics—The Code of Property—Imperialism—Chamberlain—Absolutism of the State—The Example of Germany—A National Ideal—Peaceful Penetration.

I

WHEN we examine the various forces at work in social life during the second half of the nineteenth century, we soon discover in how far politics was receding from the forefront of interest, both in the field of theoretical speculation and of practice.

The implications of democracy were being developed to their utmost, and the doctrines of political equality accepted as axiomatic. Political liberty, taken for granted, was coming to be more and more disregarded. The gradual shifting of interest from politics to economics as the pivotal factor in social life is made evident in the substitution of efficiency and discipline for the older *laissez-faire* attitude. Universal suffrage, militarism, and education were, as we have seen, developing a new sense of social responsibility. Under the influence of scientific research, an organic conception of the social order was replacing the older, atomic view, and it was coming to be realized that the community must assume the responsibility for the welfare of the individual. In order to do so, psychology and sociology were of far greater importance than politics.

The efforts of the utilitarians to give to individualism, scientific precision, had led to the acceptance of those doctrines of competition which Spencer had developed into ultra-individualism, as the survival of the fittest. This conception of struggle and conflict for survival,

dove-tailed very neatly with the scientific socialist theories which Marx had expounded. In both cases, whether by following to their logical conclusion the tenets of individualism as Spencer had done, or those of socialism, which Marx advocated, a transformation of the social order was inevitable.

The efforts made to compromise, to adjust the older, vague concepts of natural law and natural rights to the new, scientific view-point, brought to the front the question of the validity of property rights ; in how far they could be exercised by the individual owner dictated solely by self-interest, and in what measure the State was not only justified, but should be compelled to interfere in order to promote the needs and welfare of the community at large. This new attitude towards private property reveals itself in the limitations placed upon its owners, which at the time were held to be not only confiscatory, but an infringement of those " natural rights " which free government was established to defend.

A perusal of the factory, mines and railway regulations Acts, of those defining hours and conditions of work, minimum wages, sanitary conditions and safety of employees, which were written into the statute books of all civilized States, show to what extent the property owner was coming to be looked upon as a trustee who must give a good account of his stewardship. But not content with legal enactment, the working classes, through their trade unions and co-operative societies, were carrying on an active propaganda in behalf of what must be termed an economic view-point. Nothing can better serve to illustrate the transformation which was taking place in the conception of property than this substitution of an economic for a political attitude towards property, the key factor of the existing social order.

II

The code of established rights of political society places property after liberty as the highest good of mankind. The question of property and taxation had, in the past, been a conspicuous cause of political agitation.

Political history resolves itself in large part into a record of the successive extension of property rights to classes hitherto dispossessed. But property was viewed in a political sense. To illustrate—taxation without representation kindled the revolutionary war in America. But the point at issue was not that of the economic aspects of such taxation, but the pretensions of Parliament to impose these taxes. The question was one of political equality and natural rights in a political sense ; of these, the natural and inviolable right of private property was held to be the most sacred. The causes of the French Revolution may be interpreted in the same way. The middle class, which was the loudest in its clamour for equality, and led the revolutionary propaganda, could have readily borne the taxation imposed, in its economic aspects, but the privileges enjoyed by the aristocracy in the form of feudal, property rights, had become intolerable. These may be taken as good examples of a political attitude towards property in which the economic factors were to a great extent incidental. It was the rights of property that was the point at issue, and these rights were hereafter inscribed in the charter of political society.

Though all other vested rights were by degrees abolished, that of property remained intact, and was surrounded by all the safeguards which the majesty of the law and the power of the State could devise. In throwing wide open the doors of competition, in granting political equality, it was thought of minor importance to consider the economic status of any group or class. The political innovators of the time had full confidence in the validity of the scientifically demonstrated doctrines of self-interest and individualism, which would bring to the top the best man. Interest and profit were the determining motives, but they were conceived in a narrow sense, as accruing to the individual as an outcome of a competitive struggle.

We may note the gradual emergence of an economic view of property which accompanied the spread of socialist tendencies. In this way, it will be seen that though the causes of the American Civil War may, in a

great measure, be traced to the question of national sovereignty, a political question of first importance, yet, distinct from this, we may discover that in the larger issue of slavery the property rights of the slave owners were impugned, not on political, but on social and economic grounds. The numerous other wars of this decade, those of Italian and German national unity, were, however, still under the dominant influence of politics. Nationalism, as a political motive, here reached the height of its development. The Franco-Prussian War was the last political war, in the sense that political motives in the main dictated the policy of both of the contestants. Henceforth, we are on the threshold of a new era. In politics it is called imperialism.

III

Imperialism, properly understood, is only incidentally a political motive. Beneath the thin political veneer we may perceive the vigorous, economic forces at work which were replacing politics and its individualist premises by a social view-point. It is not an accident that imperialism is best defined by the phrase, "extension in directions where trading interests and investments require the protection of the flag." It is not mere chance that such men as Cecil Rodes, Chamberlain and Cromer, or Roosevelt and von Bülow should have made themselves leaders in the new movement of expansion for expansion's sake, power for power's sake, which committed the State to enterprises far beyond the limits of politics and its individualist implications. The State as Power, the Super-State and the economic and social problems with which politics found itself confronted at the beginning of the twentieth century, hastened the decay of those liberal principles which had formed the backbone of utilitarian doctrines. The new realist spirit in politics sought to make use of these principles and turn them to good account in face of the stress placed upon economic problems.

In imperialism, we have no longer questions of rights to deal with, but questions of efficient exploitation.

Social efficiency was the underlying motive of imperial expansion. It was based on the growing conviction that the ownership of property is not a question of rights in a political sense, but of efficient exploitation. Here we have the tacit acceptance of the economic view-point, which is that of the scientific application of the most efficient technique that can be devised with a view to improving the general condition of mankind. The State now assumed that it had a cultural mission to perform to spread the most advanced civilization. As a result of the nationalist propaganda, which for a generation had been carried on, it was only natural that each of the great States of the West should conceive itself to be the repository of the highest type of civilization. In foreign affairs this led to lust for territorial expansion ; in home affairs to the securing of increased efficiency by social legislation and the compulsion placed upon the owners of property to do or to forbear, according to the dictates, not of their own interests, but of those of the community at large. The two went hand in hand.

Joseph Chamberlain, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, pushed the development of imperial enterprise overseas, and brought in close contact the outlying portions of the Empire ; in home affairs he championed an Employers' Liability Act and old age pensions. His career may serve to illustrate the new economic tendencies referred to. As a successful business man he had introduced what, at the time, were new methods to secure efficiency, by replacing competition by consolidation of allied industries. Though he began life as an ardent liberal in politics, he soon joined the radical wing of the party, and went far beyond its set programme in advocating free education, playgrounds for the poor, public libraries and similar institutions which were directed towards the betterment of the condition of the working classes and the consequent improvement of their economic efficiency. In the broader issues of foreign affairs, he broke away from the liberals entirely. He opposed Home Rule for Ireland, attacked the older, individualist theories of non-

intervention which many liberals still supported, and formed a new party in advocating a social policy which he linked up with imperialism. In so doing, he strengthened the bonds of the Empire, which men of the type of Cecil Rhodes were energetically engaged in expanding.

It is not suggested that Chamberlain, or others who held similar views, were conscious of the new departure they had made in the conduct of affairs which led far beyond the realm of politics. Nor was it a phenomenon confined to England. Other examples may be found in all of the chief countries of the West. Jules Ferry, as Premier of France, ordered and put through the occupation of Tunis in order to confer upon its benighted people the "blessings of our civilization," as he proudly announced in the French Chamber of Deputies. Crispi, in Italy, sought to carve out a great colonial Empire along the Red Sea. Bismarck finally joined the march of colonial expansion which his successor, von Bülow, took up and pursued with energy. Roosevelt ardently espoused the imperialist idea ; the Panama Canal exploit can only be judged by standards of efficiency, not of mere political legality.

The extension of European influence to all parts of the world, the partition of Africa, the opening up of Asia, the balked attempt at penetration in South America which aroused the United States to a consciousness of the part it was to play in the imperialist movement ; the development of industry as of commerce, the accumulation of wealth, are all referable to the economic factors which have been outlined. It is not the place here to review in detail the policies of the various governments during the closing decade of the last century, and the opening years of the present. But even a cursory examination will reveal in how far the State had departed from its old political ideals of letting things alone, and safeguarding the rights of the individual by merely insuring public order. Henceforth, the State was daily assuming new responsibilities, directed exclusively towards increasing economic efficiency. It had already become apparent to a few that the Parliamentary

machine was inadequate to deal with the new functions which the State was being forced to assume. In point of fact politics was becoming an antiquated technique of social organization, unfitted for the new tenets of efficiency of a scientific age.

The will to power, strong ambition, and an inordinate desire for success, which were apparently the motives of imperialism, were proving themselves inadequate, in that it was becoming increasingly difficult to adjust by political means problems which were in their essence non-political. We find that the same condition prevailed in the realm of home affairs. Hence in spite of the great increase in wealth, and its more wide distribution ; in spite of the vastly improved condition of the working classes and a standard of living among them far superior to what was even dreamed of a generation before ; in spite of the abundant social legislation that was adopted in all countries, and reforms in municipal administration and increased efficiency in supervision over public institutions ; in spite of the current acceptance of socialism in some form or another,¹ even by the ruling political parties, unrest and discontent prevailed among all classes of society, and was rapidly increasing.

IV

The causes of this unrest, in the face of otherwise favourable conditions, are to be explained by the fact that the formula that "the State is a people legally united as an independent entity" was no longer adequate. Whatever interest there was in politics was kept alive artificially by a skilful use of the doctrines of nationalism to arouse sentiments of loyalty and patriotism. Nationalism remained the apparently unassailable bulwark of politics. The Nation-State had become a world unto itself, and it demanded as its right, the implicit as well as the explicit allegiance of the individual. Patriotism was as

¹ "There are a score of different forms of socialism, constitutional, revolutionary, centralized, decentralized, academic, philosophic, aristocratic, democratic, autocratic, predatory, philanthropic, idealist, materialist, Christian, anti-Christian."—Cf. *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. xii, chap. iii, p. 62.

necessary to politics as efficiency to industry. This led to the ready acceptance of the absolutism of the State, and identified the individual as a member of the State, outside of which he had no social value.

Under the impetus of imperialism, nationalism had taken on a new aspect. It was no longer merely for internal consumption to arouse patriotic enthusiasm, to stimulate waning interest in politics or render easier the acceptance of the burdens of taxation for armaments, but to be used abroad in pursuing a definite policy of foreign propaganda, to seek to impose the "national ideal" on other peoples. The Germans were the first to initiate this policy of *Weltpolitik*. Nationalism in this new form, while outwardly still a political motive, was henceforth immediately referable to its economic background.

In no country had the adoption of scientific method in industry been accompanied by such spontaneous growth as in Germany. In a generation, the country had been transferred from an agrarian to an industrial State. New markets were required for German manufacturers. Here we have the beginnings of the policy of "peaceful penetration," of nationalist propaganda abroad carried on through commercial enterprise which the Germans so successfully pursued. Here we have the origins of the plans of world dominion formulated by the Germans, and based on the dumping of their wares in all parts of the globe. The cause of this expansion was directly economic, but nationalism remained a political idea, and its political reactions were far-reaching. To secure a place in the sun for their industries, the Germans conceived and unanimously accepted the belief that the State must be able to command a formidable force, strong enough to intimidate all comers. To maintain peace, which industrial expansion required, increased armaments were needed, and the competition between States in the field of armaments was on economic grounds, abetted by the great armament firms.¹

To protect German interests abroad—economic interests—the first Navy Act was passed in 1898, and

¹ Cf. pp. 210-211.

a propaganda in favour of a great navy was carried on in every town and village in the Empire, which aroused interest in Germany's nationalist mission in the world, and opened up vistas of world empire. Here we have the origins of that policy of aggressive nationalism which historically had its beginning in German economic expansion. It forced the hand of those entrusted with the conduct of foreign affairs into taking up a complicated policy, which led to disaster in the World War.

Nationalism in this new form, though it induced a vast increase in armaments, was not in itself a belligerent doctrine. "Our task is this," a leading German exponent of the new doctrine wrote in 1910, "we must realize the idea of national expansion on which our ability to exist as a nation of the first rank depends, by making ourselves so strong on land and on sea that nobody will dare attack us, and secondly, by working thus protected for the attainment of our specific aim. This aim is to penetrate the world with the spiritual contents of our national idea."¹ Henceforth, nationalism was to become a cultural factor, a spiritual ideal, rather than merely a political principle. It was based on "The conviction that we have been placed in the arena of the world in order to work out moral perfection, not only for ourselves, but for all mankind."²

The new nationalism also had immediate, concrete objects; larger colonies, the open door for trade opportunities in all parts of the world, a favoured position for commerce, and the obligation imposed upon the State to assure to its members adequate, if need be, armed support in securing railway, mining and other similar concessions in backward countries. While economic motives came to control the aims and purpose of politics, nationalism kept alive political passions. The ardent faith in nationalism is well expressed in the words: "A national purpose is the most unconquerable and

¹ Cf. Paul Rohrbach, *German World Policies*, p. 204. This expression of the Pan-German movement had its counterpart in other countries. Pan-Slavism, Pan-Americanism, the British Imperial Union, are all manifestations of this same nationalist spirit.

² *Idem.*, p. 4.

victorious of all things on earth. It can raise up Babylon from the sands of the desert, and make imperial civilization spring from out a score of huts, and, after it has wrought its will, it can leave monuments that seem as everlasting a portion of nature as the rocks." ¹

¹ Cf. *Co-operation and Nationality*, by A. E. (George W. Russell).

CHAPTER XXIII

THE DECAY OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

The Party System—Rome and the United States—Causes of Social Unrest—Social Justice—Political Obligation—The Transformation of Politics—The New Economic Technique—The Rôle of the Specialist—The Submergence of Politics.

I

POLITICS, henceforth, was to rely upon the doctrine of nationalism to restore interest in the decaying party system and parliamentary government, as well as combat the apathy towards political affairs that was daily increasing. Writing of political conditions in Rome during the democratic age of the Gracchi, Mommsen declares: "Party phrases were in free circulation. Of the parties themselves, there was little trace in practical matters . . . it was only in rare instances that the different candidates represented opposite political principles . . . The two parties, the Optimates and the Populares, contended for shadows, and numbered in their ranks none but enthusiasts or hypocrites. Both were equally affected by political corruption. . . . Slavery, the basis of the capitalist system, had grown into a veritable Frankenstein. . . . In this way Rome reached, not the beginning, but the end of popular freedom."¹ This phraseology might, with very slight changes, be adopted to characterize politics at the dawn of the twentieth century. "The two great American parties," writes Lord Bryce, "have been compared to empty bottles, into which any liquor might be poured as long as the labels are retained."²

¹ Cf. *History of Rome*, vol. iii, pp. 330-332.

² Cf. *Modern Democracies*, vol. i, p. 131 . . . "the tendencies of human nature remain as a permanent factor, let us see whether men's

It is not implied that we have here a repetition in history, but merely that analogous circumstances conduce to analogous results. In Rome, the outcome was Cæsarism. It led to the disappearance of a political view-point, and the barbarian invasions destroyed the last vestiges of political society. In our own times, a similar transformation is taking place. The scientific spirit of the new age is showing the way to a non-political organization of society, consonant with the social requirements which economic efficiency, divested of political encumbrances, can fulfil.

Just as in the Roman world a way out was subsequently found in Christianity, which began as a religion of the poor, a proletarian movement towards social emancipation, so at the present juncture, we may trace the rise of a similar longing for emancipation, among the modern proletariat. It is not religious or political liberty that is being sought, but economic freedom that is the cry of our times. It would appear that science is to show the way to this freedom, as in Rome, religion was resorted to. Whatever differences we may discover between the Roman and the European view-point, and they are at once manifest, in both instances we may trace a similarity in the abandonment of politics, its legal machinery and moral code.

II

The Hegelian concept that the State is reality of which justice is the idea, so widely propagated in various disguises to render palatable its new absolutism, had to give way in face of the inexorable character of the demands for efficiency, which science inculcates, and an economic code alone is capable of enforcing.

behaviour in the past may not throw some glimmer of light upon the future. Frenchmen, Englishmen, Americans find it so natural a thing that men should be interested in politics, that they assume men will always be so interested. But is it really true—so students of history will ask—that this interest can be counted on to last? For a thousand years after the days of the last republicans of Rome, the most civilized peoples of Europe cared nothing for politics and left government in the hands of their kings or chiefs. . . . The thing did happen, and whatever has happened once, may happen again. Peoples that had known and prized political freedom, resigned it, did not much regret it, and forgot it.”—*Op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp 638-659.

Here we have the crux of the problem of social unrest, of pessimism and widespread discontent. Ideas were no longer in accord with the facts of the social complex. The freedom which politics claimed to vouchsafe appeared as the freedom of emptiness. The technique of politics had become obsolete. A new technique was required, consonant with the aims of a social, as distinguished from an individual ideal. The individual in becoming part of the Nation-State, in carrying forward the national purpose, had been shorn of many of his individualist characteristics. Political equality had been achieved, and had acted as a dissolvent of many of those prerogatives of individual liberty which had, in the past, been the mainstay of the interest in politics.

Democracy, expressed as the sovereignty of the people, though a loose phrase, capable of various interpretations, had become the norm of all forms of government. This concept, for a time, inspired awe among rulers and ruled alike, not unlike its counterpart the "Divine right of kings." *Vox populi, vox dei* had in it that mystical quality which experts in crowd psychology recognize as containing those elemental impulses which we term spiritual. In this way the State as Power became the living embodiment of the sovereignty of the people, and was readily accepted as such. The State became the expression of the national will.

If we seek to discover who formulated the aims of this will, we come upon a very small group or class—a political class—made up of journalists, professional politicians, capitalists, professors and publicists who sought to give a semblance of precision and sequence to national aims, and direct the national will. The means at their disposal were limited to parliament and public opinion. We have noted how by degrees, parliaments in all countries, declined in authority and became unfitted to cope with the new social problems. This gave to public opinion an ever-increasing influence, and made of its mouthpiece, the press, the principal repository of political power, the last stronghold of politics. But at the same time the press was made use of as a means of anti-political propaganda in that it laid bare the weak-

ness and corruption of political figures, the ineptitude of parliamentary régimes, and came more and more to give attention to economic and social problems.

It was coming to be held intolerable to listen to the pratings about democracy, that "Not order but justice is the end of the State," or to restatements of Rousseau's hackneyed theory that "the general will is the mechanism whereby justice may be attained,"¹ and, in practice, administer justice in favour of those in whose hands the means of coercion lay and whose interests would best be served.² More than this, it was courting disaster to disseminate doctrines of political justice in a society already largely governed by economic motives, where justice was coming to be held primarily a question of the distribution of material values. From an economic standpoint, social justice demanded tangible compensation, which politics was unable to afford. For politics was a technique of rights. It had no other means of allocating justice than its legal code. It could not rid itself of its fundamental doctrines of natural laws and natural rights, even by discrediting the term "natural," as the utilitarians had sought to do. It could not do otherwise than interpret in practice the belief in an individualist organization of society, based on the rights of private property and a competitive ideal. As we have pointed out, beliefs govern the actions of man. Political beliefs are, and to the end must remain, individualist.

We may from another side trace the more rapid decay of political ideals in the efforts made during very recent times to give to politics a social basis, consonant with the economic dictates of the new age.

We refer to those pseudo-scientific laws of political obligation by which it was sought to revivify political concepts. Hobbes had clearly set forth that practical political morality and politics in general seek to discover a means of adjusting the claims of self-seeking individualism. He had asserted that the dis-

¹ Cf. Laski, *Foundations of Sovereignty*.

² The well-known saying attributed to Themistocles: "God forbid that I should sit upon a bench of justice where my friends found no more favour than strangers" is sound politics.

interested regard for the good of others was impossible. His doctrine of exclusive egoism had been the firm foundation upon which the political structure had been erected. The utilitarians had sought to give to this doctrine scientific precision ; the evolutionists had gone a step further and presumed to have discovered that an unconscious adjustment is taking place between rival claims, dictated by self-interest, and that the "limit of evolution" would be reached when benevolence is added to justice. These views are now rejected by the new school of social ethics. It is sought to prove that reason shows that the idea of self-sacrifice is inherent in the mind of the individual, and that when fully developed, reason points out that the highest good is to be found in the devotion of the individual to humanity.¹

At a time when, as never before in history, the struggle for "power that ceaseth only in death" became the rule of political society, and the desire for self-preservation and self-gratification, whether of individuals or of peoples, was the accepted law of conduct, we see emerging a vague humanitarian view-point, still unconscious of itself and its social purpose, seeking to prop up politics and its moral code. But, on the other hand, we may discern that "poverty had become conscious of itself," and that the legal freedom and equality which political society insures, had in face of the economic servitude of the poor—the overwhelming numerical majority—become an empty phrase.

III

Politics offers a technique for the governance of society, based on a creed of individual rights. These rights are the expression of the individual will. The individual in political society is conceived of exclusively as "will," and the right of suffrage is the safeguard of his other rights. We have traced the implications arising out of this concept of the State as the sovereign will,

¹ Cf. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, and *Political Obligation*, for a statement of this view. He sought to unite morality and science. They are, according to Green, both to be explained by the same principle.

advanced by Hobbes, developed by Rousseau and adopted by Fichte as the groundwork of politics. Other hypotheses as to the nature of the State and of government were propounded; its organic character was affirmed; its divine origin was asserted; its spiritual and mystical character postulated. The utilitarians claimed—with much literal precision, though in the end a no more satisfactory explanation—that the political State arises out of the habit of obedience common among men. In their view no social compacts or contracts are required, no ethical or social ideals need be appealed to to explain the rise of government, but merely the natural striving for self-preservation as the surest road to happiness. All of these various interpretations have this in common, that they are directly referable to an individualist mode of viewing life. The State, though a corporate body, was endowed with individualist characteristics “fashioned in the image of man,” and in principle so limited its authority, even at the highest stage of its power, as to respect most of those prerogatives of the individual which were held to be his inalienable right.

Politics was the technique of social regulation offered by the middle class in accordance with its secular moral code, and the practical nature of its ethical view-point, in which individualism was held the token of highest cultural development which found expression in political liberty. We have noted the decline of this individualist view-point, and the rise of democratic doctrines. We have traced the consequences of the acceptance of the principles of political equality in vitiating the vigour of politics. We have called attention to the change that took place during the middle of the nineteenth century, marked on the one hand by the effort to substitute the term society for State and government, and sociology for politics, and on the other by the rise of a frankly economic interpretation of history which, as developed by Marx, repudiated politics as a viable, social technique, unsuited to modern needs.

In the long process of the development of politics in Modern Times, we have pointed to the rise of a secular

moral code which substantiated the aims and claims of politics, and moulded the conduct of political society. From the exclusive egoism of Hobbes, down to the will to power of Nietzsche and the pragmatism of William James, we may clearly discern the reactions of political method, as mirrored in the endless varieties of philosophical speculation. In the end the circle is complete. James and Nietzsche join hands with Spinoza and Hobbes, as the "will to believe" and the "will to power" reflect the ambitions and aims of the Nation-State to impose upon the world what the Germans called the "national idea." The State as Power, as Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes conceived it, was, making allowances for outward differences, the pattern of the State during the latest age. Democracy, which acted as the dissolvent of feudal society,¹ and destroyed the system of chivalry on which it depended, now was acting as the dissolvent of political society.

The Circean lure of democracy has left its trace on the course of history. Democracy is in the first instance hailed as a glorious end in itself, then frankly accepted as a means to an end. Only too late do men awaken to the realization of the fact that it is, in fact, a virulent malady of existing social institutions. This disease of the body politic in Modern Times has manifested itself in subtle fashion. Democracy was, as we have seen, proclaimed valuable because it was held to embody liberty by assuring equality. It was lost sight of that equality is a levelling doctrine, which in the end defeats its own purpose by its deadening monotony. In this way we may interpret the destruction of the State system in its variegated richness of forms of autocracy and monarchy, republic and empire, kingdom, dukedom and principality, and the efforts made to replace them by uniform, republican institutions; while in the kingdoms that survived, sovereigns were shorn of all political power.

Looked at from the standpoint of a vigorous, political society, this uniformity is a sign of dissolution. Further, the majesty and greatness of the State in a flourishing, political age, which inspired the formation

¹ Cf. p: 18 *et seq.*

of great States in a position to carry forward the idea of the State as Power, was being slowly undermined. The change, which took place after 1871, was at first only symptomatic. The nationalist propaganda we meet with in Finland, Poland, Ireland, among the Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, Turks, and elsewhere, was carried on with an intensity and vigour hitherto unknown. These movements differed from the German and Italian nationalist movements in that they were separatist movements, acting as dissolvents of the political State as Power.

We may see here how the concept of democracy has filtered into the institution of the State itself, and note the erosive processes at work. No longer individuals, but peoples as groups clamoured for equality—national equality. The mushroom crop of new States that sprang up out of the defeated Central Powers and Russia, after the World War and the overthrow of thrones, was an inevitable result of the reaction of democracy in accelerating the course of destruction.

IV

What more tangible proof of the decay of political society is needed than to survey the present status of the political State system. We do not deplore the passing of politics as the men of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did not deplore the passing of the feudal age. It is evident that even to-day, it is not realized that it is the influence of what is termed democracy that has wrought the necessary destruction. The democratizing of the feudal war process and the democratizing of the modern, political process are historically similar movements. Then the feudal, distinctly 'social' system was giving way before individualism and the rising political consciousness; now the individualist system and its political organization are giving way before a new, social ideal. In both instances, democracy performs the same destructive function.

We have noted the successive steps of the decline of politics and pointed out some of the salient factors of the new and vigorous social force that was making itself felt. Politics was coming more and more to

be left in the hands of professional politicians, local bosses and party leaders, and an increasingly large section of the community was growing indifferent to political affairs. It no longer concerned itself with methods of government and legal reforms, but sought to discover a means of dealing with questions of economic adjustment.

The gradual dominance of economic interests in public affairs reflects what was taking place in the minds of men. All classes of society, rich and poor alike, felt the increasing pressure of economic problems. All sought to exploit the advantages which the new economic technique offered. Politics became submerged in the process. The rich and the poor, the only vital class distinction in an economic society, were little concerned with political rights, and less with political duties. Government was looked to by the former to safeguard their wealth, by the latter to increase their share of it by forcing the owners of wealth to part with a larger share, whether directly as wages, or indirectly by taxation. Thanks to the improvement in economic technique, while the rich were growing richer, the poor were also growing richer, were better paid, both absolutely and relatively, better housed, better cared for than the working classes had been since the Middle Ages.¹

As long as such conditions could be maintained, the existing capitalist system and the political substructure out of which it had grown were secure. But when under the impact of incessant demands on the part both of the owners and of the workers, for greater profits than the system could consistently produce, in the frenzy of

¹ "Anything like the squalid misery, the slow, smouldering, putrefying death by which the weak and feeble of the working classes are perishing here, it never befel my eyes to behold, nor my imagination to conceive. And the creatures seem to have no idea of resisting or even repining. They sit down with oriental submission, as if it was God and not the landlord that was laying his hand upon them." These are the words used by an eye-witness to describe conditions of a Lancashire town in 1842. Writing of this same town, S. Webb declares: "In the Bolton of the twentieth century, though there is still individual squalor and personal misery to be found, the population—six times as numerous as in 1842—may, taken as a whole, safely be described as prosperous, healthy, intellectually alert, taking plenty of holidays, and almost aggressive in its independent self-reliance."—Cf. *Cambridge Modern History. Social Movements*, vol. xii, chap. xxiii, p. 730.

expansion the structure became top-heavy. We thus see a vast economic edifice superimposed upon a politically organized society.

The modern capitalist system, from the standpoint of the individual, is based on the rights of private property, a distinctly political concept. Private property was regarded as the natural right of men "born free and equal." Such property was the fundamental, inalienable right, which as we have seen, was so grandiloquently proclaimed during the French Revolution, the hall-mark of individualism. But when viewed from a purely economic standpoint, the right of private property has no more *raison d'être* than feudal property rights had from a political standpoint. As long as property remained in fact as well as in word, personal, and political rights were held sacred, the State, politically conceived, was strong enough to resist all attacks. By degrees the development of economic technique far outstripped that of politics. The character of property was transformed. As the work of the industrial worker became increasingly automatic, detached, impersonal, so that in the end the worker, by skilful division of labour, became infinitely more productive, though merely a servant of the machine which he tended, so the development of the mechanism of exchange, banking and stock companies endowed property with a similar impersonal, detached character, and made of the owners of property the recipient of an income from their property over which they, for the most part, exercised no direct control.

The workers as the wealth-producing, and the property owners regarded as the wealth-consuming members of the social order, had both become parts of the new economic system in process of formation, in which the individuality of the one was as completely lost as that of the other. An organ, no longer used, is subject to atrophy. Individualism is no exception to the rule. The trade union and the co-operative society, the joint stock company, trusts, cartels and combines had led to the substitution of a corporate view of life and the discrediting of competition in favour of co-operation. This new economic interpretation of social

needs was in fact incompatible with political ideals and the individualism upon which it was based. The will of the individual found no place to exercise its function in the new society in process of formation, where scientific laws of social efficiency and the compulsion of the new economic technique transcended the rights which politics had taught were indefeasible.

The doctrine of private property as a natural right of the individual, was like other natural rights which political society had developed, based on self-evident truths, requiring, as it was believed, no proofs. If *a priori*, it was asserted that natural rights are a part of the universal law of nature, empirical arguments were not wanting to prove that "every man is the best judge of his own interests, and, therefore, knows what sort of government and what laws will promote that interest. Hence those laws and that government will be best for a community as a whole, which is desired by the largest number of its members." ¹ Here is a concise statement of the modern political thesis which came to be accepted as the fundamental principle of democracy. But the development of a scientific, economic technique was every day proving that this argument is fallacious. It was coming to be doubted whether "every man is the best judge of his own interests," and later it was denied that anyone but a specialist was in a position to determine the nature of these "best interests." The utilitarians had long ago recognized the invalidity of natural laws, but neither they nor their successors, the advocates of realism in politics, could free themselves from this defect of politics.

In spite of the fact that in economic life in general the value of special knowledge was universally recognized, and the specialist given charge of the direction of affairs as the best means of securing successful results, in politics special knowledge in a scientific sense was conspicuous by its absence. Whether we look to England, France, the United States or other countries, we will find that personal popularity and services to the successful party, count for more in rising to Cabinet

¹ Cf. Bryce, *Modern Democracies*, vol. 1, p. 49.

rank than capacity to deal with the actual problems of office. No argument could more consistently be advanced to demonstrate how antiquated political technique had become than the selective system of Cabinet making which was the counterpart of the elective system of parliamentary government. In how far Cabinet members have become figure heads, and as such superfluous, is to be noted by their helpless dependence on their trained staff of permanent officials, who have in a measure evolved a scientifically efficient technique in dealing with the problems that arise under their jurisdiction. The functions of Cabinets as advisers of the executive in the conduct of what may strictly be termed political affairs, in the distribution of patronage and, in some countries, in the control of party followers in Parliament, belong to another category, but with the decay of parliamentary government in general, these duties have, from the standpoint of social efficiency and social order, grown equally superfluous.

The growing tendency to place civil servants beyond the reach of politics, and thus insure the appointment of the best man for the position, having regard for his special knowledge, rather than by the older, political method of party influence and recompense for services rendered to the successful candidate, as is the current practice under the "spoils system" in the United States, indicates the general trend towards a non-political mode of selection of public officials. It is significant that while in all other branches of modern life special knowledge is held essential, making allowance for the few endowed with exceptional natural talents, in politics no such requirement is ever demanded, nor can be as long as it is believed that "those laws and that government are the best for a community which are desired by the largest number of its members." Hence, a facile eloquence, a ready wit, a plodding loyalty to the party machine are of more value to the politician than special knowledge.

V

We must not overlook the consequences of these conditions. With the increasing complexity of social

life and the inevitable dependence upon scientific regulation of social intercourse, politics and political method have risen to the top like a light and frothy scum, beneath which the new technique was preparing itself. The social order was developing methods of organization in which politics was becoming superfluous. Politics was proving itself a wasteful and expensive luxury, which a vigorous and prosperous society might be able to support, but which was now proving itself an unbearable burden. With the increasing parasitism of politics, ways and means to be rid of it inevitably became a part of the plans for social reorganization.

Faith in the possibility of social regeneration is the most salient feature of the latest epoch. In spite of the prevailing pessimism, as reflected in the work of novelists and writers in general,—and this pessimism, properly interpreted, is nothing more than a rebellion against the emptiness of accepted social formulæ,—never before was such a variety of plans presented, never was so much zeal and energy displayed, so much enthusiasm often wasted in chimerical projects of reform, and yet so much that was tangible being silently achieved.

From whatever side the problem was approached ; whether from that of the mild social reformer, with his plans for adequate housing conditions, or that of the advocate of the "single tax" ; whether from that of the settlement worker in personal service among the poor, or the soap-box orator at a street corner in New York, or a speaker in Hyde Park demanding birth control and sex hygiene ; whether from that of a practical propagandist in the trade union or co-operative movement, or in the flights of fancy of the utopian philosopher ; whether in the programmes of social improvement demanded by progressive party leaders, or the destructive doctrines of communists or anarchists preaching social revolution, a kindred spirit inspired them all, a seeking to be rid of politics and the political methods of individualism, as no longer suited to the needs of social life. This is the conscious purpose underlying the trend of events as history reveals it to us. It is not averred that this was the special purpose of all of those

engaged in the task. Many viewed their labour in the light of strengthening existing political institutions ; all were united in a restless desire for change, for improvement as they deemed it. Few realized that they were engaged in a work of destruction and that this destruction was historically necessary.

To destroy the individualist system, to discredit the haphazard technique of politics, to lay bare its reckless wastefulness required the impact of a great struggle such as we witnessed in the European War. Looked upon in this light, the war belongs to the older epoch and does not as such, mark the dawn of a new age. But we may note here the final submergence of political technique as the flood waters of economic purpose close over it. Already for more than a decade before the war the ubiquitous pressure of the new, economic technique was crowding politics to the wall. None escaped this pressure. None were too great, none too small ; none too rich, none too poor, whether State, government or individual, not to feel the pervasive force of economic factors as the real dominants of social life.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL DECADENCE

The Traditional View-point—Social Purpose—Decline of Individualism—
Types of Civilization—The Object of Social Technique—Science
and Social Efficiency—Capitalist Enterprise—Economic Pressure.

I

NEW institutions evolve gradually, unperceived by the majority of those who live in epochs of transition such as our own. Thus while we may note a decided difference between the present age and the preceding period, it is difficult to measure the scope of the change that has been wrought. The self-complacent attitude of the Victorian Age has been abandoned. Men suspect that all is not right with the world. Even democracy and democratic principles have come under the fire of active, hostile criticism. Various remedies for the ills of the body politic and the reform of political institutions have been suggested. Novel usages of political mechanism have been tried out, such as the initiative, recall and referendum, or the city manager plan in the United States, and other experiments in social and political organization. But everywhere, even in Sovietism itself, which aims at going beyond the limits of politics, we discover how difficult it is without resorting to the language of Utopias to conceive of social arrangements that do not appear to be political.

A system of government by popular election in some form or another, the rôle of a legislature, executive and judiciary in the social life of a people has apparently become so vital a need as a method of adjusting the problems that arise, that it seems almost impossible to conceive of a society in which this political mechanism is absent, without a relapse into barbarism. The

sovereign, belligerent, national State, endowed with superhuman powers, appears as fixed as it does inevitable. But we must not allow ourselves to attribute too much influence to a State-system or form of government on the life of a people. The genius of a great race is measured by the contributions of its children to humanity at large, and cannot be confined within the narrow limits of national boundaries. Just as the individual is more than merely his "will" of which politics takes cognizance, so a race has far greater capacities and potentialities than can be confined within the boundaries of a sovereign State, no matter how great we may conceive this State to be. This is a matter that lies outside the sphere of politics and belongs to the broader problem of civilization.

It is useless to blame existing political institutions and their democratic tendencies, as is so often done, for the general literary, artistic, philosophical and religious sterility of the times; it is coming nearer to the truth to declare that this sterility may have been the cause of the willing acceptance of democratic principles in politics. In part, it is due to the fact that the thoughts of men are directed towards the new order, and their creative impulse flows along new channels. The economic problems of the new age, new methods of business, of finance, of industrial efficiency, the development of a practical scientific technique, tending towards the smoother and swifter articulation of social life, has brought to the fore a galaxy of inventive genius to which no other age can offer a parallel. Here is to be found a social purpose suited to the needs of the times. Here we have the origins of that materialism which, when viewed from the angle of politics, appears sordid, soulless, and immoral, but which, looked at from the standpoint of economics, marks the triumph of high achievement.

The older rational concept of the dominance of mind over matter, without clearly seeking to define either, was no longer tenable. It was coming to be ascertained that mind and matter are, in so far as differentiable, parts of or derived from, a same substance.

The efforts made to identify mind and matter, to note their reactions and interaction, the hypothesis that consciousness is a development, and remains under the influence of unconscious states, and other psychological hypotheses seeking to place mind in a position of subordination to matter, are characteristic of the new era.

From another side, the change that had been wrought by the decadence of politics is saliently illustrated if we compare the victorious Lincoln, Bismarck and Cavour with the victorious Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau. The former, in a measure, moulded the will of their respective peoples, embodied this will, displayed that acumen and vigour which we associate with politics during a period when no other technique is available ; the latter had to be content to be servants of the national will. Lincoln, Bismarck and Cavour towered above the events and times in which they lived, and shaped their course. They were the last great figures of a political age, and as such were enshrined in the hearts as well as in the history of their peoples. Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, half-submerged, sought to raise their voices above the multitude, to harangue and to exhort. They were soon discredited in the eyes of their followers, and became merely like all the rest, cogs in the wheel of the social order.

The causes of this radical change in so brief a space of time are not far to seek. It was no longer the political energy or policy of an individual, but the combined energies of a vast multitude that achieved results. The scale of human enterprise had been increased, far beyond the scope of even the mightiest intellect to direct. But in the face of this expansion the area of politics was daily becoming more restricted, and the rôle of the individual in social life more tightly bound by the new obligations imposed upon him to increase his productive efficiency, while the State was undertaking new duties to promote the welfare of its members. All of these factors are indicative of the gradual substitution of a social for an individual viewpoint.

The change involved replacing politics by a new

technique of social organization. The process has for more than a half century been in preparation ; new methods have been theoretically perfected. Let us see if we can outline a few of the essential elements of this new technique.

II

The history of civilization recounts the development of the methods devised to make man the master of his surroundings, to change the face of nature, to build, to render habitable the globe. In every age a type of civilization is evolved which reflects the technical processes perfected to achieve this purpose. Technique is thus little more than a mechanical means to an end—the end in this instance being a good life. The object of technique is to make things easy for someone, to remove work from the realm of drudgery, to make man skilful and accustom him to success, to make work and play converge. Though in past ages man has himself been the principal agency of technique in the sense that it was human labour that built the pyramids, as it dug the trench system along the battle front during the recent war, yet we may note a gradual substituting of mechanical means for the actual toil in the slow process towards an exclusively mechanical technique, where human labour is the mere servant of the great machine that performs the arduous tasks hitherto performed by man.

Science is as old as history, yet it is only in very recent times that it has been made use of for this distinctly social purpose. The change that has taken place in the past hundred years in man's attitude towards the universe is characterized by what we may call the scientific spirit. No one who peruses the account of the change wrought by science during this period can fail to be impressed by this new purpose that inspires all investigators. To cite but one instance : the effect of the evolutionary hypothesis was to render acceptable a social rather than an individual interpretation of history, by displacing the individual from his central position in the universe, and by the reduction

of his status from that of a privileged image of the divine Being to a type in an organic series. The emancipation of the human mind from the bondage of superstition and ignorance, which was the work of the Reformation, pales into insignificance when we compare it with the achievements of science during the nineteenth century. As at the close of the Middle Ages, the individual emancipated himself from social control and broke the fetters that bound him to the Church Universal, the great social institution of the long non-political era, so at the close of Modern Times men find themselves drawn once again towards a corporate social organization which is to replace the individualist social structure and its antiquated political technique.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when political society was in process of formation, men struck out along new paths, confident in the vigour of their rational faculties to discover for themselves the answers to all possible questions. The social technique of feudal society no longer fitted the needs of the new age, and the new scientific method of a Galileo, Kepler and Newton, culminated in the cult of the Goddess of Reason and the triumph of Hegelianism. The new technique patterned itself on Aristotelian doctrines, and the dominance of individualism rendered the acceptance of a political code inevitable. When Aristotle declared that the end and perfection of government was first founded that we might live, but continued that we might live happily, he was outlining the boundaries of politics and placing the happiness of the individual at the heart of his system.

In political society it is, as we have seen, the individual that counts. Politics offers a technique of social relations viewed from this individualist standpoint. Whether this individual is a king, a despot, or merely a citizen, politics takes cognizance of him in so far as he exercises his rights. The individual of political society is held to be endowed with certain inalienable rights. Legality is the essence of political technique. Politics thus deals, and can only deal, with rights. By degrees it

perfects means of uniting governed and governing more strongly, but it can never free itself from its individualist traditions or achieve a corporate, social standard. The individual remains to the end an isolated entity, guided by reason, bounded by laws, endowed with certain rights. A semblance of corporate unity is finally attained in nationality. But at this final stage, when the Nation-State emerges as the nucleus of political society, the technique of politics, outwardly so vigorous, is in point of fact, already in full decay. Nationality, as the expression of democracy, tends to bring it about that the individual no longer strives for his rights and liberties, but is content with the benefits of equality as the highest gift of politics. The path of equality leads, however, directly towards new social arrangements.

III

From the standpoint of philosophy, politics is the expression of a distributive view of life. In a political age, the individual as a subject, and later as a citizen, is the unit. His relations to the State and government are personal and direct. Politics is in fact a mechanism for adjusting these relations, based on the assumption that man is a rational animal, and that his reason guiding his conduct will offer means for the fullest expression of himself, or what is called his will. Self-determination, self-help, self-government, every man for himself, and let competition act as the stimulant, the weak get the wall, the strong survive and some arrive ; such is the highest perfection this technique was able to attain. Beneath it we find a blind confidence in the human will to determine the course of events, and make of man the master of his destiny, the captain of his fate, to realize the saying that "it is not in our stars, but in ourselves that we are underlings."

The philosophy of politics is egoism. It hypostatizes that in the universe there is nothing real but will. We have shown how the divine will was refashioned into a human will, how the State became the immortal God. We have noted the elements which led to the formation of

a secular moral code that replaced the former tenets of religious morality ; how the State became the executant of the general will, and the individual its beneficiary. Throughout the process the will remained an attribute of the individual. We may, in fact, trace the development of political technique through the various stages which, in the end, was to give to the individual will a preponderant place, akin to a final cause. At the close of the political age the mania to explain all of the functions of the mind in terms of will, to give to action, to behaviour, to life itself, a voluntarist basis, the counterpart of the State as power, may be taken as so many efforts to prop up the decadence of the individual as of the political State itself. To accept the view of the pragmatists, that success depends on the energy of the act, and this on the conviction that it will succeed, while the conviction is true because " I make it so," or that behaviour is the continuous product of the will, are voluntarist arguments which have their related parallels in politics.

Politics thus offered us a social system in which the technique of social intercourse was dependent upon the human will as immanent. This will was the source of power, and power became the chief aim of politics. The great contribution of physical science lies in the fact that it denied the supremacy of the will, then its freedom, and finally its existence altogether. It is this destruction of volition which will enable science to give the *coup-de-grâce* to individualism and political society, and make possible the growth of a new social order.

IV.

It is not the place here to set forth in detail that volition is a metaphysical hypothesis, useful to explain individual motives psychologically obscure, which may be dispensed with when a social attitude is adopted and a scientific view-point substituted. This social attitude is the result of a new conception of the universe from which the idea of the will is banished. Science shows the way, in that it can readily reach its conclusions

without the need of the intervention of a mechanism such as the will. An economic technique denies the "allness of mind, and the nothingness of matter." It admits of a natural dynamic relationship between mind and matter, but rejects the hypothesis of the supremacy of the former. None but a closet philosopher, born in a political age, seeking to establish the supremacy of the individual, could have evolved the doctrine of the supremacy of mind, and called it first reason, and then will.

As long as the elementary problems of natural science remained unsolved, as long as science was bound by the chains of biblical cosmogony and a geocentric theory of the universe, the usefulness of a principle such as the divine will was indisputable. The breaking of these chains was the problem that confronted the political age, but once these chains broken, we see men busy at work, forging for themselves an even more closely meshed chain of a human will. The divine will became the remote, the human will, the immediate causative agency. The technique of politics based itself on the human will. But science, undaunted, was again at work, seeking a way out of this new bondage. While philosophers discussed the freedom of the will, and politicians transferred the doctrine of liberty to the realm of politics, and made man "free," the chosen instrument of his destiny, we have at the close of the political age the Darwinian hypothesis offered to us, which overthrew the dogma of the special creation of man.

The individual as such, clad in his armour of will, was not ready to give up the fight. As in the past theology had opposed the progress of politics, and religion had used its most subtle and convincing arguments, and in the end resorted to force in order to oppose the spread of a secular moral code, so now we find a brave band of voluntarist philosophers, theologians and politicians rising in defence of politics and its individualist doctrines, bringing all their pressure to bear to combat the new economic view-point and its materialist moral code.

To put it bluntly, the technique of politics is to the

newer technique of economics as the stage-coach and the sedan-chair are to the railway and the automobile. It is an arduous task to divert men from the path they and their ancestors have followed. Nor is a radical and abrupt change desirable. The value of conservatism is not to be overlooked. As a result, the technique of social life is modified so imperceptibly that it is almost impossible to note a distinct change at any given period. It is only by a recourse to history that we may form a comparative estimate. When we do make such a comparison, we discover that the change which is constantly taking place is carried through as a slight modification of the older forms. The first railway coaches were patterned after the model of stage-coaches. In the same way, politics adopted to its uses much that belongs by right to a theological system. The divine nature of kingship, the trappings of majesty, the fundamental thesis of sovereignty were taken over bodily into the realm of politics in order to give to the political State an imposing ascendancy like that which the Church had hitherto exclusively possessed. By degrees unessentials were suppressed, and we find politics evolving a technique of its own in the form of constitutional government and the Nation-State. In the same way, the religious moral code was made over into a secular code of morality, the divine will was refashioned into the human will, and individualism, based on a more or less exclusive egoism, was the ethical doctrine developed.

Thus to-day the technique of political society must for the time being be made use of to contribute vital characteristics to the economic, or as we should better say industrial, type of organization, which must perforce imitate the mechanism of politics pending such a time as it will be able to evolve a technique of its own. The technique of politics was developed during the period of theological supremacy, and we may trace its beginnings to the doctrines preached by Marsiglio in the fourteenth, and Nicolo da Cusano in the fifteenth, and widely accepted in the sixteenth century that as nature speaks the will of God, and that as by nature all men

are free, authority under God is in no man who claims to be their superior, but in the people. This was a direct assault on Papal and imperial supremacy, which was to have such far-reaching consequences in future ages. Thus from the standpoint of history, we may now discover the origins of the new economic doctrines in the conception of trade held during the seventeenth century, and the beginnings of the capitalist system.

V

The nucleus of the new economic technique is to be found in capitalism. We may trace the gradual transformation wrought by this economic method, which strode rough shod over the domestic system that still predominated in the seventeenth century, and fostered the industrial revolution of the later eighteenth century. Economics, captive in the chains of politics during the nineteenth century as politics in the fifteenth, was still captive in the chains of theology, was by degrees transforming the character of social organization. In this light capitalism may be looked upon as a tentative form of economic technique. While its immediate object when viewed from the standpoint of individualism, was greater profits for the owner of the means of production, viewed from a broader, social aspect, it was by degrees preparing for the socialization of industry, the development of a technique by which the individual was to be integrated in the social order. Capitalism thus appears as a means of stimulating industrial development. It served to unite the peoples of the earth, regardless of national boundaries, by the ties of industrial intercourse, and by the exploitation of machinery relieve them from the heavy burden of physical toil and thus increase their material well-being. When we view the rise of capitalism and this economic purpose of service as distinct from the political purpose of power, or the individualist aim of personal profit, we throw light on much that appears confused and obscure in social evolution when examined as it is habitually done from the standpoint of politics.

Capitalism with its methods of scientific exploitation thus appears to the impatient radical and to many sober-minded workingmen as much of a monster as Papal exploitation appeared to some of the politically-minded reformers of the sixteenth century. But this is a profound error. Capitalism is in reality promoting the evolution of the new economic technique, which will render politics and the politically-organized state system obsolete.

Thus imperialism and internationalism, as well as the activities forced upon the State, such as free education, sick and old-age pensions, State insurance, unemployment compensation, protection of women and children in industry, the minimum wage and the normal day, to say nothing of ownership of railways, subsidies to shipping, national postal and telegraph service and other functions which the State has assumed, have not only made it the most powerful of all agencies in promoting capitalist enterprise, but transformed the character of politics and made politics subservient to economics. At the same time, private capitalist corporations, unhampered by national boundaries, have extended the sphere of their operations across the globe, have opened up new sources of raw materials and natural wealth, exploited new inventions, promoted scientific research, and brought about intimate, commercial relations with distant peoples.

In spite of nationalist doctrines which continued to be the cause of mutual suspicion and jealousy among peoples, and thus kept alive an interest in foreign politics and its cult of power, in spite of the competitive ideal which gave to capitalist exploitation a national, individualist character, capitalist enterprise was becoming impersonal and non-competitive. Individual initiative, political motive, the State itself, were sinking into insignificance when compared with the great industrial corporations which had adopted the new code of efficiency and scientific method in place of the older hit-or-miss system of competition which still prevailed in politics. These corporations, commanding vast resources, wielding authoritative influence in the councils

of the State, though still looked upon as private property, and still distributing profits to their shareholders, had in a large measure become organizations for public service. Capitalism at this stage had already outgrown its individualist bounds, and was making ready to break the hold of the State and political control of the social order—the tail was wagging the dog.

If we review the political history of the decade of 1904–1914, we will discover everywhere manifestations of the new spirit of economic efficiency which marks the final transition from individualist to social methods, not merely in industrial enterprise, but in the directive control of social life. Increased efficiency had for its outward purpose the promotion of self-interest, whether individual or national, but we may also note a deeper social purpose which found expression in capitalist expansion. The goal was world empire. This empire was not, however, to be a political empire, as the Germans naively believed, but a great industrial union of all peoples. For the first time in history, economic technique was rising to a position of unrivalled mastery, and was to be in a position to offer a pattern of social organization suited to an age of science. For the time being, however, economic motive was still condemned and despised. Materialism was presented as something degrading to mankind, which for centuries had become used to a religious and then to a political ideal as the pivotal factor in social life. It was taught that there was something so crassly physical about economic motives, as currently accepted in political society that though all the world was principally engaged in the pursuit of wealth and material well-being, all were eager to give it another name. Imperialism was the fine-sounding term that became the label of the latest age.

CHAPTER XXV

THE ECONOMIC AGE

Transition from Individual to Social Standards—World Empire—The
Rôle of France—The First World War—Its Political and Social
Consequences—The Bankruptcy of Political Method—The New
Economy.

I

IF we examine the political moves on the chess-board of international affairs of the period, which began with the Anglo-French Entente of April 8, 1904,¹ we will gain a glimpse of the direct influence of economic pressure upon the course of events.

The German policy of world dominion was a direct reflex of the economic efficiency attained by the adoption of a scientific technique of industry. Unhampered by a long tradition in industrial enterprise, the Germans appeared on the scene of industry just in time to take advantage of the great discoveries of science. The educational system of the country had borne fruits, and the natural discipline of the race made possible the adoption of the new methods without let or hindrance. Thus we find that Germany had from a political standpoint in seeking new markets, new sources of raw materials, new scenes of commercial activity, become a menace to similar interests of other peoples.

The German efforts towards world dominion, in this

¹ In the words of a French historian, who as Honorary Inspector-General of Education, may be taken to represent official French opinion, "The Great War which is disabling Europe and one may say the whole world, since 1914, was virtually inevitable from the time when opposed to the Triple Alliance, there was established, thanks to the agreement of April 8, 1904, the Anglo-French Entente, which coming after the Franco-Russian alliance, was soon to be merged with it in a common policy directed against the Central Empires."—Cf. A. Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe Depuis le Congrès de Berlin jusqu'à nos Jours*, vol. ii, p. 1.

economic sense, determined the foreign policy of the period. Constantinople had come under German influence, and we may trace the origins of many of the perplexing political difficulties of the Balkan question to the thrust of the Germans towards Salonika. They had gained the concession to build a railway across Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf, and Asia Minor as a ripe fruit was to fall in due season. We see them promoting pan-Islamic propaganda in the hope of raising the standard of revolt in Egypt and India ; consolidating their hold on Shantung, with a foothold in Australasian waters in Samoa, New Guinea and the Carolines, and exploiting rich colonies in Africa.

Aside from these fields of activity, we may note the effect of the German policy of peaceful penetration in Belgium and Holland, in Italy, in Russia, and the Near East ; the sending of her commercial travellers to all parts of the globe, competing in France, England and the United States for the local markets, seeking new fields for industrial enterprise and concessions in Morocco, in Mexico, in Chile. Everywhere the economic motive was the incentive, economic advantage, the immediate aim. Political power was the dream of the political class, which saw visions of world empire, gained by conquest and held by force.

Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Germany, which two decades before had not a single foreign colony, and was only then just beginning to seek foreign markets, had, relying on her economic strength and new scientific technique, built up a colonial empire second only to that of France and England, who had for more than two centuries been engaged in such enterprise. As long as the Germans adhered to their economic programme their expansion continued by leaps and bounds, but once they were caught in the meshes of international politics, France showed her traditional mastery of the game. The French alliance with Russia, and the Entente with England, the Algeciras Conference, Casablanca and Agadir, the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, were all exploited to best advantage by France, enabled her to consolidate her position in

Europe, and made it possible for her to face the enemy when the final test of strength should come.

Though the technique which shaped these events remained political, and the men who took part in the negotiations and acted on the behalf of their governments, in peaceful meetings or on the field of battle, believed themselves to be acting on the old political principles of the "balance of power" and "European equilibrium," while nationalism suffused a glow over all, yet we may everywhere detect the direct pressure of economic motive in dictating policy, as in furnishing new scientific means of destruction in the war that was to achieve world empire. In this struggle Germany went down to defeat, chiefly because her economic resources were not great enough to cope with those of a world leagued against her. The Germans lacked the political skill and training needed to prevent the formation of such a league. Their provocative, political attitude which had aroused the antagonism of immediate neighbours, spread to the remote parts of the earth, until for the first time in history we have what may, with all propriety, be termed a World War.

Viewed from an historical standpoint, the defeat of Germany was an historical necessity, and as such, inevitable. In no other fashion could politics and political methods become so thoroughly discredited, and the way be paved for the acceptance of a new social technique. France, victorious, found herself with the hegemony of a dislocated and dissolving continental State system on her hands. Politics was henceforth to be concerned with problems of finance, of reparations and indemnities, of economic adjustments and new experiments in industrial organization. In this way the Germans carried on the war after the war, and hastened the collapse of the State system and its political methods.

II

In the same way during the period under review in the realm of home affairs, social legislation and social reform, protective tariffs and subsidies, trade union

agitation and co-operative enterprise, syndicalism, strikes and sabotage, were all the results of economic pressure. Then, in 1914, the war came, which concentrated the energies of the world more than ever on questions of industrial efficiency and economic organization. It brought together and unified in a common enterprise the various peoples of the earth. Not since the days of the Crusades had such a spirit of unity of purpose manifested itself. The *Deus vult* of the twelfth century had tended to free Europe from those turbulent hosts of feudal barons who spent their warlike energies in the East in the conquest of the Holy Sepulchre. This greatly facilitated the beginning of the task of consolidation of political States in the West. Now the propaganda against the "Huns" brought from the confines of the world a new host to fight for "democracy and freedom,"¹ and spend its energies in a struggle which was to facilitate the acceptance of new social standards. As during the Crusades the peoples of the West came into direct contact with Arabian culture, in many respects a more advanced civilization than that prevalent in Western Europe at the time, and the Europeans learned many valuable lessons in the arts and crafts, and were here first awakened to the idea of freedom of thought, and of a new standard of individual value, so in the twentieth century the cultural effects of the mingling of peoples in close contact in a common enterprise, the resulting interchange of ideas, the adoption of new methods, the reshaping of ideals will remain as the most lasting effect of the first World War.

Thus, while this war cannot be held a war of peoples, but rather appears as the final expression of the domination of the social order by the middle class, and in the Peace of Versailles, as of St. Germain and Sevres, we see set forth the old political ideas of balance of power

¹ "Shall America stand idly by while Russia, Japan and China fight for Democracy and Freedom?"—Cf. *The North American Review* for April 1917. This editorial article contains the following, which is typical of the spirit of the day, "we look—and hope and pray—for war to follow soon the great Message of Patriotism which we have no question the President will deliver to Congress, to America and all the world on or before the 16th day of April of this glorious year of Democracy Triumphant."

and the political terminology, in most respects antiquated, yet the indirect effects in loosening the bonds of political control are unmistakable. The failure of the treaties more than the violence done to the principles which, it was alleged, they were to enforce,¹ testifies to the inadequacy of a political technique.

The *Fourteen Points and Subsequent Discourses* of President Wilson were, in spite of pledged promises, not made use of as the basis of discussion of these treaties, not because they were in advance of their times, but because his "points" were framed in a spirit of unscientific altruism, and as such politically ineffectual and economically worthless. In their efforts to arrive at a "world-wide political and territorial adjustment," the victorious Powers, great and small alike, in every instance, made mental reservations in regard to their own particular obligations for the purpose of evasion. The rigid fulfilment of obligations without such reservations had in the past given to politics the symmetry of principle. Now expediency rather than principle dictated the policy outlined. The facts of the case are, that no sound political principle had survived the war.

III

It is not our purpose here to note outward manifestations, but rather to lay bare origins and causes, and to show the historical filiation of the decay of politics. In so doing, we discover that the failure of the treaties of 1919 is due to the fact that the transition from a political to an economic status involves a fundamental change, not only in motive and method, but in mental make-up. It involves a change even greater than that which took place in the transition from the feudal to the political organization of the social

¹ Cf. President Wilson's Mount Vernon address of July 4, 1918. "The settlement of every question whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, shall be made upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its exterior influence or mastery."

order. Without setting forth in detail many contributing factors which may be adduced as proofs, nor taking account of the long period of time required to produce social changes in which centuries must be reckoned as mere decades, the problem may be stated as follows : Politics retained, though it vastly modified the conception of a divine will, which, in an economic technique, finds no place. In feudal society the highest value is " God's will " ; in political society " man's will " replaces it without materially altering its attributes. But from an economic standpoint, problems connected with volition, problems of freedom, or of bondage in a political sense, do not arise.

The problems of economics are frankly physical, and are not like those of religion or politics, metaphysical. This requires a revision of the current conception of the term, materialism. It requires the denial of the old and hackneyed " mind over matter " idea. It requires what scientific research is intent upon proving, that mind and matter are but two facets of the same substance. It arouses fresh interest in the truth of the old Heraclitan hypothesis, that life must be conceived as an eternal becoming, that all forms of society, and all institutions are part of a process in continuous flux and change. It demands the formulation of the conviction that there is no final and fixed limit, but that all is relative. This doctrine of relativity was to find its first practical confirmation in that branch of science, astronomy, in which the nearest approach to fixity had been hitherto deemed mathematically ascertainable. But whatever the angle of approach, we may note that the technique of science in this new sense, left no room for any concept of a will. It removed, once and for all, the hypothesis of an agency, and in its latest development ever substitutes the more valid notion of " types," for the conception of " stages " growing out of each other in an evolutionary sense.

Science is merely a method of organizing facts so that they may be more easily used ; it is a classification. Here the question of technique enters. Technique is the method of making use of facts so classified in the most

economical fashion. It is the co-ordinating agency of theory and practice. For illustration from the point of view of this survey, it may be cited that a geocentric universe, and the scientific concepts devolving from this hypothesis of a literal acceptance of Biblical cosmogony, find expression in a feudal organization of society, fixed and immobile, with a hierarchical system leading from serf to God. A heliocentric universe and the implications of the scientific method of the Copernican hypothesis, find their counterpart in the rationalism of Descartes and the egoism of Hobbes, and are illustrated in the political organization of society in which man is conceived as the lord of creation, a free agent. In both of these social systems the animating force was the will, first divine, then human. Now in turn the scientific concepts formulated in the theory of evolution, of non-Euclidean geometry, and the elaboration of pure mathematics and qualitative physics culminating in the theory of relativity, requires a new formula as well as a new form of social organization which we term economic, to denote thereby that "the will" can have no share therein.

IV

History shows the futility of seeking to retain a technique of social organization suited to scientific concepts that have proved inadequate. It is evident that no one who claims to be in accord with the temper of the times, would to-day advocate a return to handicraft or home industry, or even to the unregulated factory system of a half century ago, but all join in demanding the perfection and development of the technique of industry, which will push forward the suggestions of Taylorism and improve the methods of efficiency as yet only partly exploited. In the same way politics offers a technique of social adjustment suited to a social order that is fast disappearing. Political methods are as much anachronisms when compared with the scientific, economic technique of the present age, as theological methods appeared to be to the men of the seventeenth century.

Politics belongs to an age of metaphysical contemplation, and as such is only one step removed from theology as affording a viable, social technique. The will is the immanent basis of politics as it was of religion. The chief characteristic of the will in its social aspects is that it neglects life in the present and urges a constant seeking after a future goal. It projects life into the future, scans the future, in a sense is believed to lead to the mastery of the future. The divine will extends the goal to a life beyond the grave ; the human will, while leaving this concept intact, makes man the arbiter of his own destiny.

In the later stages of its development, politics perfected the concept of a general will as its positive contribution, to solving social problems by offering the State as the supreme power—the immortal God. But the human will had to rely on reason to support it. Reason offered a plan of action in confronting the problems of social life in which the future remained the great unknown. Here the will came to the rescue. It forshortened the future, and thereby overshadowed the present. In the process, it discovered what gave to volition its dynamic power, a sequence between the past and the future, and that the future might be made to obey the dictates of the carefully matured plan of the individual in the present ; this plan was the expression of his will, and the process was called progress. Progress was, as we have seen, the fruit of the technique of politics. It was the discovery of the will and a volitional attitude towards the universe. It was held to be a march towards perfection. It led to the uncovering of mechanical method which became the ground of the new, scientific method of the later age.

Such are, in brief review, some of the elements of the technique of the political age, which developed in the realm of politics, constitutional government and the modern State system. Both show the direct influence of the mechanical view of the universe which a Spinoza made use of to establish an *Ethica, more geometrica demonstrata*, and the framers of the Constitution of

the United States, used in devising the elaborate system of mechanical devices, of checks and balances.

The technique of the political age postulated the control of matter by mind, and though chiefly concerned with satisfying ever-increasing, material wants, remained under the influence of vague metaphysical concepts such as justice, happiness, the greatest good, natural laws and natural rights. But the aim of the life process is to solve, not metaphysical but practical problems, to formulate a working system that may perform this function most economically. The intellectual processes, in general, all tend to this one end, the mastery of the material universe. Will and imagination, the natural aids of reason, are but tools in that process. It would be poor economy, given the present development of scientific technique, to make use of methods in industry that have become obsolete. This is, however, constantly being done in dealing with problems relating to social conditions. The fear in the heart of the average man, when confronted with the problem of adopting a new technique of social organization, is one of the strange anomalies of the age. Even in the minds of the more enlightened, physical science and economics are held to belong to a lower, less sublime sphere than philosophy or politics.

It is inadequate to seek to set up a distinction between philosophy¹ and science as different functions of the mind, the former theoretical, the latter practical, as Croce has so skilfully done. The fact that a separation exists cannot be doubted. The difference is one of method. This may serve to illustrate respectively the difference between the technique of a political and of an economic age, and should not be limited to differentiate theory from practice.

In our view, both theory and practice must, to be in accord with the ruling temper of the times, be scien-

¹ It is not without interest to note that it has been the ideal of many political theorists to have the State ruled over by philosophers, in the same way an industrial social order may be expected to demand the rule of efficiency experts or industrial engineers. As the former ideal was never realized, so the latter will probably not be possible, as government, even in a scientific age, requires broader qualities than those with which the specialist may be expected to be endowed.

tific. An historical view-point is required. We have outgrown philosophical methods suited to the needs of political society, as the latter outgrew the theological methods suited to the needs of the feudal age. In brief, thought has entered upon the stage of the scientific concept. Let it not be supposed that we have here a positivist view of science in a Comtian or other rigidly bound sense of the term, but we merely wish to denote the emergence of a new type of approach to the problems of the life process in accordance with the spirit of the age which, for the first time offers a valid, economic technique as the groundwork of the social organization. This might be demonstrated at great length.

It is an error of those supporting an economic interpretation of history, as it is called, to claim to be able to discover economic causes as everywhere operative in the past; as grave an error as it is for others, holding orthodox views of history, to disregard the fact that economic factors are rapidly becoming, if they have not already become, everywhere operative. Seen in the light of a broad and truly scientific interpretation of history, we may discover the successive rise of various types of economy in the West, in which all but that of the latest age may be held subservient to and moulded by other and stronger social factors.

V

If we examine the various phases¹ of the changes

¹ N. S. B. Gras in *An Introduction to Economic History* (1923), outlines the following five stages of European economy:

1. Collectional economy—"Supplied all their needs by appropriating what nature had provided in the immediate district.
2. Cultural, nomadic economy—"Distinguished by a combination of these practices, continuing to collect, roaming about and cultivating systematically, a large part of the things which they needed.
3. Settled village economy (the first historic period)—"Residence in one spot, continued from season to season, and is ostensibly permanent from year to year when no change is contemplated, or is part of the regular order of events."
4. Town economy—"The organization of many villages, and one town so as to constitute a single economic unit."
5. Metropolitan economy—"The organization of producers and consumers mutually dependent for goods and services."

in social organization, we will find that village economy belongs to the feudal system of organization in which the primitive methods of science are reflected in the subservience to a theistic cosmogony, where economics, in a scientific sense, plays no part, and politics only a very subservient one. In town economy, we have a new type rather than stage of economic development, and we may discover all of the elements needed for the growth of political technique, in which the influence of economics is growing important, but remains subservient to politics, while theology is relegated to a sphere of æsthetic values. Town economy is essentially the basis of the organization of national States with a capital city, constituting a single unit, in which specialization of manufacture has not yet taken the place of trade. We then reach the type of metropolitan economy which may be taken to characterize the coming social arrangements in which politics and the politically organized State are displaced as focal factors of social life by the growth of a new economy. Here the new technique of industrialism supersedes the technique of politics and the national State system based on town economy.

It is not a question as to whether or not the workshop will displace government, in its political sense, which is the confident expectation of the syndicalists. It is still less a question of seeking to introduce political methods in industry, by giving us an industrial democracy and democratic control of government in industry in the political sense of the term.¹ Both of these views show a misinterpretation of the function of the new economic technique, and of the rôle of science in modern life. The problem goes far deeper; its solution requires a complete change of view-point, a

¹ A typical expression of this view is to be found in A. Zimmer's *Nationality and Government*, cf. chap. "The Control of Industry."—"The problem of management, what I would call the constitutional problem in industry, the question as to how the industrial process shall be controlled, is already, and is likely to continue, the burning question in industrial policy." The dangers of infecting modern industry, which is developing a scientific, economic technique (in spite of the shortcoming of the methods of distribution of "profits") with the taint of politics, are patent to all enlightened observers of industrial conditions.

revision of standards. It is a much closer approach to probability to infer that the methods of efficiency, which made possible the growth of industrialism, will, when applied to problems of social life, lead to the complete transformation of social arrangements.

As the pride and prejudices of one generation become ridiculous in the next, as the fashions of a decade reveal the kaleidoscopic adaptibility of human beings to vary their outward form, so in spite of the tenacity of habits and customs, in spite of our so-called instinctive traditionalism, such a revision, within a brief space of time, is not impossible. It is poor economy, given the present scientific development, to make use of methods that have become antiquated. As an historical view-point is replacing philosophy, it may be expected to offer what may be tentatively called a materialist moral code.

Materialism, as here used, is not a seeking after a mechanical explanation of physical phenomena, it does not imply that in the conflict between science and what are termed the highest human aspirations, peace may only be attained when the transient character of all that is fictitious in art, religion and philosophy is recognized;¹ but on the contrary, that outside the realm of science and the reality that it offers, fiction must remain the rule. Materialism thus offers a scientific interpretation of the universe. Here the will, whether as the will to believe, the will to power, or the will to live, which in a political age superseded the will of God of a theological system, are dispensed with,² as unmeaning fictions. We would not deny the value of these fictions to politics and theology in periods of a different type of economy from that of the new epoch, but we must deny their being anything more than fictions, in that they offer a means of solving social problems by assuming what would now appear untenable, the superiority of mind over matter, and the rigid cosmology that this implies.

No one who surveys the giant strides of industrial

¹ Cf. Lange, *History of Materialism*, vol. ii, p. 596.

² Cf. p. 284 *et seq.*

organization, during the past fifty years, the complex mechanism of credit and exchange, of transportation and communication, will fail to perceive that they are the interrelated parts of a new social technique, based on the tacit acceptance of what we would term a materialist moral code. The historian of the future will be able with much precision to point to the advance made in our day in all branches of social organization, and of a social life in general, as directly traceable to the same source.

The increase of wealth and of population, of well-being and the normal duration of life ; the safeguarding of health and of public welfare, are coefficients of the economic efficiency which is transforming the character of social life.

CONCLUSIONS

I

THE economy of the new age is bursting the bonds of the political organization of society, and demands a new scheme of social arrangements. The new psychological attitude reveals that politics can no longer offer an adequate channel of approach. Modern politics is based on a social organization in which town economy was the prevailing type, the middle-class view-point the accepted standard, where any enfranchised man in the community might rightfully aspire, and be able to represent adequately the interests of his community without requiring special knowledge or special training. But this is admittedly no longer the case. Not only is the middle-class view-point being discarded, but the demand for special knowledge is daily increasing with the result that the best that the political State can devise, is for government to extend its functions, first in one direction, then in another, in order to meet the emergencies of the situation as they may arise. This renders effective control, in a political sense of the term, impossible.

Thus we see that the State instead of assuming far-seeing direction and leadership, initiative and a constructive plan of action which good government implies—and by “good” we mean no more than that suited to the needs of the times—is constantly being harassed, constantly giving ground before the organized assault of those determined to bring about changes in the existing order.

The rise of the great associations of trade unions, such as the C.G.T. in France, the Triple Alliance of mine, railway and transport workers' unions in England,

or the American Federation of Labour and the Labour Leagues of Australia ; of defensive associations of employers, and industrial combinations, such as the International Harvester Company, the United States Steel Corporation, or the Stinnes Konzern, present phenomena of singular, historical importance. It is an error to suppose, as is so often done, that the trade unions, employers' associations and industrial combinations, are to be looked upon as integral parts of the modern State. They are on the contrary, negations of the State, politically conceived, and are powerful agencies working for the disintegration of politics.

While, on the one side, the trade union organizations with their enormous membership have the power of the ballot, they have the far greater weapon of the strike. Here it is no longer a question of rights that are at stake ; but the life of the State itself may be paralyzed by the concerted action of a few trade union leaders against which the mechanism of politics, in its accepted sense, is powerless to act. On the other side, capital may mobilize the military power of the State in its defence, and make use of injunctions, supported by the full force of the law. But in doing so, the confidence of the vast majority of the working classes, in the State system, is by degrees undermined. Politics and political methods come to be looked upon by the latter with suspicion as weapons to be used to keep the workers in subjection. The efforts made to gain political control of the State by the workers through regular parliamentary channels, has, in certain instances, met with much success, and the influence of labour parties as political units to secure legal enactment to improve working conditions, has been attended with good results. But these are mere palliatives. The State remains the enemy. It is only dimly realized that the political system that supports it, rests on the continued good-will of the working classes. Tradition and the habit of obedience here play their part, though the advocates of revolution are always at hand to preach and teach methods of violence.

The parties in the new social order thus appear as

capital and labour, which here replace the older political parties. Capital is represented as the conservative party, made up of those who desire the continuance of the present status of property and its attendant system of government ; labour as the radicals who desire the development of a system which will insure for them an adequate distribution of the wealth which they produce. But neither capital nor labour are in fact interested in politics in the sense of the enforcement of abstract rights of the individual or the will of the majority. They are both concerned solely with questions of industrial efficiency, of organization and management, of wages and profits. Political ethics, the middle class moral code of right and wrong in business and elsewhere, a narrow, limited, national view-point have in themselves little influence in the councils of either capital or labour. The problems arising from the new functional economy are of greater importance. Manufacture for exchange, migratory populations and increasing delocalization, mobility of capital and easy access to places of production, emphasis on social solidarity rather than individual privilege, on material advantages and not on legal rights are some of the factors of the new industrialism. These cannot be adjusted by political methods belonging to the older geographical type of a society, rooted to one spot where a national boundary seemed a wide horizon, hoarding and accumulating, high virtues, individual, exclusiveness a mark of distinction, and the vast majority of the population, producers of wealth, lived from hand to mouth, often in direst misery as hired labour.

II

The demand for social reorganization has manifested itself in all spheres of human society. With the growth of capitalism, the individual labourer was no longer in a position of isolation and subservience. As a result of efficient organization and active propaganda, a new sense of class-consciousness was awakened among the workers which was primarily social and not political,

though many leaders of the labour movement sought to exploit it for political advantage.

Industry can no longer be considered a field of battle between capital and labour. Though in some instances, the individual capitalist may look upon himself as a general of armies of coined wealth, pitted against the armies of workers, in the main this is no longer the case. There is a growing feeling of social solidarity. Both capital and labour have become impersonal,—the two great industrial forces of more or less equal strength, working towards a common goal. In the same way, poverty is no longer left at that, as a puzzle, a nuisance, or a necessary evil. It is no longer dealt with by individual effort and pompous, kind-hearted interest in the suffering of the poor which identified the philanthropic methods of the last century. The personal element in the relations between master and man, between rich and poor, which made for a galling sense of social inferiority among the recipients of wages as well as of public assistance, is being replaced by impersonal methods based on a careful and sometimes scientific analysis of prevailing conditions. The idea of the infallibility of the law of the struggle for survival, and that a man can survive only by getting the better of his neighbour, is as obsolete as Mill's notorious "wage fund." In brief, the competitive ideal, based on an individualist view of life and political methods, is being supplanted by a co-operative ideal which characterizes the new industrialism. It is this corporate purpose which, as we have seen, is the significant factor.

The change from individualist to social standards is arduous. It implies nothing less than the abandonment of a political view-point, of politics in all of its accepted forms as a valid technique of social adjustment. The foundations of politics are not to be sought in the social order, but in the self-developed individual. This self-development has, on the one side, reached a stage above which it cannot for the present rise; on the other, the vast majority now admitted to a share in political affairs, are not capable of the self-development which

politics demands. Economic problems of greater urgency require their attention.

A complete revision of social standards is necessary ; a vaster social perspective is required. The individual, in a middle class sense of the term, if he has emerged above his fellows, must be prepared to sink himself in the mass, to return to the group out of which he sprang. He must be prepared to sacrifice his ethical values as an individual, and his metaphysical concepts of liberty, for new economic values and material advantages. He must be prepared to seek a wider, spiritual horizon in materialism by the contribution of his intellectual attainments to the development of a materialist moral code. It must be admitted with all frankness that the middle class has in the new order no economic and less social value.

Half measures are destined to fail. The unrest that prevails is not due to the fact that the proletariat has become politically conscious, but that it has become socially conscious. Political liberty and equality are looked upon as of no value when compared with economic liberty, or social equality. The slogans of politics offer a tissue of unrealities which, from a materialist standpoint, have no concrete or tangible *raison d'être*. The current tendency to approach industrialism as though it were a political movement is fraught with extreme danger. The emphasis on social as distinguished from political factors, shows clearly that industrialism differs from all previous programmes.

Most of the labour leaders are as much in the dark as the capitalists or middle class politicians, as to the nature of the new orientation. To all concerned, it seems the easiest way out for the time being, to adapt political methods to industrial needs. From the side of labour, we have plans for economic world federation, and elaborate, economic constitutions, modelled, for the most part, on the old worn-out political pattern and thought out in terms of an individualist organization of society to which new labels are affixed. In most instances, it is assumed that a capitalist class of robbers and social parasites exists which must be swept out of

existence. It is not realized that this so-called capitalist class has already grown socially impersonal, and from an industrial standpoint is as integral a part of the new society as labour itself. The capitalists are in point of fact carrying on the work of the destruction of the middle class organization of society as dexterously and efficiently as the workers themselves. They may be compared to the *condottieri* of the fifteenth century. As at the close of the Middle Ages, the small and enfeebled city republics of the Italian peninsula hired their fighting men to protect them, so to-day, the capitalists are engaged by the middle class to make best use of its accumulated savings, to protect its members who have in a large measure become economically worthless, from being immediately submerged by the proletariat and crushed by the new economy, which they do not understand, and in which they have no proper place.

Whitley reports, or a search after a true law of wages, profit-sharing schemes or plans for conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes, which occupy so much of middle class energy, are only temporary measures. The real reason why industrialism has not developed more rapidly is that both capital and labour are still largely under the domination of the ideals of politics. Few realize that the tendency to judge industrial and social problems by the norm of political standards, leads into an impasse from which there is no escape.

III

As long as there were sound political institutions to be made use of, and the limits of political freedom and equality had not been attained, as long as politics remained a means of spreading cultural ideas, it may have been advisable to make use of the political mechanism to achieve economic ends. But with the rise of a political party that coincided with a social class, such as was the case with the labour and socialist parties, the discipline that they imposed on their members, and the compulsive elements this tended

to introduce, while outwardly still retaining the form of politics, had in reality already gone far beyond the scope of politics which finds its sole support in the exclusive interpretation it gives to individualism.¹

What becomes of government by discussion and compromise, the basis of the constitutional system, under such conditions, it revealed in the rapid decline of parliamentary authority, directly traceable to this source. Those compulsive tendencies which in politics soon invaded all parties and became known as party loyalty and discipline to hide their true significance, gradually replaced the ideas of freedom and individual rights and privileges upon which the exercise of political functions depends. The position of the individual was by degrees encroached upon, his special privileges were disregarded, when not in accord with the new economic needs of the community. Politics was, step by step, giving way to industrialism.

In the process the fortunes of capital and labour are linked together. While labour is making use of politics to further its ends, compelling by legal enactment the enforcement of its current demands, and by gradually expropriating the property-owning class, is transforming the social order, capital has long since realized that politics can be corrupted to serve its needs and that democracy, as the rule of the many, is an empty phrase,² —a sign of the fast-ebbing vitality and social virtue of the middle class which capitalism purports to serve, but which it will soon seek to master.

Between the two, the middle class, the repository of the integrity of politics as well as of the culture of

¹ The compulsory arbitration of industrial disputes such as was first tried out in Australia is avowedly a method of bringing about a more equal distribution of wealth, and thus attacks the cardinal tenet of political society, private property. All compulsive enactments of this nature must be looked upon as subversive of the political control of the State, and aim at a transformation of the social order along lines of industrialism. Whether the methods used are those of the syndicalists, who prefer violent measures, or those of a parliamentary labour party, who seek to bring about changes without a violent dislocation of the social fabric, the end sought is identical.

² Even Lord Bryce in his apologia of democracy, is led to declare, after a painstaking inquiry: "Thus free government cannot but be, and has in reality always been an oligarchy within a democracy."—*Modern Democracies*, vol. ii, p. 603.

the political age, the class that furnished the faithful public servants, the staunch party politicians, the students of politics, the theorists of political economy, the propagandists of nationalism, and the heirophants of capitalism are being crowded out. The plodding virtues of respectability of this class so highly prized, are rapidly becoming curiosities of historical interest to a few specialists. Yet the organization of the social order, based on this integrity and these virtues, still persists. The passing of the middle class is the healthiest symptom of the possibility of peaceable readjustment of social problems in the near future. It is no mere phrase that the middle class is the backbone of the political State system. Until this class is scattered and disappears, no gradual and peaceable growth of new arrangements is possible. This is the more difficult in view of the fact that the middle class has everywhere identified itself with the State, has divested itself of class consciousness and assumed a national view-point. Nationalism still appears as a virile, constructive force, which has been handed on to peoples who have no conception of individualism or the political doctrines it implies, but to whom nationalism makes a direct emotional, quasi-religious appeal.

IV

It must not be forgotten that the middle class gained its first successes as the result of revolutionary movements. The religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were middle class revolutions, as were the subsequent purely political American and French Revolutions of the eighteenth century. As a result of these revolutions, the middle class gave to the world religious toleration and offered a doctrine of political liberty and equality as the natural outgrowth of this toleration. On the other hand, it devised the competitive system which led to a form of industrial slavery not equalled since the days of Rome. Withal its members present a picture, at the highest stage of development which we may take as the middle of the

nineteenth century, of dignity, honesty and uprightness, in accordance with their lights. Politics was their natural standard, the Nation-State their creation.

The middle class raised work and industry from a position of subservience to that of high social importance. They dignified labour in the sense of production, but they knew nothing about how to handle questions of distribution. They had full sympathy with the man who saves, but little understanding of the man who labours. They gave to labour an individualist interpretation, in accordance with their philosophy of exclusive egoism and self-interest, which labour in the past had never possessed. In so doing, they isolated the individual and burdened him with a load of work, that as time went on, became intolerable. They apparently never realized that work is fundamentally co-operative, a social function to be performed in part by all.

The middle class devised the division of labour to increase production, but failed to arrive at any adequate conception of distribution. The best they could do was to speed up production in order to meet competition. The idea that all wealth is the product of labour was readily admitted, yet it was denied that the labourer himself was anything more than a commodity, a part of the wealth-producing mechanism. But above all, the middle class saddled the world with ideas of parsimony and thrift, and taught the magic of money, that, "Money is of the prolific, germinating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more and so on. . . . The more there is of it, the more it produces every turning, so that the profits rise quicker and quicker. . . ."

"Get what you can, and what you get hold,
Tis the stone that will turn your lead into gold." :

It is not to be wondered at that when by organization the workers were able to assert their combined strength, they should demand not merely a share of this wealth,

: Cf. Benjamin Franklin, "Advice to Young Tradesmen," written Anno 1748.—*Memoirs*, vol. v, pp. 105-106.

but rally to the cry of the abolition of private property,¹ and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

V

Simple ideas are the most revolutionary. The abolition of private property and the exploitation of man by man, coupled with that ambiguous phrase the dictatorship of the proletariat, are the popular watchwords of the present social revolutionary movement. As long as the political organization of society remains intact, as long as politics remains the pivotal agency of the social order, these terms are destined to remain the rallying cry of the revolutionists. But if the pivotal factors of the social order are replaced by new factors, what is now called private property, and the exploitation of man by man, may be expected to have in some altered form their counterpart; just as the exploitation of man under the rule of the Church and feudal property rights were abolished and replaced by what is now called the exploitation of man by man, and private property. In other words, human nature, or better, the psycho-physical factors of the life process are not to be altered by changes of social organization.

To-day when the social order is confronted by a new revolution, we find for the first time, that the greatest emphasis is placed on purely economic factors. The fact that these play such a preponderant part is due to the prestige conferred upon industry by the middle class, the magical qualities with which wealth was endowed, and above all the high perfection that economic technique has attained. In comparison, political methods seem archaic and wasteful. It is not to be wondered at that in the belief of benefitting mankind in general, it should be sought to adapt this technique to the major problems of social life, and supplant the methods of politics and the egoism of its moral code by the scientific methods of economics and a materialist moral code.

In the first phases of the struggle, undue emphasis is being placed on purely physical factors as though

the whole process were concerned solely with these factors. But the object in view is to replace the exclusive egoism of political society—and politics, be it remembered, can exist on no other basis—by a collective, or as we say, social view-point. It is sought to remove the individual from his position of isolation, to make him feel that he is part and parcel of the social order to which he belongs. In political society, the individual is constantly confronted with a series of choices with which he is unable and unequipped to deal. In the new economy, it is assumed that he is part of the social order, and belongs to it, and not it to him ; it is not a question of choice.

The difficulty of abandoning individualist standards owing to the advantages that individualism appears to confer, is self-evident. From the standpoint of history, we may see in the change from feudal to political organization, and from political to industrial standards, a gradual tendency to eliminate the idea of the will and the emphasis that volition places upon the future. As life lived and guided by an other worldly way of thinking was replaced by a worldly way of thinking, a world of to-morrow, we now approach a step nearer to the living of life in the present, freed from the incubus of futurity. This is the high gift which the new technique and the increased social efficiency of industrialism has to offer.

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